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Tsar Nicholas XI of Russia abdicated on March 15, 
1917. For several months, Russian politics was in a 
state of flux until Vladimir Ilych Lenin led the Bolsheviks 
to power in November and established the first government 
based upon Marxist Socialism.
America's initial reaction to the abdication was 
one of extreme pleasure as the Americans expected the 
Russians to establish a government similar to their own.
In addition, most Americans interpreted the events in Russia 
as beneficial to the Allied cause. Less than a month after 
the abdication, however, the united States entered World 
War I, and it soon became apparent that political unrest 
in Russia might weaken her ability to continue as a belli­
gerent. President Wilson sent a Special Diplomatic Mission, 
to Russia in the summer of 1917. The nine-man Mission, 
headed by former Secretary of State Eliliu Soot, was a 
good-will mission and a fact-finding group whose work was 
to determine Russia's material and financial needs and to 
assess the political and military stability of the new 
government. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine 
the work of the Root Mission and to evaluate its accomplish­
ments .
iv
in the preparation of this work, many unpublished 
sources were used. The state Department Records in the 
National Archives contain hundreds of items, including 
reports from each member as well as a detailed log of the 
trip. The private papers of seven of the men furnished 
significant material and the detailed diaries of three of 
the members were utilized. These and other sources were 
examined in an attempt to present an accurate account of 
the Root Mission and its effect on American policy.
v
PREFACE
News of the March, 1917, revolution in Russia ar­
rived in the united States at approximately the same time 
that president Woodrow Wilson decided to enter World War
I. Most Americans reacted favorably to the events in 
Russia and were especially pleased with initial reports 
that the provisional Government would probably be based 
upon a political ideology similar to that of the United 
States. The overthrow of the Tsar was timely in that 
Americans could now more realistically accept World War 
I as a struggle between the forces of democracy and autoc­
racy. Americans soon began sending messages to congratu­
late and encourage the new Russian government. And many 
began to suggest that the United States send a special 
fact-finding Mission to Russia.
President Wilson accepted the idea, envisioning 
the Mission as an elaborate goodwill venture as well as 
a way to observe at first-hand Russia's military needs. 
This Mission, headed by former Secretary of State Elihu 
Root, was to be Wilson's most ambitious attempt to deal 
with revolutionary conditions in Russia. It departed from 
Washington in May, 1917, and returned in August of that 
year. While in Russia, Mission members encountered events
vi
which were evolving so rapidly that even the most expe­
rienced observers of the Russian political scene understood 
and interpreted them with difficulty, if at all.
When Elihu Root departed for Russia, American 
public opinion, as reflected by journalists, was that 
the aged diplomat could effectively encourage political 
stability in Russia and persuade that nation to continue 
its role as an effective ally in World War I. Historians, 
however, view the Root Mission as a dismal failure. Some 
have gone so far as to suggest that both Allied and 
American diplomacy during the period in which the Pro­
visional Government ostensibly was in control in Russia 
was based upon the false premise that the Russian government 
could continue the war while consolidating its political 
strength. The Root Mission is a prime example of diplomacy 
based upon this premise.
Historical judgment of the worthlessness of the 
Root Mission is far more accurate than was contemporary 
opinion of its value. Most historians, however, have 
reached this conclusion without a thorough study of the 
Mission's activities in Russia. I have sought to examine 
in detail the Root Mission in an effort to determine why it 
was sent, what was expected of it, what it accomplished 
while in Russia, and what effect, if any, this Mission had 
on United States-Russian relations during this critical
vii
period.
I did my research for this study almost entirely 
in primary sources, many of which have never been fully 
utilized before. I undertook this work with the realiza­
tion that the Root Mission, in all probability, contrib­
uted very little toward establishing a significant Russian 
policy by the united States Government. I pursued it, 
however, with the conviction that in historical research 
and writing it is as valid to study policies and experi­
ments which have failed as to peruse those which have had 




On March 15, 1917,^* Tsar Nicholas II of Russia abdi­
cated the throne from which his family has reigned for more 
than three hundred years. This event followed a brief 
period of rioting in the Russian capital of Petrograd but, 
nevertheless, came as a surprise to almost everyone. The 
causes for the Tsar's overthrow and subsequent abdication 
were complex and, as is the case with most events of such 
magnitude, resulted from many factors.
The underlying causes of the collapse of absolutism 
in Russia had roots deep in the nineteenth century, but the 
event which precipitated it in 1917 was Russia's involve­
ment in World War I. This first total war simply placed 
unbearable strains on an already deeply riven (some would 
say disintegrating) society. The tsarist government enjoyed 
a brief period of popularity at the beginning of the war. 
Popular support declined, however, as the war began to go
^Throughout this work all dates cited will be 
according to the Gregorian calendar. The Gregorian calen­
dar was thirteen days ahead v ? the Julian calendar which 
remained in use in Russia until February 14, 1918, Thus, 
the term "February and October" Revolutions refers to 
events which occurred in March and November according to 
the Gregorian calendar.
2
against the Russians early in 1915. on July 1, 1915, a 
combined Austro-German offensive wiped out most of the 
Russian gains of the previous year. From that point on, 
the military outlook was bleak and, with the exception of 
a few brief reversals, the war continued to go against the 
Russians.2
Because of the inability of Nicholas and his bureau­
crats to mobilize efficiently Russia's resources for the 
war, living standards for millions of Russian citizens 
quickly plummeted. The Russian peasantry, source of the 
bulk of the manpower for the Army, found it Increasingly 
difficult to obtain consumer goods, industrial workers, 
whose wage increases failed to keep pace with inflation, 
were periodically confronted with bread shortages in the 
cities. As early as 1915, small numbers of industrial 
workers began to strike in protest against these deplorable 
conditions. These early and isolated strikes did not
3seriously threaten the government.
By the fall of 1916, however, expressions of dis­
satisfaction with the situation in Russia arose from all 
segments of the political- spectrum. The inefficiency of 
the government coupled with the incredible spectacle of
2Williara Henry Chamberlin,. The Russian Revolution 
1917-1921 (New Yorks The Macmillan Company, 1935), I,
66-70.
3Ibid., 66-67.
Rasputin, an ignorant, dirty peasant "holy man," manipu­
lating the Empress and through her the weak-willed Tsar, 
had destroyed the last vestige of respect for Nicholas' 
regime, indeed, wide popular credence was given to rumors 
that the poor Russian performance in the war was due to 
treason at the highest levels of the government. The 
situation did not improve at all when Rasputin was 
murdered in December, 1916. strikes continued, Duma (lower 
house of the legislature) members were clamoring for respon­
sible government, and, as winter progressed, the shortage 
of food and fuel in the rear areas became acute. And yet, 
not many observers felt a major crisis was imminent, in 
February, 1917, an Inter-Allied conference was held in 
Petrograd, and none of the delegates saw anything to indi­
cate the grave events which were now just around the 
4corner.
During the first week in March, industrial strikes 
began in petrograd. At their height, these strikes involved 
a quarter of a million workers and culminated in the fall 
of the Tsar's government. The two most important causes 
of the strikes were the closing of the huge Putilov Muni­
tions Works and rumored bread shortages in the capital.
4Robert D. Warth, The Allies And The Russian Revo­
lution; From The Fall Of The Monarch To The.peace Of 
Brest-Litovsk TBurham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1954),
19-22.
The Putilov factory was accustomed to labor problems and 
had been plagued with a series of strikes in 1916. on 
March 3, 1917, however, workers in one department of the 
factory demanded a fifty per cent wage increase. When 
their demands were not met, they went out on strike. A 
few days later, the remaining workersrjoined the strike 
and the management closed the plant on March 7. The Putilov 
workers, approximately 30,000 strong, organized street 
demonstrations for wage increases as well as for more bread. 
The demands for more bread resulted from rumors circulating 
throughout Petrograd that a serious flour shortage existed 
and that the bakeries were selling a portion of their flour 
on the black market.5 Tsar Nicholas was assured by A. D. 
Protopopov, Minister of the Interior, that the demonstra­
tions, peaceful in nature, could be handled easily, and 
he left the capital on March 3 for the Russian Military 
Headquarters at Mogilev.
On the day of the Tsar's departure, the demonstra­
tors were joined by thousands of additional workers and a 
bread riot ensued. The riots became much more serious on 
March 9, and many of the guards regiments, whose duty it
gwas to suppress the rioters, joined in the demonstrations.
5George Katkov, Russia 1917; The February Revolu­
tion (New York: Harpers and Row Publishers, 1967), 359-61.
6warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 19-
22.
The riots in Petrograd continued, and the Tsar adjourned 
the Duma for an indefinite period on March 11. That body 
met without his permission on March 12 and from its member­
ship elected a provisional committee to fill the void 
created by the adjournment. Although the committee was 
unable to alter in any way the course of events in Russia, 
it is important because it became the Provisional Govern­
ment following the Tsar's abdication.
By this time, there was virtually no support for 
the Tsar in petrograd, and troops brought in to quell the 
uprisings quickly joined the rioters, on March 12, a group 
of insurgents and radical intellectuals invaded the Taurida 
Palace,7 occupied rooms not being used by the Duma, and 
established the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Deputies. Tsar Nicholas tried to reenter Petrograd on 
March 13 but his train was stopped and rerouted to Pskov 
by troops loyal to the revolution. When the extreme 
gravity of the situation finally penetrated to the incred­
ibly imperceptive monarch, military and political advisers 
convinced him that he should abdicate in favor of his 
twelve-year old son, Alexis, and a regency. For personal 
reasons, however, he decided instead to give up the throne 
to his younger brother, the Grand Duke Michael, on March 18.
7The Taurida Palace was built for Prince Potemkin 
of Taurida by Catherine the Great. In 1917, it became the 
seat of the Provisional Government.
But the Grand Duke, after conversations with Duma repre­
sentatives, decided it would be prudent to refuse the 
Crown. Thus, with less than half-hearted efforts to
preserve it, the monarchy which had dominated Russian
3politics for centuries perished.
An event of such magnitude would be significant in 
the history of any nation. The downfall of the Russian 
monarch, however, transcended purely internal considera­
tions. The Tsar's abdication, coming as it did in the 
midst of Wbrld War I, presented the possibility of a 
Russian withdrawal from the war because, as it turned out, 
this was merely the opening act of a revolutionary drama 
which tore the very fabric of Russian society asunder.
Before the year was over, Lenin and his Bolshevik party 
had seized power in the name of Marxian Socialism —  an 
event of lasting significance in world history. But none 
of this was foretold by the events of March; the immediate 
problem facing Russia seemed to be the creation of a 
government to replace the monarchy.
Overnight, Russia was converted to the most demo­
cratic country in the world. In this new freedom, a plethora 
of political factions appeared.9 The history of political
8Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 92-98.
9When it became apparent that there was little if any 
chance for a return to a monarchy, all those who normally 
supported the Crown disappeared or went into hiding and 
were of no significance during the next few months.
events in the capital between March and November of 1917 
is basically the story of the struggle for power among 
the three most important factions.
The most conservative of these groups were the 
Kadets led by Paul Miliukov, who was a member of both the 
last Duma and of the provisional committee, and who became 
a power in the first provisional Government. Prior to the 
March Revolution, the Kadets were considered a liberal- 
reform party. The swiftly moving events during and after 
March, however, soon relegated them to a position on the 
right of the political spectrum, a result of the extreme 
radicalization of politics within Russia. The Kadets held 
a party conference in early April, 1917, and issued a 
statement advocating the creation of a western-style 
democratic republic. The party also strongly supported 
the war against Germany and upheld the Tsar’s secret 
treaties with the Allied powers. The Kadets felt, however, 
that substantive economic and social change should be 
delayed until a constituent assembly could be held. The 
Kadets dominated the first cabinet of the provisional 
Government but lost control as the Revolution overtook and 
passed their leaders.
In the center of the political spectrum were the 
Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries. These two 
parties furnished the leadership of the early Revolutionary 
movement and controlled the Petrograd Soviet until shortly
before the Bolsheviks seized power in the November Revolu­
tion.1*̂  The Socialist Revolutionaries were the largest 
party in Russia in March, 1917, but were hampered by the 
lack of a comprehensive program. While they recognized the 
trend toward industrialization in Russia, they believed 
that its economic backwardness called for a revolution 
based primarily upon the peasantry. Consequently, they 
championed reforms, especially the confiscation of landed
estates, which would appeal to the peasants.^ The Menshe-
12viks were the largest Marxist party in Russia. They also
believed that the working class in Russia was too small to
revolt successfully. Unlike the Socialist Revolutionaries,
however, they had little ô r no hope that the Russian peasan-
13try would support a revolutionary movement. The domestic 
programs of both parties varied but both advocated the imme­
diate convocation of the Constituent Assembly. Their view 
with regard to the war, however, was more consistent. Unlike 
the Kadets, both were unwilling to support the secret
^Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 359-61.
1LIbid., 39-41.
l2The Bolshevik-Menshevik division has been described 
by one historian as "more temperamental than doctrinal." 
Robert V. Daniels, Red October; The Bolshevik Revolution 
of 1917 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), 20.
^Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 39.
agreements with the Allies. They did not insist upon an 
immediate peace, as did the Bolsheviks at a later date, but 
supported the war only as a defensive measure until a 
general peace could be arranged. This would occur, hope­
fully, when the masses in the belligerent countries forced 
their governments to renounce imperialistic war aims and 
accept a policy of "no annexations, no indemnities."
The last and most radical of the three major 
political groups were the Bolsheviks. At the time of the 
Tsar's abdication, most of the Bolshevik leaders were living 
in exile, and their role in the March Revolution was incon­
sequential. The Bolshevik program was the most extreme of 
any of the revolutionary groups. When Lenin returned, they 
immediately advocated withdrawing support from the Provisional 
Government, confiscation of land by the peasants without 
waiting for the Constituent Assembly to meet, bread for the 
hungry, and later, peace for the war-weary. Even in his 
April Thesis in which Lenin called for turning the im­
perialist war into a revolutionary war, he did not yet 
champion an immediate peace. The Bolsheviks' position
with regard to the war, however, did lead to a separate
14peace with Germany once they gained power.
The actual power in Russia was divided between two 
bodies. This situation is usually referred to by historians
14Ibid., 359-61.
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as "dual power." The provisional Government, as the 
"legitimate" successor to the Tsar and political heir of 
the Duma, was recognized as the legal head of state by 
foreign governments, in the first few weeks, it was 
controlled by the liberal and moderate leadership of the 
Duma. Although the Provisional Government had the respon­
sibility for conducting the government, it never had the 
power to enforce its policies, a fatal weakness.
The other source of power was the Petrograd Soviet 
of Workers1 and Soldiers' Deputies organized by a group of 
revolutionary leaders who called themselves the Provisional 
Executive Committee of the petrograd Workers' Deputies.
They patterned their organization after the St. Petersburg 
Soviet of the Revolution of 1905. At first, the Petrograd 
Soviet was no more than a loose organization of self- 
appointed revolutionaries. Later, a larger and more 
representative group was obtained through the addition 
of delegates from the factories and the petrograd Garrison. 
The growing strength of the Petrograd Soviet was derived 
from the increasingly revolutionary masses of soldiers, 
workers, and peasants. Whereas the Provisional Government 
attempted to exercise power where none existed, the petro­
grad Soviet soon had the power to act as a government but
1 Rdid not choose to do so. Dominated by Mensheviks and
15Katkov, Russia 1917, 359-61.
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Socialist Revolutionaries, the Soviet resolved not to 
participate in the Provisional Government. This decision 
was based on their concept of the Soviet as a class insti­
tution whose task was to protect the toiling masses from a 
"bourgeois" government, the inevitable product of the first, 
or "bourgeois" revolution. The time was not yet ripe for 
the second, or socialist revolution, when they wauld wield 
power. Thus, the socialist parties were completely free 
"to support or to oppose" without any responsibility.
The selection of the members of the Provisional 
Government was done in an irregular fashion. M. V. 
Rodzianko, President of the Duma, and Miliukov determined 
its membership after consulting the Executive Committee 
of the petrograd Soviet on the night of March 13. The 
Executive Committee, however, did not wish to publicize
its role in the selection of the members of the Provisional 
17Government.
Most of the members of the provisional Government 
were extremely conservative for petrograd in March, 1917. 
Prime Minister Prince G. E. Lvov and Foreign Minister 
Miliukov were members of the Kadets. Alexander Guchkov,
IQthe Minister of Navy and war, was an o c t o b r i s t . A
16Ibid., 388.
17Ibid., 393-94.
L8ln 1917, the octobrist party was considered 
extremely conservative.
conservative Ukrainian businessman, M. X. Tereshchenko,
served as the Minister of Finance. The only member of the
Provisional Government associated with a revolutionary
party was Alexander F. Kerensky who became the Minister of
19Justice. Kerensky, a former Trudovik, was now a Socialist 
Revolutionary. Another Socialist, N. S. Chkheidze, a Men­
shevik, had been offered the position of Minister of Labor 
but had refused. His refusal was caused by the Soviet's 
decision that none of its members should serve in the 
Provisional Government. As Deputy Chairman of the Soviet 
of Workers' Deputies, Kerensky should have refused the post 
in the provisional Government. On March 15, however, 
Kerensky addressed the petrograd Soviet and in an emotional 
appeal to the members explained his decision to accept the 
appointment as Minister of Justice. Following his address, 
he was carried by the members of the Soviet to the room of 
the Executive Committee, an action which apparently indi­
cated that he had the support of the Soviet. Although 
Kerensky retained both his Cabinet post and his position 
as Deputy Chairman of the Soviet, it became increasingly 
difficult to do so.20
19Prdor to 1917, the Trudoviks had a fairly large 
following and considered themselves spokesmen for the 
peasants. After March, 1917, roost found their way into 
the ranks of the Socialist Revolutionary party.
^^Katkov, Russia 1917, 388-93.
13
Newspapers informed the inhabitants of Petrograd 
of the membership of the new Provisional Government on the 
morning of March 16. The article appeared as a statement 
by the Duma Executive Committee but was signed by the 
newly appointed ministers of the Provisional Government 
rather than by the members of the Duma committee, included 
in the announcement was an eight-point program Which was 
the provisional Government's expression of faith in the 
Revolution. This program resulted from discussions between 
the Duma committee and the Soviet Executive Committee and 
may be interpreted as the price paid by the Provisional 
Government for acceptance. The eight-point program was 
as follows:
1. Complete amnesty for all political and religious 
offences, including terrorist attempts, military 
mutinies and agrarian disorders;
2. All democratic liberties (of speech, of the press, 
etc.) for all citizens, including the military 
insofar as permitted by technical military con­
siderations;
3. Abolition of all discrimination on grounds of 
class, religion, and race;
4. immediate preparation of elections to the Con­
stituent Assembly;
5. Replacement of the police by a popular militia, 
with elected officers, subordinated to the organs 
of local administration;
6. New elections on the basis of universal franchise 
to all organs of local self-government;
7. Military units which took part in the revolu­
tionary movement not to be disarmed or withdrawn 
from Petrograd;
8. Extension of all civic freedoms to soldiers and 
military personnel, subject only to the maintenance 
of strict military discipline when on duty.21
21Ibid., 395
14
The willingness of the Provisional Government to 
keep the mutinous garrison in Petrograd (point number 
seven) has been seen as the cause of many of its later 
problems. Thus maintained in Petrograd was a large 
military force which turned for leadership to the Soviet 
rather than to the Provisional Government. Years later, 
Miliukov wrote that the decision to include point number 
seven was made at a time when it was unclear whether the
22regular military might attempt to suppress the Revolution.
The petrograd Garrison, however, had already been 
assured of protection in Order Number One issued by the 
Executive Committee of the Soviet on March 14. The Order 
was to apply solely to the petrograd Garrison but was 
soon distributed to the troops at the Front who assumed 
that it also included them. It is usually accepted as 
the most important factor leading to the deterioration of 
the Russian Army as an effective fighting unit. The Order 
stated that all military and naval units should elect 
committees to represent the enlisted men; that each 
company should send a deputy to the petrograd Soviet, the 
decisions of which would determine the political activities 
of military units and take precedence over any orders of 
the Duma Military Commission; that the committees should 
be allowed to keep arms; that the soldiers should enjoy
22Ibid., 396.
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all civil liberties conferred by the Revolution; and that 
all soldiers should be treated with more courtesy and 
equality by their officers.23
That this order was generally obeyed by rank-and- 
file soldiers made it an executive act of overriding 
significance; thus, it was apparent immediately that the 
real power in Russia resided in the Soviets, if they 
chose to grasp it, rather than in the provisional Govern­
ment. On March 22, less than one week after his appoint­
ment as Minister of war, Guchkov admitted as much in a 
letter to General M. V. Alexseev, the Russian chief-of- 
Staff:
The Provisional Government possesses no real power 
and its orders are executed only insofar as this is 
permitted by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' 
Deputies, which holds in its hands the most important 
elements of actual power, such as troops, railroads, 
postal and telegraph service, it is possible to say 
directly that the Provisional Government exists only 
while this is permitted by the Soviet of Workers' 
and Soldiers' Deputies. Especially in the military 
department it is possible now only to issue orders 
which do not basically conflict with the decisions 
of the above mentioned Soviet.
The "dual power" certainly did not bode well for 
the future of liberal-democratic elements. It is there­
fore not surprising that the first Provisional Government 
lasted approximately two months. Too conservative to remain
23Ibid., 372.
24Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 101.
long In favor in Petrograd, the immediate cause of its 
downfall was its position on war aims. Upon assuming the 
position of Foreign Minister, Miliukov notified the Allies 
that the Provisional Government would honor all treaties 
entered into by its predecessors. A few days later, the 
Petrograd Soviet issued a statement to the "peoples of 
the world" in which it expressed strong opposition to a 
war of conquest. In an attempt to reconcile the two 
positions, the Provisional Government published a statement 
on war aims on April 9 which pledged to secure a peace 
based on the "self-determination of peoples." included in 
the statement, however, was a pledge to support "all obliga­
tions assumed toward our allies." Miliukov approved pub­
lication with reluctance and prevented its transmission
25to the Allies as a diplomatic note.
Although the petrograd Soviet viewed the April 9 
statement as a modification of war aims, Miliukov continued 
to insist that Russia receive territorial concessions. His 
position was made public following an interview on April 
22 by a reporter from the Manchester Guardian. in this 
interview, Miliukov's statement that he hoped to gain the 
Dardanelles for Russia indicated that he was as favorable 
toward receiving a share of the spoils as had been any of 
the Tsar's advisors.
25warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 46-
49.
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Three days later, the Soviet reaffirmed its sup­
port of the Provisional Government's April 9 statement on 
war aims and suggested a conference with ’’ranee and England 
for the express purpose of denouncing all territorial claims. 
On that same day, and without Miliukov's knowledge,
Kerensky announced that the Provisional Government might 
inform the Allies of a change in Russian war aims as indi­
cated by the April 9 statement, Miliukov insisted upon and 
received a retraction of Kerensky's announcement.
Kerensky, nevertheless, had forced the issue, and
the Soviet demanded that the Provisional Government send
26the April 9 Manifesto to the Allied capitals. The Cabi­
net sent the Manifesto and an explanatory note to the 
Allied governments on May 1, 1917. The note, however, 
included a pledge to "observe the obligations assumed 
toward our allies" and was, therefore, unacceptable to 
the Soviet. Consequently, on May 3, 1917, thousands of 
soldier3 and workers marched on the Mariinsky Palace to 
demand the resignation of Miliukov. The demonstrations 
continued the following day, and a clash between supporters 
of the Soviet and the Foreign Minister resulted in the 
death of several persons. General Lavr Kornilov, com­
mander of the petrograd District, ordered that troops be 
sent to the Palace Square but was ignored by the soldiers
26Ibid., 54-55.
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who looked to the Soviet for leadership. Order was finally
27restored by the Executive Committee of the Soviet.
The demonstrations of May 3 and 4 made Miliukov's 
position in the government untenable. Leaders of the 
Petrograd Soviet recommended that he be transferred to 
the Ministry of Education. This solution was endorsed by 
a majority of the cabinet as well as the Executive Commit­
tee of the Kadets. Miliukov, however, preferred to withdraw 
from the Ministry. His resignation was submitted on May 16, 
three days after the resignation of Minister of War
Alexander Guchkov, a strong supporter of the Foreign 
28Minister.
On May 18, a new cabinet was formed. This cabinet, 
usually referred to as the First Coalition, represented a 
significant shift of power within the Provisional Govern­
ment. Whereas the first government had included only one 
socialist, six of the sixteen members of the First Coali­
tion were socialists. Prince Lvov remained as Prime Minister, 
but Kerensky, Who had replaced Guchkov as Minister of W&r, 
became the real power in the government. Miliukov was 
replaced as Foreign Minister by Tereshchenko, a change 





Perhaps one of the major changes in the government 
resulted from a new policy of the petrograd Soviet which 
no longer instructed its members to refrain from partici­
pating in the government. Although the Socialist parties 
still did not assume a position of responsibility for 
governmental actions, leading Socialists served the govern- 
ment with their parties' blessings. Victor Chernov, leader 
of the Socialist Revolutionary party, became the new 
Minister of Agriculture and Heracles Tsereteli, a Menshevik, 
was named Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.
The First Coalition, led by Kerensky, became con­
vinced that Russia needed a successful military offensive 
to consolidate Russian opinion and persuade persons of many 
diverse political viewpoints to support the government.
The Allies were pleased by the planned offensive, but the 
decision was made primarily because of domestic considera­
tions. The offensive, which was directed against the 
Austrian Army in Galicia, began on July 1, 1917. It was 
halted after two weeks, and the Russian troops were thrown 
back in such disorder as to imperil the entire Russian line. 
The political repercussions in petrograd caused by the 
military defeat were general disorder and rioting on July 
16 and 17, usually known as the July Days.
The July Days were probably the unorganized actions 
of some of the companies of the petrograd Garrison. Although 
they apparently did not organize the demonstrations, the
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Bolsheviks decided to accept the responsibility for having 
organized them. If there was any theme of unity during the 
July Days, it was that the petrograd Soviet seize control 
of the government. The moderate leadership of the Soviet 
was not prepared to assume such power. On one occasion, 
the angry mobs came close to lynching Chernov, one member 
of the group that they desired as leaders, and might have 
done so had not Trotsky intervened. The July Days demon­
strated that the radicalized masses were repudiating not 
only the Provisional Government but the moderate leadership 
in the Soviet as well.
The frustration, anger, and repudiation of modera­
tion by the masses of soldiers, workers, and peasants are 
easy to understand. Since the Revolution, absolutely 
nothing had been done to satisfy their immediate demands. 
Bread was still scarce, the inflationary spiral continued 
to outrun workers' wages, the land had not been given to 
the peasants, and, worst of all as time progressed, the 
war dragged on with no end in sight. The temper of the 
masses grew more radical and the reaction following the 
July Days turned out to be no more than a temporary pause 
in the swing of politics to the left.
Beginning in the summer of 1917, the masses, 
cautious at first, began to move of themselves. Workers 
seized factories in the cities, in the villages, peasants 
satisfied their age-old land-hunger and seized the estates
of noble landlords, often avenging the humiliations of 
centuries by murdering their former superiors and burning 
their mansions, in the army, peopled largely by peasants 
in soldier's uniforms, news of the "Black partition" 
occurring back home prompted countless millions to "vote 
for peace with the legs," as Lenin put it. Needless to 
say, these mass desertions had a devastating effect on the 
morale of those who stayed in the army. To the common 
Russian in 1917, "law and order" had no positive influence; 
popular spontaneity was producing chaos and anarchy.
Against this tide were swimming Kerensky, the Provisional 
Government, and the moderate leadership in the Soviet—  
therein lay their fatal weakness. As Trotsky remarked, 
the Bolsheviks alone chose to accept the masses as history 
had made them— therein lay their great strength. There­
fore, as might be expected, the Bolshevik setback in the 
wake of the July Days was only temporary.
In an attempt to counteract the growing influence 
of the Bolsheviks, the Provisional Government circulated 
documents which purported to prove that Lenir was in the 
pay of the Germans, Which in fact he was. Gradually, a 
trend which favored the government developed among moderate 
elements and, on July 18, Bolshevik headquarters were 
raided and a few leaders were arrested. Most of the 
leaders, however, went into hiding so as to be able to
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29emerge at a more advantageous time. Following the July 
Days, the Bolsheviks renounced temporarily their slogan 
of "All Power to the Soviets" as they realized that the 
only way they could gain control of the government was 
through violence. Also, as a result of the July Days, a 
new government, known as the Second Coalition, was formed. 
The Cabinet was headed by Kerensky who now assumed Prince 
Lvov's position as well as his power. For the first 
time, the socialists outnumbered the non-Bocialists in 
the cabinet and held eleven of the eighteen posts, but 
they were the "wrong kind" of socialists as far as the 
Russian masses were concerned.
Kerensky realized that he lacked a power base and 
tried to create support for himself and his new government. 
In late August, he called for a meeting of persons who 
represented all political viewpoints, it was held in 
Moscow and was called the Moscow State Conference. All 
political factions were represented except the Bolsheviks 
who boycotted the meeting. Kerensky had intended the con­
ference as a means through which he could gather political 
support, one of the most significant results, however, was 
a heightened interest in and support for the conservative 
General Lavr Kornilov.^
29Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 166-90.
30Warth, The Allies and The Russian Revolution. 119-21.
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In early September occurred the roost conspicuous 
effort by the political right to seize power. This 
incident, known as the Kornilov Affair, grew out of the 
conservatives' belief that Kerensky was unwilling to use 
the force necessary to prevent anarchy and restore order.
In actuality, this meant that the Soviets had to be curbed. 
General Kornilov, who had replaced General Brusilov on 
July 31 after the ill-fated July offensive, did not hide 
his willingness to disperse the Soviets by force, if 
necessary. Thus, he became the rallying point for advocates 
of a restoration of order. Kerensky, well aware of Korni­
lov's increasing strength and the threat this posed to his 
government, removed him as Commander-in-Chief. Kornilov 
then ordered troops to march on Petrograd. Running 
scared, Kerensky called upon all elements to save the 
Revolution from this right-wing threat. Revolutionary 
elements responded vigorously, it was the hastily illegal- 
ized Bolshevik party, however, which emerged as the chief 
benefactor from the "Kornilov Affair" because it was the 
most ardent and vocal defender of the continuation of the 
Revolution in the face of counter-revolutionary forces. 
Consequently, as Kornilov's forces approached the capital, 
they were isolated, worked on by revolutionary agitators, 
and finally melted into the mobs shouting their allegiance 
to the revolution.
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The threat of counter-revolution represented by the 
abortive Kornilov coup was very real to contemporary 
Russians. This menace, beginning with the July Days and 
continuing into September, galvanized mass support for 
the most radical party in Russia and eroded completely the 
increasingly untenable position of any moderates. By 
September, the masses had spoken in no uncertain terms: 
the results were chaos and anarchy. As the most radical 
element, the Bolsheviks rode the wave of mass spontaneity 
to power. Shortly after the Kornilov Affair, Lenin's 
party won a majority in both the Petrograd and Moscow 
Soviets. The old slogan of "All Power to the Soviets" was 
revived and took on an entirely different meaning.
The Third Coalition, already foredoomed to failure,
was formed on October 8 after more than three weeks of
confusion, in order to free himself from any suspicion
of collusion with Kornilov, Kerensky punished all persons
involved. But all of this was futile. Kerensky, like so
many others in Russia in 1917, was being swept away by the
whirlwind of Revolution. Just about a month after it was
formed, the Third Coalition was cast into the garbage-bln
31of history by the Bc-lshevik Revolution.
Thus culminated a frenetic eight months in which 
the Russian government was completely transformed. Prom 
the revolution precipitated by the collapse of tsarism
3Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 192-222.
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issued a regime professedly based on Marxian socialism.
None of this was inevitable, in retrospect# it is fairly
clear why the Provisional Government failed. But at the
time, few perceived these causal relationships and fewer
still understood them.
The Revolution# coming as it did during World war
I# was of particular concern to the Allied nations. For
some time# the Allied camp had felt, erroneously, that
German sympathizers in the Tsar's government had hampered
the Russian war effort. Consequently# the immediate
reaction in the western European press was that the Revolu
tion was due in large measure to Russian liberals who
desired a more vigorous prosecution of the war. Even the
London Times, at the time considered a government organ,
described the political upheaval as a "win the war move- 
32ment." The Allied nations soon began to have second 
thoughts about the positive effect of the Russian Revolu­
tion on the war. Nevertheless, they continued to view 
events in Russia within this narrow frame of reference.
The result was that "immediate national interests became 
the sole guide of ^llied7 politico-diplomatic judgments
32Warth, The Allies and The Russian Revolution,
27.
33and policy decisions."
The March Revolution also had a significant bearing 
on United States-Russian relations. Shortly before the 
nations of Europe became involved in Ttorld w ar lf the rela­
tionship between the united States and Russia had deterio­
rated drastically. As a result of the Russian political 
upheaval in 1905, thousands of Russians fled their homeland, 
and a large number of these political refugees found asylum 
in the United States. Their presence soon led to problems 
between the two nations. The first crisis developed in 1908 
when the Russian embassy in Washington sought to have Janov 
Fouren, a participant in the Revolution of 1905, entradited 
under the provisions of the Russo-American treaty of 1893.
The Ambassador explained that Fouren was accused by the 
Russian Government of non-political crimes, but the American 
public believed otherwise, organized opposition to Fouren's 
extradition developed immediately. The American Jewish 
community, along with Socialist and labor organizations, 
spearheaded the movement, but support came from all parts 
of the nation, in October, 1908, a united States commissioner
33Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New 
Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven: Yale university Press,
1959), 66? The Allies were unable "to believe that anything 
other than the war in Europe could be of real importance." 
George P. Kennan, Russia and the West under henin and 
Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), 17.
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in New York ruled that Pouren was guilty of the charges 
brought against him and would therefore be extradited.
This decision was reversed the following year when another 
commissioner ruled that, although Pouren had committed 
the crimes in question, he had been acting as a revolu­
tionary and was therefore not subject to the provisions 
of the 1893 treaty. Similar cases developed involving 
Christian Rudewitz and Yevgeni Azev, and, as in the case
of Pouren, extradition was refused on the grounds that
34their actions were of a political nature.
The anti-Tsarist feeling expressed in support for 
Pouren and other Russian exiles was soon transferred to 
a movement for the termination of the Russo-American 
commercial treaty of 1832. This long-standing treaty in­
cluded the customary provision for the reciprocal right 
of entry and travel for the citizens of each country.
This clause created no difficulties until the last few 
years of the 19th century. At that time, Russia began to 
curtail the rights of Jewish citizens who, in turn, emi­
grated in large numbers to Western Europe and the united 
States in order to avoid persecution. A problem soon 
arose when these Russian Jews, now naturalized American 
citizens, attempted to return to Russia for business and
^^Thomas Andrew Bailey, America Faces Russia; 
Russlan-American Relations From The Early Tiroes To Our 
Day (Glouchester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), 209-14.
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personal reasons, in some instances, these individuals 
were denied entry into Russia. Even when allowed entry, 
they were frequently subjected to the same restrictions 
as jews of Russian citizenship. To many Americans, non- 
Jewish as well as Jewish, this was a flagrant violation of 
the Treaty of 1832 and an affront to American citizenship. 
The result was that by 1909 Congress had received numerous 
requests for an investigation of this discriminatory treat­
ment of American Jews. These requests, coupled with the 
furor created by the extradition cases, prompted Congress 
to pass a joint resolution asking for renegotiation of 
the 1832 treaty. President Theodore Roosevelt signed the 
Congressional resolution in March, 1909, just before he 
left office.
For two years, the State Department attempted to 
carry out the Congressional request but found the Russian 
Foreign Office in no hurry to negotiate a solution. By 
1911, Congress began to consider resolutions calling for 
the abrogation of the treaty. The impetus for this move­
ment came primarily from the Jewish community but, as in 
the extradition cases, support was received from all seg­
ments of the American public.
in December, 1911, the House of Representatives, 
with only one dissenting vote, passed a resolution which 
bluntly charged the Russians with having violated the 1832 
treaty and requested president Taft to give formal notice
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of termination. The President, after an unsuccessful 
attempt to obtain from Russia a joint statement of abro­
gation, informed the Russians that the treaty would be
35terminated on December 31, 1912.
Although hostile on the surface, Russlan-American
relations did not deteriorate after 1912 as rapidly as
some had expected. In fact, even in the absence of a
commercial treaty, trade between the two countries was
36maintained at its former level. For two years, the 
United States had no ambassador in Russia. As World War 
I approached, President Woodrow Wilson remedied the situa­
tion by the appointment of George t . Marye in 1914. The 
Russian government accepted the new Ambassador with reluc­
tance. By the end of his brief tour in petrograd, however, 
Marye had gained the respect of the Emperor's Court. When 
Marye was withdrawn at his own request in March, 1916, the 
Russian government considered the move an affront. Thus 
was created in Petrograd a climate of suspicion which
Marye1s successor, David R. Francis, found very difficult 
37to overcome.
35Ibid., 216-20.
36George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations, 1917 
20; Russia Leaves The War (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton 
University Press, 1956), I, 33.
3?Marye gave poor health as the reason for his re­
quest to be recalled. Later, he said that "Political 
combinations had arisen at home which affected me and . . . 
I felt impelled to withdraw." Kennan, Russia Leaves The 
War, 34.
Obviously, during the last few years of Tsarist 
Russia's existence, Russo-American relations were in need 
of improvement. The opportunity for rapport came suddenly 
in 1917 with the almost simultaneous events of the March 
Revolution and American entry into World war I.
President Woodrow Wilson, who would play the 
leading role in establishing a policy toward the Russian 
Provisional Government, was an admitted novice in the area 
of international affairs. Shortly before he became presi­
dent, he wrote to a friend, "it would be the irony of fate
if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign 
38affairs." And yet, during the second half of his first
administration and throughout his second, Wilson found it
necessary to devote almost all of his time to an area in
Which he had little experience. Historians agree that
39Wilson was ill-prepared in this field, and one, Who 
found "no evidence that /ffilsor\7 ever studied the details 
of any foreign issue," described the President as "woe­
fully ignorant" of conditions Which brought war to Burope
38Arthur S. Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist," Earl 
Latham (ed.), The Philosophy And Policies of Woodrow Wilson 
(Chicago: The university of Chicago Press, 1958), 147.
■^in preparation for the presidency, Wilson "gave 
little thought to the conduct of foreign affairs." John 
Morton Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of Morality 
(Boston: Little, Brown and company, 1956), 84; "Wilson1s
training as a diplomatist . . . was exclusively theoretical. 
Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist," 147.
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40in 1914.
Prior to assuming the presidency, Wilson had de­
voted most of his attention to domestic problems, in his 
writings about governmental matters he had barely touched 
upon foreign affairs. After the Spanish-American war, 
Wilson began to express more interest in this area, but a 
leading Wilson scholar suggests that this was "superficial 
and reflected more the faddish thought of the time than an 
astute understanding of what was taking place." Even 
during the presidential campaign of 1912, Wilson never
discussed foreign issues unless they were also current
41domestic issues.
Through the years, however, Wilson had studied
various governments and consequently brought with him
to the White House a concept of the nature of government
which he would use as the basis of his foreign policy.
A significant element in Wilson's view of politics and
foreign affairs was his devotion to Christian precepts.
Xn issues of "basic Christian faith," Arthur S. Link
judges that the President "was like a little child, never
42doubting, always believing." He believed that moral
40William L. Langer, "Woodrow Wilson: His Educa­
tion in World Affairs," Earl Latham (ed.). The Philosophy 
And Policies of Woodrow Wilson, 167-68.
41Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist," 151.
42Ibid., 150-51.
laws were applicable to nations as well as to men. That
"God controlled history and used men and nations in the
unfolding of His plan according to His purpose," Wilson
had no doubt. A Wilsonian idea which greatly affected
his attitude toward foreign affairs was his firm belief
that democracy constituted the "most humane and Christian
form of government." The result was that he believed that
any society capable of establishing a government would, if
43given a choice, select democracy. Wilson, therefore, 
visualized the role of the united States as that of fur­
nishing moral leadership in order to assist the less 
fortunate areas of the world in acquiring the desired 
political institutions.
Wilson's tendency to emphasize ideals and princi­
ples in his conduct of foreign affairs ultimately resulted 
in pitfalls. With respect to his attitude toward Russia 
between the March and November Revolutions, Wilson's 
policy was restricted by his belief that a responsible
and enlightened government would ultimately emerge as
44the result of free elections.
Another important aspect of Wilson's conduct of 
foreign affairs was his tendency to reserve for himself 




affairs. For all practical purposes, Wilson was "his own
45Secretary of State." This situation arose from his 
idea that in the area of international relations the 
powers of the president were almost unlimited. As he put 
it clearly in 1907, "The initiative in foreign affairs, 
which the President possesses without any restrictions 
whatever, is virtually the power to control them absolute­
ly."4^ And Wilson applied this principle once he became
47President, even to the exclusion of his own advisors.
Consequently, foreign diplomats frequently by-passed
Secretary of State Robert Lansing and dealt directly with 
48the President. An additional basis for this attitude may 
have been, as Link contends, Wilson's "awareness of his own 
intellectual superiority over most of his associates, and,
45Kennan, Russia Leaves The War, 28.
48Quoted in Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist,1 160.
47Wilson "failed systematically to consult the expert
intelligence in the executive departments and the foreign 
service." Blum, Woodrow Wilson and the Politics of 
Morality, 85; 11/n / o President was ever in more complete 
control of the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs 
than Woodrow Wilson . . .  in the broad outline of his
foreign policy and the principal decisions implementing
it, Wilson was remarkably independent of his advisers."
Robert Endicott Osgood, ideals and Self-interest in - 
America1s Foreign Relations; The Great Transformation Of 
The Twentieth Century (Chicago; The University of Chicago 
Press, 1955), 172.
48Kennan, Russian Leaves The War, 30.
49above all, in his urge to dominate."
Historians who have described Wbodrow Wilson's 
conduct of foreign affairs as "Missionary Diplomacy" have 
generally agreed that Wilson attempted to impose his own 
concepts of morality upon other nations. An excellent 
example of this tendency as well as Wilson's attitude 
toward revolutions appears in the first diplomatic crisis 
which confronted the new president. On February 22, 1913, 
Francisco I. Madero, a Mexican liberal whose government had 
been recognized by president Taft, was executed by the 
revolutionary forces of General victoriana Huerta. Taft 
decided to take no position with respect to the new govern­
ment but would Instead allow Wilson, who would be inaugurated 
within the week, to handle the problem. Wilson refused to 
acknowledge the Huerta regime, believing that to do so 
might encourage government by assassination in other areas 
of Latin America. This strategy of non-recognition, 
announced on March 11, 1913, reversed the historic policy 
whereby the United States had extended diplomatic recogni- 
tion to de facto governments.
in dealing with the Mexican problem, Wilson demon­
strated little respect for or confidence in career diplomats 
and relied increasingly upon "amateur diplomatists and
49Link, "Wilson the Diplomatist," 160.
50Howard Francis Cline, The United States and Mexico 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), 139-62.
special agents." John Lind, one such agent in whom
Wilson placed great trust, was ignorant of Mexican prob-
51lems, spoke no Spanish, and was anti-Catholic as well.
This tendency to rely upon personal agents, most of them 
amateurs in diplomacy, was coming to characterize Wilson's 
efforts in international relations. The Root Mission of 
1917 would be a striking example.
Once Wilson determined his proper course of action 
toward Mexico, he did not hesitate to use military inter­
vention "to force the Mexicans to behave according to his 
standard.1 In April, 1914, American naval forces bom­
barded vera Cruz, and United States Marines then entered 
the city, a move that soon forced the overthrow of the 
Mexican government. For the next four years Wilson 
attempted to influence the course of events in the Mexican 
Revolution through the support of various revolutionary 
leaders. As he confided to a British diplomat, "I am
going to teach the South /sic7 American republics to
52elect good men."
Wilson apparently learned little from his ex­
perience with the Mexican Revolution. After years of
5 •'■Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor; Woodrow 
Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz (New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), 31-32.
52William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of 
American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Company,
Inc., 1959), 64.
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intrigue and intervention, the united states withdrew from
Mexico with no apparent success, and almost immediately
became involved in a much larger and more significant
53revolution in Russia.
When news of the March Revolution reached the 
United States, the President and most of the American 
public welcomed it and anticipated the establishment of 
a government similar to thoBe of Western Europe, Both 
Wilson and his Secretary of State had a very limited 
knowledge of Russian history and institutions, and, un­
fortunately, they received inadequate advice from the 
so-called "Russian experts" in the United States. This
deficiency prevented a realistic view of events in
, 54 Russia.
Wilson was also misled by the statements of the 
leaders of the Provisional Government. Their pledge to 
hold a constituent assembly in the near future in order 
to determine a permanent form of government led Wilson
^ T h e  most succinct account of Wilson's inter­
vention in the Revolution is in Howard Cline, The United 
States and Mexico, 139-188; Robert Quirk, An Affair of 
Honor is authoritative on the vera Cruz expedition.
Volumes ix through V of Arthur S. Link, Wilson (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1956-1965), contain superbly 
detailed chapters dealing with Wilson's Mexican policy 
between 1913 and 1917. For the 1917-18 period, see 
Clarence c. clendenen. Blood on the Border; The United 
States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (New York; The 
Macmillan Company, 1969).
^4This lack of reliable information is discussed 
in Chapter III below.
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to assume that the results would he a western-style demo­
cracy. in view of his own faith in human nature and his 
unqualified acceptance of democracy as the best of all 
forms of government, it was impossible for him to believe 
otherwise. The Provisional Government also issued 
unqualified assurances of its intention to pursue the war 
effort. It was upon these assurances and Wilson's own 
beliefs that he established his policy toward the Russian 
Provisional Government: to promote the stability of the
Provisional Government and to encourage Russia to retain
55her position as an effective military force in the war.
5^Kennan, Russia.■ Leaves The War, 12-23? "in war­
time Russia, Wilsonians sought initially to buttress the 
pro-Allied liberal-nationalistic regime of the March 
Revolution, in order to save the moral and material 
strength of a liberalized Russia for the anti-German 
Coalition.'' N. Gordan Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson And 
Wbrld Politics: America1s Response to War and Revolution
(New York: Oxford University press, 19687, 7.
CHAPTER II
DECISION TO SEND MISSION
On the evening of April 2, 1917, before a joint 
session of the united States Congress, President Woodrow 
Wilson requested a declaration of war against Germany. In 
the course of his message, Wilson directed the attention 
of Congress to the recent revolution in Russia which he 
described as "wonderful and heartening." Wilson suggested 
that Russia was now "a fit partner for a league of honour 
/sic7." The Russian people would now.be able to fight 
more effectively for "freedom in the world, for justice, 
and for peace."^
Wilson's reference to Russia indicated two ways 
the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, might affect 
American participation in World war I. Coming as it did 
immediately prior to America's entry into the war, the 
Revolution strengthened Wilson's claim that the war was 
a struggle between democracy and autocracy, of more signi­
ficance to Wilson was the possibility that the political 
upheaval in Russia would increase its military effective­
ness in the war. in a few weeks, however, it became
^-George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves The War, 18.
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apparent that the exact opposite might occur, and many 
Americans began to reconsider their enthusiasm for the 
March Revolution.
During a cabinet meeting on March 20, 1917, less 
than two weeks after news of the Tsar's abdication reached 
America, Secretary of State Robert Lansing suggested that 
the Russian Revolution made the European war a conflict 
between the forces of democracy and absolutism, thus 
making American entry into the war more acceptable. Al­
though agreeing that events in Russia had "in a way 
changed conditions," the president explained to his
2Cabinet that he "could not give that as reason for war."
The American people, however, were more willing 
than their president to accept the Tsar's abdication as 
further justification for entry into the war to end all
3wars. News of the Revolution occasioned in America a
kind of spontaneous rejoicing that Russia had overthrown
its monarch and joined the ranks of the world's demo- 
4cracies.
2Jbid., 14-16; E. David Cronon (ed.), The Cabinet 
Diaries of Josephus Daniels 1913-1921 (Lincoln, Neb.: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 117.
^Leonid Ivan strakhovsky, American opinion About 
Russia, 1917-1920 (Toronto: university of Toronto Press,
1961), 4-6? Robert D. Warth, The Allies And The Russian 
Revolution, 27; and Christopher Lasch, The American Liberals 
and the Russian Revolution (New York: Columbia university
Press, 1962), 14-16.
^Lasch, American Liberals and the Russian Revolu­
tion, 21-22.
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Many Americans, who knew little of Russian history 
and less of contemporary conditions, became keenly 
interested in and sought additional information about 
recent political developments. George Kennan, a recog­
nized authority and author of several works "on tsarist 
Russia, recorded in his diary, "Since the first news of 
the Russian Revolution our telephone has rung every twenty 
minutes or so from morning to night, and letters and
invitations to speak have poured in on me faster than
5I could answer them."
Mass meetings were held throughout the country to 
express sympathy and encouragement for the new government, 
one meeting, chaired by Alton B. Parker, was held in the 
Manhattan Opera House in New York city and inc luded among 
its sponsors former Senator John C. Spooner of Wisconsin, 
the president of the American Federation of Labor Samuel 
Gompers, New York Mayor John P. Mitchel, former Ambassador 
to England Joseph H. Choate, and Charles Evans Hughes, 
Presidential candidate for the Republican Party in 1916. 
Following the meeting, the American Committee for the 
Encouragement of Democratic Government in Russia was 
formed. Most of the committee's work consisted of encou­
raging the governors and legislatures of the several states
5George Kennan, "Diary," March 19, 1917, George
Kennan Papers, Box 24 (Division.of Manuscripts, Library 
of Congress).
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to send messages of support to the Provisional Government.
An American in Russia probably reflected public
opinion accurately when he explained, "So long as Russia
was an autocracy we could see no essential difference
between either side . . . But the moment there came the
wonderful news of your magnificent revolt all this began
to change. We saw then that the conflict was between the
7fundamental principles of autocracy and democracy."
Similar views were expressed by Russians. George Kennan
was informed by a Russian friend that "we can /now/7 join
hands with your America and with all the free nations of
the world, not only in this war but in all our succeeding
life . . . without blushing for our country and A?lth7 a
8feeling of real brotherhood." A Russian newspaper con­
cluded that there was "no doubt" that the Russian Revolu­
tion "hastened the decision of the head of the great
8Charles R. Flint, Memories of an Active Life 
(New York and London: G. P. Putnam's, 1923), 231-33.
^Charles Edward Russell, "Address of Charles 
Edward Russell at the Demonstration in Behalf of the 
Soldiers at Pavlosk-Voksal, June 30, 1917," Charles 
Edward Russell Papers, Vol. 7, No. 1164, (Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
8Mrs. Ann Petrunkevitch to George Kennan, April 
21/8, 1917, George Kennan papers, Box 3 (New York 
Public Library, New York).
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qtransatlantic republic to break definitely with Germany." 
This certainly exaggerated the significance of the Russian 
Revolution in determining American foreign policy. The 
Revolution, however, made an already established policy 
more acceptable to the American public.
Of far greater importance to the American govern­
ment was whether the political upheaval in Russia would 
affect the country's ability to continue the war effort. 
Conservative Americans became increasingly aware that the 
Revolution might weaken Russia's contribution and con­
ceivably remove her as an active belligerent."1*0
Prom the outset, Secretary Lansing's policy toward 
the Provisional Government was dictated primarily by his 
estimation of its ability to continue the war. Shortly 
after the Tsar's abdication, David R. Francis, the American 
Ambassador in petrograd, urgently requested that the united 
States extend diplomatic recognition to the new government. 
He explained that representatives of the government had 
assured him that Russia would "vigorously prosecute the
^"Translation of Article from the oddeskiya Novosti, 
Odessa Russia, May 30/June 12, 1917," enclosed in John A.
Ray to Robert Lansing, June 6, 1917, Document Number 861.00/ 
446, State Department Records (Record Group 59, National 
Archives). A limited amount of the diplomatic corres­
pondence pertaining to the Root Mission can be found in 
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States; Russia, 1918. 3 vols. (Washington: Government
Printing office, 1931-32.)
■^Strakhovsky, American Opinion About Russia, 3-9.
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war." Francis, overly optimistic about the political
situation, informed the State Department that there was
"no opposition to /the/ provisional government" and
"absolute quiet prevails here and throughout Russia. 1 ̂
Lansing received Francis' request on the same day he
received assurances from Paul N. Miliukov, Russian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the new government would
"continue to respect the international undertakings made
12by the fallen regime."
The State Department reacted immediately. Within 
twelve hours after receiving Francis' request, authoriza­
tion for the American Ambassador to extend diplomatic
recognition to the Provisional Government was on its way 
13to petrograd. Less than an hour after receipt of 
Lansing's telegram, Francis called on Miliukov and made 
arrangements to be received by the President of the 
Council of Ministers, George E. Lvov. At 4:30 on the
■•■̂ David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, March 18, 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/284, St. Dept. Lansing also received assur­
ances from the American minister in Stockholm that the revo­
lution had been "general throughout the Empire" and in 
Petrograd and Moscow had been "entirely successful." Ira 
Nelson Morris to Robert Lansing, March 19, 1917, Doc. No. 
861.00/285, St. Dept.
*-2paul Miliukov to Robert Lansing, March 19, 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/285, St. Dept.
■^Robert Lansing to David r . Francis, March 20, 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/284, St. Dept. Notwithstanding the prompt 
action of the State Department, Ambassador Francis sent two 
additional messages urging prompt action; one undated and 
received by the Department March 21, 1917, and the other 
dated March 21, 1917.
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afternoon of March 22, 1917, Ambassador Francis, accompa­
nied by his staff and military and naval attaches, read 
to the Provisional Cabinet a statement extending full 
diplomatic recognition to the new government.14
Two weeks later, Secretary Lansing pointed out to 
President Wilson that the United States had recognized 
the new government but had not “congratulated the Russian 
Government or people upon the establishment of democratic 
institutions." He therefore proposed sending a message
through Ambassador Francis "going a little further than
15we did in the telegram of recognition." On April 6,
1917, Wilson approved Lansing's draft with only "a verbal
change here and there." The message was liberally sprinkled
with such phrases as "new bond of friendship" and followed
the same pattern as those which had so recently emanated
16from private sources in America.
Three days later, April 9, 1917, Secretary Lansing 
suggested to the President that the United States take a 
further step in its efforts to encourage Russia. His
14David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, March 22,
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/294, St. Dept.,* and David R. Francis 
to Robert Lansing, March 22, 1917, Doc. No. 861.00/296,
St. Dept.
■^Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 5, 1917, 
Robert Lansing, war Memoirs, (Indianapolis and New York: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1935), 332.
16Ibid., 333.
action was prompted by a letter from William Phillips, 
Assistant Secretary of State. Phillips' concern grew 
from a conversation he had on the sixth of April with 
Lieutenant Zinori pechkov, the adopted son of Russian 
novelist Maxim Gorky. When asked how the united States 
"could most help Russia," Pechkov suggested that Phillips 
"ask the president to send to Russia at once a commission 
of three men to speak to the Russian people." He proposed 
a commission consisting of "an Intellectual" (and sug­
gested Professor Franklin H. Giddings of Columbia univer­
sity), a "prominent and vigorous lawyer," and "a man of 
high rank, for example, an ex-ambassador." Hie Russian 
visitor felt that they should be joined by "two or three 
younger men who could mingle with the young men of Russia." 
To Pechkov, a commission such as this "would go far toward
creating a solid foundation of mutual understanding between
17the two people." The Secretary of State believed that 
Phillips' letter contained "a suggestion which should be 
carefully considered." He reported to Wilson that the 
proposed coromisdion "would encourage and strengthen the 
new government and would create an atmosphere of friend­
ship which would be very helpful in future negotiations."18
17William Phillips to Robert Lansing, April 7, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/3799^5, St. Dept.
18Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 9, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/3799^5, St. Dept.
The president made no response.
Two days later, Russian Ambassador George Bakhmetev
warned Lansing that the Provisional Government "will not
last" and that the Socialists "may get the upper hand and
19make peace with Germany." That same day the state
Department received from Ambassador Francis a dispatch
lacking his earlier optimism. Describing the Russian naval
situation as "precarious" and that of the Army as "not
wholly satisfactory,” Francis suggested that "everything
possible be promptly done to strengthen /the7 situation,"
20as there were elements in Russia "urging peace."
Lansing informed the President that the Francis 
dispatch had caused him "serious concern" and repeated his 
earlier request that a commission be sent to Russia, thus 
enabling the united States to "do something to prevent the 
socialist element in Russia from carrying out any plan
21which will destroy the efficiency of the Allied Powers." 
Similar recommendations, Wilson replied, had reached him 
from "a number of quarters," and the President was "inclined 
to think that it would be a good idea to send one . . .
^Robert Lansing, "Desk Diary," April 11, 1917, 
Robert Lansing papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library 
of Congress).
20David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 10,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3771, St. Dept.
^Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 11, 1917, 
Doc. No. 3771, St. Dept.
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22practically at once.'1 Lansing telegraphed to Francis
to "discretely /sic7 ascertain from Miliukoff" his views
about such a mission, whose purpose would be to "consult
with the Russian Government as to the best means of
cooperation /in the war effort/ and to convey a message
23of good will from the United States."1
Within a few days, Francis replied that Miliukov 
had "no objection" to the proposed mission, and that it 
would be welcomed by the Russian government. Francis in­
cluded his "personal view oh the subject." He suggested 
that the group should direct its efforts "first and mainly 
to successful prosecution of war . . .  be very discreet," 
and avoid "giving expressions to views concerning internal 
affairs." Although Francis did not object openly to the 
mission, he emphasized that good relations had been estab­
lished with the Provisional Government as a result of early
diplomatic recognition and suggested, "We should be careful
24to avoid anything likely to detract from a good record.1 
His true feeling, however, was that the mission would make 
his work in Russia more difficult. To a member of his 
family Francis wrote, "I don't know what effect their
22Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
23Robert Lansing to David r . Francis, April 14, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4001A, St. Dept.
24David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 19, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4002, St. Dept.
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coming will have and sometimes wish that they were not
coining as my relationships with this Government are so
good now that I feel they will be injured rather than bene-
fitted by the injection of any new element.1'25
Anticipating a favorable response from the provisional
Government, President Wilson and Lansing had already begun
selecting the members for the special diplomatic mission.
The group would ultimately consist of nine men representing
diverse elements of American society and be headed by an
aging leader of the Republican party, former Secretary of
State Elihu Root.
It is impossible to determine with any degree of
accuracy who first suggested sending the special diplomatic
mission to Russia. When Lansing presented the proposal to
Wilson he was informed that the idea had already reached
Wilson from several sources. Wilson would later name his
26advisor Colonel E. M, House as an early sponsor. oscar S. 
Straus of New York played a prominent role in encouraging 
interest in such a mission and has been recognized by 
historians as well as contemporaries as the first to
25David R. Francis to Perry Francis, May 16/29,
1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box "May 1917" (Missouri 
Historical Society Library; St. Louis, Missouri).
26Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
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27suggest the idea. But the idea of a mission had been 
discussed in many circles.
As early as April 7, 1917, The New York Times 
carried a story, datelined "London April 6," that Russian 
sources indicated that "an American commission of national 
character would be welcomed in Russia" and that "its co­
operation with the new Government would be of inestimable
28value now and for the future." An American Army officer
attached to the Boot Mission recalled in his memoirs that,
at the time of America's entry into the war, "the word
'mission* had taken on a new importance for Americans."
French and British "missions" to the United States had
stirred the nation with excitement. "The whole country
was in its first paroxysm of war-fever and everybody was
in a prodigious hurry to do something; do it at once, and,
29above all, do it in Europe."
Perhaps the most important promoter of American 
assistance to Russia and one who has been neglected or 
ignored by historians was Stanley Washburn, an American 
journalist who in 1917 had recently returned from Russia
27 "You originated the idea of a commission and 
were the first to suggest it." George Kennan to Oscar 
Straus, April 27, 1917, George Kennan Papers, b o x 8 
(Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
28The New York Times, April 7, 1917, 1.
29T. Bentley Mott, Twenty Years As Military 
Attach'^ (New Yorks oxford University Press, 1937), 194.
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where he had served as a war correspondent for The London
Times. Washburn arrived in Washington on March 28, 1917,
and contacted Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad and Chairman of the Advisory Committee
of the National Defense Committee. With Willard's
assistance, Washburn presented his ideas about railroad
assistance for Russia to the National Defense committee
30three days later.
Washburn was concerned primarily with improving the 
railroad system, particularly the Trans-Siberian road. He 
suggested that a commission of "eight or ten of the best 
of railroad men in America" be sent to assist the re­
organization of the railway system. The group would make 
recommendations to the provisional Government and "if
necessary suggest taking over the actual operations from
31the Pacific to Moscow."
Washburn's suggestions impressed the National 
Defense Committee, which included six members of Wilson's 
Cabinet. The chairman later stated that although "many 
men of distinction" had appeared before the Committee,
30Stanley Washburn to Lord Northcliff, April 6, 
1917, Stanley Washburn Papers, Box 1 (Division of Manu­
scripts, Library of congress).
3IIbid.; and "Minutes of Special Joint Meeting of 
the council of National Defense- and Advisory Commission, 
March 31, 1917," Josephus Daniels Papers, Box 451 
(Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
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“none of therp, not a single man, received the close atten-
32tion which he /washburn,7 received." Willard recognized 
Washburn as the originator of the railroad commission and 
wrote to him:
But for your own efforts to stimulate interest in 
this particular matter, it is doubtful if such a 
commission would have gone at all, and in any event 
it would not have started at this time. The first 
recommendation which was made to the Council of 
National Defense /sic7 concerning such action by our 
government, was based wholly upon your personal 
appeal to me. I know, because I presented the 
matter to the Council.33
Washburn also hoped that something could be done 
to help stabilize the political situation. Xn March, 
Washburn had written his London publisher that things "seem 
to be going extremely well and we must hope for continuity 
of the present system of Government established by the 
Revolution." The Allies "must not overlook the possibility 
of a reaction from this spasm in the form of a contra- 
revolution." Washburn believed the political left 
constituted an even greater threat to the military 
effectiveness of the provisional Government. "This 
sweeping democratic movement may become so top-heavy that
32Josephus Daniels, "Diary," March 31, 1917, Josephus 
Daniels Papers, Box 3; and Ann W. Lane and Louise H. Hall 
(eds.), The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, personal and 
Political (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), 243; and Daniel
Willard to Mrs. Stanley Washburn, April 10, 1917, Stanley 
Washburn Papers, Box 1.
33Daniel Willard to Stanley Washburn, May 6, 1917, 
Stanley Washburn papers. Box 1.
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fanatic radicals will over-rule the moderate and if the
German drive should develop successfully on the Russian
front we may again see talk of an independent peace.
Washburn felt that the only effective method of
assuring pro-Allied sentiment in Russia was by reaching
"the hearts of the common people." He saw "an enormous
increase of pro-ally publicity" as the best method of
assuring this relationship and of counteracting the
potentially dangerous radical influence in Russia. He
emphasized the need for immediate action:
Now while the Russian Government is with us is 
the time to develop and push every form of publi­
cation which can reach the common people in Russia 
so that in case this Government by misadventure is 
weakened or over-thrown we have not lost the oppor­
tunity of reaching the heart of Russia which would 
ultimately dominate foreign relations.
Finally, Washburn expected a "difficult summer." Any
"serious reverse" in the Russian military situation "would
at once create the background for a reactionary attack on
the present government and an equally dangerous radical
35demand for cessation of the war."
Washburn's role as one of the first, if not the 
first, to create interest in aiding the Allied cause through 
assistance to Russia has been neglected. Not only was he
^Stanley Washburn to Lord Northcllff, March 23, 
1917, Stanley Washburn Papers, Box 1.
35lbid.
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directly responsible for suggesting the Railroad Commis­
sion, but his ideas about publicity make him one of the 
first to envision an expanded diplomatic mission to 
Russia in the summer of 1917.
On May 22, 1917, Secretary Lansing instructed 
Ambassador Francis to inform the Russian Foreign Minister 
that the Root Mission was being sent "primarily to manifest 
to the Russian Government and people the deep sympathetic
feelings which exist among all classes in America for the
36adherence of Russia to the principle of democracy."
President Wilson described the Mission's purpose as an
attempt "to convey to the Provisional Government of Russia
the congratulations of the Government of the united States
on the formation of the new Government and to arrange for
the cooperation of the two Governments in matters in which
37they are mutually interested." Thus, in their official 
statements, the secretary of State .and the President 
limited the objectives of the Mission to good-will and 
fact-finding.
In addition to the stated purpose, other considera­
tions prompted the decision to send the Mission to Russia.
36Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, May 22, 1917, 
found in Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (eds.), 
The Russian Provisional Government, 1917; Documents (Stan­
ford: Stanford university Press, 1961), II, 113.
37Woodrow Wilson to Provisional Government of Russia 
/no date/7, Elihu Root Papers, Box 136 (Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
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Originally, Lansing had suggested that the group he used
to "prepare the way to negotiate a new treaty with Russia
which will secure satisfactory commercial relations after
38the war is over." The possibility did not go unnoticed 
abroad. Post Wheeler reported from Tokyo that the Japanese 
press viewed the proposed mission as an attempt to estab-
39lish favorable economic relations with the new government.
Wilson, however, decided to exclude any such task from
the Mission's duties, and the members were instructed to
refrain from any discussions on the topic of a commercial 
40treaty.
Many Americans, among them some of Wilson's closest
advisors, felt that another goal of the Mission should be
to assist the Provisional Government in preventing the
41takeover by more radical elements. The possibility of 
a movement toward a separate peace sponsored by persons 
referred to as "radical," '^socialistic, " or "anarchist"
38Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 9, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/3799%, St. Dept.
39Post Wheeler, charged d'Affaires ad interum, Tokyo, 
to Robert Lansing, May 5, 1917, Doc. NO. 763.72/4959, St. 
Dept.
4°see below. Chapter on Finance.
^oscar Straus, one of the first to suggest the Mis­
sion, told George Kennan in a telephone conversation that 
the purpose of the proposed Mission should be to help the 
Provisional Government in all possible ways and "particu­
larly in its struggle with Socialists and radicals." George 
Kennan, "Diary," April 9, 1917, George Kennan Papers, Box 
24 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
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seemed to be the most dangerous threat to the Russian war
effort. Many observers warned Lansing of this danger. On
March 20, 1917, he received a message from the American
Ambassador in Stockholm that if the present "moderate
party" remains in power the results of the recent political
changes would be beneficial. If, however, "control passed
into the hands of /the? extremist party /the7 outcome is
42more doubtful." Francis also warned that elements in
Russia were "urging peace" and suggested that "everything
43possible be promptly done to strengthen situation."
On the same day that Wilson approved the Root
Mission, Henry Morgenthau requested that something be done
to "prevent any internal disturbance in Russia at this 
44time." The idea of helping Russia and the Allied war
effort by preventing a radical takeover in Russia was
45fairly common in the American press. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that some analysts in the united States
42Ira Nelson Morris to Robert Lansing, March 19, 
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/285, St. Dept.
43David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 10, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3771, St. Dept.
44Henry Morgenthau to Robert Lansing, April 12, 
1917, Robert Lansing Papers, Vol. 26, No. 4532.
45Strakhovsky, American opinion About Russia, 6-9; 
*3316 New York Times quoted Count Ilya Tolstoy, son of the 
Russian literary figure, as suggesting, "The only thing I 
fear . . .  is that the Socialists of the.extreme left will 
be too radical." The New York Times, April 28, 1917, 12.
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viewed the Root Mission and Root's role in particular as
that of offering "wise counsel" in order to "stem the
4-6current of the forces of radicalism."
There can be no doubt that Lansing envisioned the
Mission as a way to prevent the possibility of a "radical"
overthrow of the Provisional Government, in his request
for a Mission on April llf 1917, he stated, “I wish we
could do something to prevent the socialistic element in
Russia from carrying out any plan which will destroy the
47efficiency of the Allied powers."
President Wilson was.^not as direct as his Secretary 
of State but no doubt shared Lansing's opinion. When 
Charles R. Crane, upon his departure for Russia immediately 
after the March Revolution, asked Wilson if he had any 
message to convey to the Russian people, Wilson replied, 
"Oh, no, I do not know much about their problems and they 
probably understand what is needed." He added, however, 
"People are much controlled by political habit and if the 
Provisional Government can accomplish the essential things 
they are after and hold old forms they would probably get
4®Editorial in The New York Times, April 28, 1917,
12.
^7Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 11, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/3771, St. Dept.
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on easier and make more progress."^*8 When asked by a 
leader in the suffragette movement to give assistance to 
the women in Russia, Wilson replied that he was in sym­
pathy with the movement but felt that any "political 
guidance on our part" would be resented. The Russians 
would react in a way "that would be detrimental to the
interest of the country and to the relations of Russia
49and the united States."
There is no indication that Root or any member of 
the Mission received any instructions to try to prevent 
a radical coup, in fact, they were cautioned to refrain 
from any statements Which could be interpreted as inter­
ference in Russia's domestic politics.
One way in which Root and his group could have 
played an important role in American-Russian relations 
would have been by a clarification of American war aims. 
Root, however, was specifically instructed to avoid any
Charles R. Crane, "Memoirs, Russia 1917," 203, 
Charles r . Crane papers (Columbia University Library, Mew 
York). The view that Wilson did not hesitate to use 
American military and economic power in an attempt to 
create a new world political order is found in N. Gordon 
Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and Wbrld Politics; America's 
Response to War and Revolution (New York; oxford univer­
sity Press, 1968). See also Arno J. Mayer, Political 
Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Havens Yale 
university Press, 1959).
48Woodrow Wilson to Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, May 
8, 1917, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case Pile 64B 
(Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
discussion of the topic, since the president was reserving 
this problem for himself. Wilson's dilemma over the 
question of war aims stemmed from what many Russians con­
sidered a shift in policy by the United States following 
its entry into the war. Wilson's "peace Without Victory" 
speech before the united States Senate on January 22, 1917, 
was translated in Russia into the slogan "no annexation, no
indemnities." Miliukov, whose foreign policy differed in
50no great degree from that of the Tsar, felt compelled 
to explain Wilson's statement to his countrymen. Stating 
categorically that "peace without victory, proposed by 
President Wilson is inadmissable for the Allies," Miliukov 
explained that the phrase was being used incorrectly and 
out of context with the President's broader views. When 
"all the ideas" of Wilson were examined it could be seen 
that "the president's statements imperiously demand the 
very continuation of the war by the Allies to a victorious 
end." "peace without annexation" would be acceptable only 
if the word annexation were interpreted as "conquest.'.' But 
in the same statement, Miliukov talked of "fixing the map 
of Europe on lines that will exclude every possibility 
of a new international catastrophe," "the settlement of 
national historical questions" and "the fixing of frontiers 
in accord with national endeavors" as examples of "broad
50warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 48.
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international questions" suitable for consideration by
51the Allies once the war was over. At this point,
President Wilson's position on war aims was closer to
those of the soviets than to those of Miliukov.
President Wilson was informed by several advisors
that an official statement on American war aims was
desirable. Lansing forwarded to the President an urgent
52request from Francis, who had recently conferred with 
the officials of the Provisional Government, afre Ambassa­
dor explained to the state Department that these officials 
"contend that wrong construction is being placed on /the/ 
President's utterances." Francis agreed and reported 
that a "workmen's committee" had been using Wilson's 
"Peace without Victory" speech to justify its own formula 
for peace. Even the French Minister of Munitions suggested 
the possibility of a conference in petrograd in order to 
issue a "joint reply" to the Russian Government. Francis 
opposed such a conference due to the "absence of /a7 
definite understanding between ourselves and other
51"Translation of an interview accorded by the 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the petrograd press," 
David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 9, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/5547, St. Dept.
52Robert Lansing to Wtaodrow Wilson, /po date7,
Doc. No. 861.00/361, St. Dept.
53countries fighting Germany."
The Secretary of State also forwarded for the
President's consideration the view of a leading pro-war
American Socialist that "immediate renunciation of no
annexation no indemnities program by President may save
54Russia nothing else will." Lansing later received the 
same advice from George Kennan, a man whose knowledge of 
the Russian situation he respected. Kennan suggested,
"If we can make a breach in the dogma of 'no annexation 
and no indemnities' . . .  we shall greatly weaken their 
position."55
Secretary Lansing, convinced that Wilson must 
issue a statement to the Russians concerning war aims, 
pointed out that "certain phrases uttered by you are 
being used by the radical socialists (probably under 
German influence) to force the Provisional Government to 
declare a policy which will remove the chief incentive to
53David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, May 11, 
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/356, St. Dept.; Three days later, 
Francis relayed to Lansing a request from the Russko 
Slavo, a Moscow daily with a circulation of over one 
million and described by Francis as "perhaps the most 
influential Russian Journal," for a statement from 
Wilson on war aims. David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, 
May 14, 1917, Doc. No. 861.00/361, St. Dept.
54William English Walling to Frank K. Polk, May 
16, 1917, Frank K. Polk Papers, Drawer 85 (Yale Univer­
sity Library, New Haven, Conn.).
^George Kennan to Robert Lansing, May 30, 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/422%, St. Dept.
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Russian offensive operation." He interpreted this as "an 
insidious and ingenious plan to win over the Russian 
people to the idea of a separate peace . . .  a very real 
danger" and suggested that Wilson send a personal mes­
sage clarifying war aims to the Provisional Government to
56he published in Russia. Wilson delegated the actual
drafting of the statement to Lansing and approved the
57draft with "only a few verbal changes." The statement
contained nothing that was new and was transmitted to
58Francis on May 22, 1917.
During this period, Miliukov was finding it in­
creasingly difficult to maintain his position on the war. 
Throughout April and into the first week of May, various 
attempts were made to reconcile Miliukov's position on 
foreign policy with that of the soviet. This task proved 
impossible and a cabinet crisis resulted in the resigna­
tions of both Miliukov and Guchkov by May 16. A new 
cabinet known as the First Coalition was formed. Michael 
Tereshchenko assumed Miliukov's position, and Kerensky
58Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, May 17, 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/361, St. Dept.
57Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, May 19, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/5078E, St. Dept.; and Woodrow Wilson to 
Robert Lansing, /no date, May 19, 19177, Doc. No. 763.72/ 
5078E, St. Dept.
58Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, May 22, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5171A, St. Dept.
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became the new Minister of WSr.59
When Tereshchenko accepted Wilson's note, he in­
quired whether certain passages could he "changed or 
60altered." Although Francis had been instructed to
deliver Wilson's message in the form of a "verbatim copy,"
he, along with Tereshchenko, felt that alterations were
possible. When inquiries were made, Lansing directed him
to explain that the president's message was "in no sense
a reply to anything" but was a "wholly spontaneous and
independent communication" and "not subject to any 
61change."
Tereshchenko's fears were not without foundation, 
as considerable opposition developed in the Russian Press 
when Wilson's original message was published on May 28.
The president's statement contained lengthy passages of 
a high moral tone. This caused one Russian critic to
59warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution,
55-56.
®°0ne passage in question stated: "The war has
begun to go against Germany*” The Foreign Minister felt 
this would be used by some Russians to argue that further 
offensive military efforts on their part would no longer 
be required. Tereshchenko also pointed out that Wilson's 
use of such phrases as, "The day has come to conquer or 
submit" and "That status /power of the imperial German 
Government/ must be altered" would suggest a "dictated 
and annexationist peace." Browder and Kerensky, Provi­
sional Government Documents, II, 1109.
61David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, May 31, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/5173, St Dept.; and Robert Lansing to 
David R. Francis, June 3, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5173, St. 
Dept.
observe that "as should have been expected" Wilson's
message "contained nothing new" and differed with the
remarks of other Allied powers only in that the true
meaning of the President's words had been "camouflaged"
62by the use of "peace-loving sounding words." The editor 
of a large Odessa daily, socialist but non-Bolshevik, 
stated: "President Wilson is renouncing the principles
he proclaimed only a short while ago." The author also 
noted that with American entry into the war, Wilson could 
"no longer pose as a superarbiter," and Russians "can no 
longer have any faith in the impartial objective judgment 
of President Wilson."®"^
Wilson's message of May 28 was his last attempt to 
state clearly American policy and aims until his signifi­
cant "Fourteen Points" were issued in January, 1913, 
following the Bolshevik victory in November. Two years 
later, Arthur Bullard, who was assigned to Russia by the 
American Committee on Public information, wrote:
We will not know until men still young write their 
memoirs in their old age why the Allies refused to 
define their war aims, if Mr. Wilson could have 
formulated his fourteen terms in July instead of 
January there would have been some hope. But the
62S. D. Maslovskil, "Wilson's Response," pel 
Naroda, May 30, 1917■, p. 1, quoted in Browder and 
Kerensky, Provisional Government Documents, II, 1110.
63Clipping from the odesskiya Novostl, Odessa 
Russia, May 30, 1917, translated, John A. Ray to Robert 
Lansing, June 16, 1917, Doc. NO. 861.00/446, St. Dept.
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refusal of the Allies to even discuss the Russian 
proposals were fatal as far as Russia was concerned: 
it dampened the ardor of all our friends and it gave 
a new and tremendous weapon to our e n e m i e s .
Bullard probably overemphasized the possible effect of a
statement by Wilson on American war aims. He was correct,
however, in the assumption that Russia was tired of the
war by the summer of 1917 and was unwilling to continue
in pursuit of the objectives agreed upon by the Tsar and
the Allied Powers. Consequently, the objectives of the
Mission, although frequently visualized as broad and
comprehensive, were never more than Wilson had originally
intended. These objectives were to congratulate the new
Russian government and to determine how the United States
could materially assist Russia in the two countries'
united war effort.
64Arthur Bullard, The Russian Pendulum: Autocracy-
pemocracy-Bolshevism (New York: Macmillan, 1919), 66-67.
CHAPTER III
SELECTION OF MEMBERS
The process of selecting members of the Mission began
as soon as the decision to send a group to Russia was made.
Wilson informed his Secretary of State on April 12, 1917,
that the Mission should be sent "practically at once" and
that "the important, perhaps the all-important thing is the
p e r s o n n e l . M i s s i o n  members should be "men of large view,
tested discretion, and a sympathetic appreciation of just
what it is they have been sent over for . . . and it is
necessary, besides, that they should look the part." He
added that "they must not all be Democrats." in fact, it
was not necessary that "any of them be Democrats." The
group "should all be genuinely enthusiastic for the suc-
2cess of the Russian revolution."
Wilson also desired the selection of men Who repre­
sented a cross-section of the American ptblic. Ambassador 
Francis was instructed to inform the Russian government 
that the men were "selected by the president with the
Hfoodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St.. Dept.
2Ibid.
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special purpose of giving representation to the various
3elements which make up the American people." Thus began
the process of selecting members of the Mission, a task
4which would not be completed until May 10.
in early April, when the idea of a Mission was 
first suggested to the State Department, it was decided 
to include a man of high rank in order to lend prestige 
to the effort. As England and France had sent Cabinet 
members to Russia, the united States could scarcely do 
less. At first, Lansing favored William G. McAdoo, Secre­
tary of the Treasury, and suggested him in a Cabinet 
meeting on the afternoon of April 13 following a con-
5ference with Frank L. Folk, State Department counselor. 
Apparently, former Secretary of State Elihu Root's name 
was mentioned at the same cabinet meeting, as Secretary 
of the interior Franklin K. Lane wrote his brother of 
the plans to send a Mission to Russia "possibly headed
g
by McAdoo or Root."
^Robert Lansing to David r . Francis, May 22, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5078E, St. Dept.
^Vtoodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, May 10, 1917,
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case File 64 B.
5Robert Lansing, "Desk Diary," April 13, 1917, 
Robert Lansing Papers. Hereinafter referred to as, 
"Lansing Desk Diary."
^Franklin K. Lane to George W. Lane, April 15, 
1917, in Lane and Wall, The Letters of Franklin K. Lane, 
248.
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On the evening of April 16, Secretary McAdoo
called on Lansing at his home, where the two discussed
the Mission to Russia.7 Evidently it was in this conference
that McAdoo and Lansing decided to support Root for the
position. On the following day, McAdoo wrote Wilson that
Root's appointment would be "highly regarded by the entire
country" and that he would be a good choice if he were
found to be "in full sympathy" with the administration's 
8plans. McAdoo repeated his recommendation in a cabinet
meeting on the same day and was given strong support by 
gLansing.
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy, was the 
only member of the cabinet who objected to the choice.
He believed the selection of Root would be a mistake, 
although he agreed there was "no abler man in America" 
for the task. President Wilson replied that politics 
should not be a factor in their choice. Daniels attempted 
to clarify his position: He explained that his objection
did not stem from Root's Republicanism but resulted from 
Root's reputation as a conservative, which might bring
7 "Lansing Desk Diary," April 16, 1917.
8William G. McAdoo to Woodrow Wilson, April 17,
1917, Woodrow Wilson papers. Box 84, case File 64 B.
^"Lansing Desk Diary," April 17, 1917? and Josephus 
Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of war and After, 1917-1923
(Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press,
1946), 57-58.
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him undue criticism. Daniels suggested Theodore Roosevelt 
or William Jennings Bryan, who "were known in Russia as 
liberals," as possible alternatives. Daniels' argument 
had no apparent effect, and he later recalled that neither 
"Wilson nor any member of the cabinet agreed with me.
Lansing and McAdoo rebuked me, and Wilson agreed with 
them."10
The only restriction placed upon Root's selection
was that his position on Russia be determined prior to
informing him of the appointment.^^ Wilson instructed
Lansing to determine whether Root could be considered "a
12real friend of the Russian Revolution." After conferring
with Root, Lansing found him to be acceptable. Root agreed
13to accept the position on April 24 and met with President
14Wilson to discuss the Mission two days later.
It is difficult to determine the motives behind 
the selection of Root. Discussions about the minor members
^Daniels, Years of war, 57-59.
^■^William G. McAdoo to Woodrow Wilson, April 17, 
1917, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case Pile 64 B.
■^Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 24, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4031^, St. Dept.
■'■■̂ "Lansing Desk Diary," April 24, 1917; and Lansing, 
War Memoirs, 334.
^"Lansing Desk Diary," April 25 and 26, 1917; and 
Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters (New 
York; Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1939), VII, 37.
69
of the Mission were recorded in correspondence between the 
President and his Cabinet members. Root, however, was
15evidently discussed in conversations that went unrecorded. 
Perhaps those who favored Root were later reluctant to
claim credit for the selection of a 'man whose work was so
16soon discredited. There are, however, several factors 
which may explain the selection. Root was a Republican, 
a man of international stature, and, perhaps most impor­
tant, a man who had given strong and open support to the 
President's war policy. Root had impressed both Wilson 
and Lansing with his willingness to suppress partisan 
feeling and, in a sense, had offered to join their team.
in the months immediately preceding America's 
entry into World War I, Root publicly as well as privately 
supported the President's preparedness campaign. In 
Washington on January 25, 1917, Root delivered a speech 
entitled "America's Present Needs" to a gathering of the 
Congress of Constructive patriotism held under the aus­
pices of the National Security League, in his address, 
the former Secretary of State made a strong emotional 
appeal for universal military service, which he saw as the
^"Lansing Desk Diary," April 12-26, 1917.
16In his memoirs, Lansing stated, "it had been 
decided that Honorable Elihu Root should head this impor­
tant mission if he was willing to accept the post." Lansing, 
War Memoirs, 334.
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17surest way to protect the vital interests of the nation.
Following Wilson's request for war. Root congratu­
lated the President and offered his support. Wilson replied 
that Root's "generous letter" had given him "real gratifi­
cation." He was especially pleased that Root considered
his action a reaffirmation of traditional American foreign
18policy rather than an abrogation of it.
A week later. Root once more expressed support for 
Wilson and his war policy at a gathering of the Republican 
Club in New York city. The man who was considered by many 
the elder statesman of the party told his fellow Republi­
cans that partisan considerations would have to be shelved 
for the duration of the war. He added that there was no 
need for a coalition cabinet, and the President's adminis­
tration should be supported "as if every man there was a 
Republican."1,9
Root's early support for preparedness did not pass 
unnoticed, on April 11, the same day the decision was 
made to send a mission to Russia, Secretary Lansing com­
plimented Root on his New York speech: "There has been
no utterance by any man which surpasses it in patriotism
■*-7Elihu Root, "Speech, January 25, 1917," Elihu 
Root Papers, Box 220.
^Wbodrow Wilson to Elihu Root, April 7, 1917,
Elihu Root papers. Box 136.
^ T h e  New York Times, April 10, 1917, 3.
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or in sound practical means of helpfulness to the Govern­
ment." Lansing assured Root that his speech would discou­
rage those persons who heretofore had been unable to
"divorce their public responsibilities from partisanship
20and the petty things in politics." one of Wilson's
Cabinet members later recalled that the president's
"former harsh opinion" of Root changed "when Root rang
21clear on war measures."
When news of his selection became public. Root re­
ceived many congratulatory letters from varied elements
of American society and from members of both major politi-
22cal parties. A letter from Root's personal friend, 
former President of the United States William Howard Taft, 
illustrated the reaction for which Wilson had hoped. 
Expressing surprise "that Wilson would be wise enough to 
select the best man in the united States to go to Russia," 
Taft confessed that "the president's selection of you has
20Robert Lansing to Elihu Root, April 11, 1917* 
Elihu Root papers, "Box 136.
21*Daniels, Years of war, 58; Root's former chief, 
Theodore Roosevelt, was "utterly sick of the gush about 
supporting the President." He expressed surprise and 
disappointment that "Taft, Hughes, and even Root take 
part in the general idiot cry which aligns us behind the 
President." Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge,
March 18, 1917, quoted in Elting Elmore Morison (ed.), The 
Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard 
University Press, 1954), VIII, 1183.
^Eiihu Root Papers, Box 136.
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heartened me more than any other thing that has happened—
23It means everything for the country."
Although the President's selection was well 
received by most of the American press, significant 
opposition was voiced in the Socialist New York Call and 
the New York Russian-language newspapers Russkoye, Russky 
Golos, and Novy Mir. Socialist Congressman Meyer London 
of New York's Twelfth Congressional District asked Wilson 
"to revoke the appointment" if it could "possibly be done." 
He felt that Root was "the last person in the world to 
command the confidence of that awakened country." The
25Russians would look upon the appointment as "a calamity."
On that same day, Wilson was asked by Rabbi Stephen S. Wise
of New York to reconsider the appointment. Wilson replied
that prior to Root's selection, "I convinced myself that
, he was genuinely and heartily in sympathy with the revo-
26lution in Russia."
22William Howard Taft to Elihu Root, April 28,
1917, Elihu Root Papers, Box 166.
2^Strakhovsky, American Opinion About Russia, 11-14.
25Meyer London to Woodrow Wilson, April 28, 1917, 
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, case Pile 64 B. Senator 
Hiram W. Johnson would later express a similar view. Hiram 
W. Johnson to Mrs. Raymond Robins, July 17, 1917, Raymond 
Robins Papers, b o x 12 (State Historical Society of Wiscon­
sin, Madison, Wisconsin).
26Woodrow Wilson to Stephen S. Wise, April 28, 1917, 
Baker, Wilson Letters, VII, 42.
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Most of the criticism came from Socialists and
jews and, to a lesser extent, from naturalized Americans
of Russian birth and Russians living in America. Professor
Alexander petrunkevitch of Yale university disapproved of
Root's appointment and discussed it with George Kennan
27and oscar Straus. In a speech in New York, petrunke­
vitch stated that the decision to send a mission to 
Russia was "fraught with danger" which "lies in the 
selection of the members of the commission." He did not 
openly oppose Root's appointment but urged his audience
to persuade Wilson to add to the commission "men accept-
28able to the Russian Social Democrats." two days later.
Representative Abraham Shiplacoff introduced a resolution
in the New York State Legislature asking the President to
reconsider Root's appointment. His resolution, however,
was "hooted down" by his colleagues and "all record of it
29. . . expunged from the Journal." In addition to public 
expressions of displeasure, many persons privately dis­
approved of the appointment, included among them were 
Ambassador Francis and Oscar Straus who had played a large
27George Kennan to Oscar Straus, April 27, 1917, 
George Kennan papers, Box 8 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress); and Oscar Straus to George Kennan, 
May 2, 1917, George Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
28The New York Times, May 2, 1917, 1.
29Ibid., May 4, 1917, 7.
part in promoting the idea of the Mission.
Wilson did not anticipate the objections that the
appointment created and probably regretted his choice
even before Root departed. On April 28 he wrote to a
critic, "I believe, all things weighed together, j/that7 my
31choice has been the wise one." A few days later, how­
ever, Wilson wrote, "I am trying to put men on the commis­
sion whose popular sympathies and catholic view of human
rights will be recognized (at any rate, in the case of most 
32of them)." Although Wilson did not name him, Root must
have been the member to whom he referred, as no other
member had aroused any controversy.
Years later, one of Root's friends, Colonel T.
Bentley Mott, suggested that Wilson had sent Root to
Russia “to get rid of him" and to avoid utilizing him in
33a more responsible capacity." This accusation, which 
Mott admits was only "ray hypothesis" based upon nothing 
"I have heard Mr. Root assert," cannot be borne out by 
the existing records. All available information indicates
30Oscar Straus to George Kennan, May 2, 1917, George 
Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of 
Congress); and David R. Francis to Edward B. Lilley, May 
1/14, 1917, David R. Francis papers. Box "May 1917."
3 ̂-Woodrow Wilson to Stephen S. Wise, April 28,
1917, Baker, Wilson Letters, VII, 42.
32Woodrow Wilson to Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, May 
8, 1917, Waodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case File 64 B.
33Mott, Twenty Years, 192.
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that everyone involved in the selection of the personnel
felt that they had selected a man who could accomplish
34the Mission's objective. if Wilson did have second
thoughts about appointing Root, his removal would have
been politically impossible. The choice of Elihu Root,
was a decision for which the president was responsible
and one which he ultimately regretted.
Historians usually restrict their attention to the
factors and motives leading to the selection of Root and,
in general, have neglected the other eight members. This
is understandable in view of Root's prominence in American
politics and his subsequent exclusion from the Paris peace 
35Conference. it is important, however, to examine the 
other members selected.
Colonel House recommended to Wilson that the 
group consist of Samuel Gompers, Willard Straight,
Benjamin Ide Wheeler, and Oscar Straus to represent
Root would later write his biographer that "Wilson 
didn't want to accomplish anything. It was a grand-stand 
play. He wanted to show his sympathy for the Russian 
Revolution. When we delivered his message and made our 
speeches, he was satisfied; that's all he wanted." Elihu 
Root to Phillip C. Jessup, September 16, 1930; quoted in 
Phillip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New YorK: Dodd, Mead and
Co., 1938), II, 356.
35Root's most recent biographer suggests that it 
was Root's performance in Russia which led Wilson to ex­
clude Root from the Paris Peace Conference following 
World war I. Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Con­
servative Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1954),
119.
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American labor, business, education, and Jewry, respec­
tively. Prom this group Wilson eliminated Wheeler, whom 
the President considered "a bit too ladylike." Wilson 
then submitted for Lansing's consideration the names of 
the other three along with those of Charles R. crane, a 
wealthy Chicago businessman, who was already in Russia,
and professor Samuel Harper, whom Wilson considered
36"widely known and trusted in Russia."
Of the four originally recommended by Colonel 
House, Lansing approved only of Samuel Gompers, "as avail­
able a man as we could get." Gompers, however, eliminated 
himself. Straus was eliminated by Lansing who questioned 
the "advisability of sending another jew" and felt there 
was "a measure of danger in overplaying the jew element." 
Straight was also rejected by the Secretary of State as 
was Wheeler, already excluded by the President. Lansing 
approved the President's choice of Crane but opposed 
Professor Harper with the explanation that "I have heard
from several different sources that he is not as popular
37as x had supposed in Russia." in addition to Gompers 
and Crane, Lansing suggested that the Mission include 
John R. Mott (President of the Y.M.C.A.), Cyrus McCormick
36Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
37Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 12, 1917, 
Doc. NO. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
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or Harold Elliot as a representative of American business,
Samuel r . Bertron (a New York banker), and "a lawyer of 
38prominence."
Crane had for many years expressed a keen interest
in Russia and the furthering of Russian and Slavic studies
in the United states. He had established a lecture series
in Slavic studies at the university of Chicago and had
invited Miliukov and others to the University. He had
also subsidized the work of Professor Harper and had made
it financially possible for him to visit Russia several
39times prior to Wbrld war I. He had, moreover, encou­
raged Harper to travel to Russia as advisor to Ambassador
40Francis in 1916. Crane maintained his interest in
Russia throughout this period, although he refused to
accept the position of Ambassador to Russia when Wilson
41offered it to him in 1913.
As soon as news of the March Revolution reached
42the united States, Crane left for Russia. Before 
3aB>ia.
39hasch, American Liberals And The Russian Revo­
lution , 5-7.
40Paul V. Harper (ed.), The Russia I Believe i m  
The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1945), 91.
4'LLasch, American Liberals And The Russian Revo- 
lut ion, 5.
42Charles R. Crane, "Memoirs, Russia 1917," 203, 
Charles R. Crane Papers.
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departing, he asked Colonel House to inform the President
that if he were needed in any capacity, "You have only to 
43make a sign." a?hus, when members of the Mission were
being chosen, Wilson personally included Crane in the 
44group. No open opposition to Crane's appointment was
expressed, although Kennan privately criticized the choice
because crane was not a "level-headed thinker and although
he has been in Russia many times he doesn't know the
45psychology of the Russian people."
Cyrus McCormick was chosen as a representative of
American business because international Harvester Company
46was "very popular in Russia." However, McCormick and
the President were also personal friends, and McCormick
corresponded with the President on a first-name basis.
This no doubt enhanced his availability for such a post.
During the time names were being considered, McCormick
47wrote the President and offered his services.
4^Charles R. Crane to Edward M. House, April 4, 
1917, Charles R. Crane Papers.
44Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 12,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3800%, St. Dept.
^George Kennan to Oscar Straus, May 16, 1917, 
George Kennan Papers, Box 8 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress).
4^Lansing, War Memoirs, 334.
47Cyrus M. McCormick to WOodrow Wilson, April 22, 
1917, Vfoodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case Pile 64 B.
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Samuel Bertron, described by one of his colleagues
48as an unusual banker in that he was a Democrat, was
named to the group by Lansing although Bertron thought
his appointment was due to the influence of Colonel
House. John R. Mott, who was included for the "reli-
50gious and social betterment" of Russia, was attached
51to the Mission following a suggestion by Crane. perhaps
the least controversial of all the men to serve on the
Mission, Mott impressed one extremely critical Russian
observer as a "very pleasant, mild-mannered man, very
much like a clergyman of a well-to-do parish," a man who
52was "genuinely anxious to help Russia."
Wilson soon decided that the Mission should in­
clude representatives of the Army and Navy. Major General 
Hugh L. Scott, Chief of Staff,of the United States Army, 
was chosen to represent the army. This selection was 
somewhat surprising since the united States had just
48William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson, May 
22, 1917, William V. Judson papers, Box 4 (Newberry 
Library, Ch icago).
49Samuel R. Bertron to Edward M, House, April 28, 
1917, Edward M. House Papers, Drawer 3 (Yale university 
Library, New Haven, Conn.).
50Lansing, war Memoirs, 334.
^Charles R. Crane, "Memoirs, Russia 1917," 185, 
Charles r . Crane Papers.
52D. Fedotoff White, Survival Through War and 
Revolution in Russia (Philadelphia: university of Penn­
sylvania Press, 1939), 140.
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declared war, and It would appear that the nation could 
ill afford the absence of its ranking military roan for 
such a long period of time. To prevent any "misunder­
standing" concerning Scott's detachment from duty at 
this time, Newton D. Baker, secretary of war, explained 
that Scott had been selected "in order that the people 
of Russia may realize from the dignity of his office the
full compliment and cordiality of our great mission to 
53them."
Scott's appointment was first mentioned in a con­
versation between Secretaries Lansing and Baker on April 
26, at which time they also discussed sending General 
Samuel b . M. Young. The matter was settled, however, 
when Baker informed Lansing that the president favored 
Scott. When told of the President's decision by secre­
tary Baker, Scott replied that he did not wish to leave 
the country at that particular time but would accept the
decision since he was "at the disposition of the President
55and would do cheerfully whatever he wished." Thus, of
53The New York Times, May 12, 1917, 9.
34"Lansing Desk Diary," April 26, 1917? The fol­
lowing day Root was told of the choice and was "delighted 
at the idea of Gen. Scott's going." Ibid., April 27,
1917.
55Hugh L. Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 2,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box.84 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress). Hereinafter referred to as Scott, 
"The Russian Revolution."
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all the men in the Mission, Scott joined most reluctantly
and was the most pessimistic about the possibility of 
56success.
The choice of the naval representative was dele­
gated to the Secretary of the Navy. Daniels discussed 
the appointment with Lansing, and they both felt that in
view of Scott's rank the naval representative should be
57a junior officer. Daniels recommended, and the presi­
dent accepted, Rear Admiral James h . Glennon, who was 
described by Daniels as "a handsome man of commanding
COpresence" and an "expert in ordinance."
The question of including a Jew on the Mission 
was perhaps the most explosive. Prom the beginning, 
President Wilson, following the advice of Colonel House, 
had wanted Straus to be the representative of American
egJewry. Lansing had no objection to the appointment of
58 "I greatly fear we rre too late . . .  I start 
out with very little hope of any successful results."
Hugh L. Scott to General Elbert Wheeler, May 15, 1917, 
Hugh Scott Papers, Box 29 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress); "it looks very much as if Russia 
is breaking up and we will be too late." Hugh L. Scott 
to Mrs. H. L. Schelling, May 15, 1917, Ibid.
^7josephus Daniels, "Diary," May 10, 1917, 
Josephus Daniels Papers, Box 3; and."Lansing Desk Diary," 
May 10, 1917.
58Josephus Daniels to Vfoodrow Wilson, May 10, 
1917, WOodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case Pile 64 B.
59Woodrow Wilson to Robert LanBing, April 12, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3800*5, St. Dept.
82
a jew, but he assumed that Gompers would represent Labor,
and, therefore, thought It Inadvisable to send another
jew.^° On April 14, Lansing instructed Francis to
"discreetly ascertain" from the Russian Foreign Minister
"whether it would be wise to have a prominent Hebrew a
member of the Commission " and if his being "orthodox or
6 Xunorthodox" were important. Following a discussion 
with Miliukov, Francis informed the state Department 
that there were no objections from the Russian Foreign
6 2Office and that "either kind" was "equally acceptable."
tfhe President, after learning of Gompers' reluc­
tance to leave the country for such a prolonged period, 
was faced with the task of finding not only a Jewish 
representative but a labor leader, as well. By April
24, Wilson had decided upon Eugene Meyer, Jr., of New
63York and notified Lansing of this decision; Almost as 
soon as the decision was made, the Secretary of State 
began to reconsider the desirability of sending any jew 
to Russia, since the State Department had received
60Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 12,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/3800*5, St. Dept.
61Robert R. Lansing to David r . Francis, April 14, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4001A, St. Dept.
6 2David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 19, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4002, St. Dept.
63Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, April 17,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4031*5, St. Dept.
dispatches which suggested the possibility of an anti-
Semitic movement which might disrupt the Provisional 
64Government. Other persons began to fear that the 
Russians might interpret the appointment of any Jew as an 
indication that America was more interested in securing 
political rights for Jews than in assisting the pro­
visional Government in its war effort. Bertron wrote 
Colonel House that he had been advised by persons "best 
posted in reference to the Russian affairs" that a Jew
gcshould not be sent on the Mission. Professor Harper
reminded the State Department that "the revolution was not
66put through to give the Jews rights."
Secretary Lansing then received a further opinion 
from Ambassador Francis. Following his conversation with 
Miliulsov, Francis had discussed the question with other 
members of the Russian Government. He informed Lansing 
that "another minister . . . cautioned against Hebrew 
being chairman or vice chairman" of the Mission and that 
"while no objection to such membership on commission
®4David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 17, 
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/407, St. Dept.; and Madding Summer, 
American Consul Moscow, to Robert Lansing, March 20, 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/337, St. Dept.
6 Ŝaftiuel R. Bertron to Edward M. House,April 30, 
1917, Edward House papers, Drawer 3.
®^Samuel N. Harper to Richard Crane, April 20, 
1917, Samuel Harper Papers, Envelop 9 (university of 
Chicago Library, Chicago).
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/exists7 he should not be conspicuous but discreet."^7 
Becoming increasingly concerned over the possi­
bility of jeopardizing the effectiveness of the Mission,
Lansing, following a discussion with Stanley Washburn on 
68April 30, wrote to Wilson at length about Washburn's 
views on the matter. He considered Washburn “very closely 
in touch with Russian affairs," a man whose “Knowledge 
and judgment as an observer entitle his opinion to careful 
consideration.1 It was Washburn's view that “it would be 
a great mistake to send any Jew at all on the commissio.n 
to Russia." The appointment of a jew, he felt, would 
"cause popular suspicion on the purpose of the commission 
and very materially impair its usefulness." The Secretary 
of State then directed the president's attention to Ambassa­
dor Francis' telegram and recommended that Meyer be asked 
69to withdraw. on the following day, after conferring
with Wilson about the Mission, Lansing was undoubtedly in-
70structed to ask Eugene Meyer to withdraw.
On May 2, Secretary Lansing discussed the situation 
with justice Louis D. Brandeis. Meyer arrived in Washington
87David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 20, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4003, St. Dept.
68"Lansing Desk Diary," April 30, 1917.
^Robert Lansing to Wbodrow Wilson, April 30, 1917, 
Doc. No..763.72/4386%, St. Dept.
70“Lansing Desk Diary," May 1, 1917.
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on the following day and was met by Brandeis, who ex­
plained the situation to him. The two men then met with 
71Lansing. Following the conference, the Secretary of
State informed President Wilson that Meyer "was very
pleasant about it and at once declared his willingness
to withdraw his acceptance." He cautioned the President,
however, that it would be difficult to explain why no Jew
had been included. He felt that this "delicate question"
72would require "very careful handling."
Shortly after the Root Mission had departed for 
Russia, Judge Aaron J. Levy of New York interviewed 
President Wilson and published an account of the interview 
in the jewidhDaily Wfrrheit. Readers were given the im­
pression that the President's decision to withdraw the 
Meyer appointment had resulted from a suggestion by the 
Russian Provisional Government. Reuben Fink, Washington 
correspondent for The Day, a rival of the Daily W&rheit 
in New York, interviewed both Joseph Tumulty, the Presi­
dent's secretary, and Secretary Lansing for clarification
73of Judge Levy's article. Both men forwarded Fink's 
7W ,  May 2-3, 1917.
7^Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, May 3, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4390%A, St. Dept.
7^Reuben Fink to Joseph Tumulty, May 26, 1917, 
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, case File 64 B. In for­
warding the letter to Wilson, Tumulty attached a note;
"The Secretary thinks there is dynamite in it."
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questions to the president, who expressed considerable 
displeasure that Levy had published an account of the 
interview and stated that nothing in his conversation had 
indicated that he had received a request from the Russian 
government to exclude jews from the Mission.74 Although 
there were no serious political repercussions, Prince 
Lvov, the Provisional Prime Minister, issued a categori­
cal denial that he or any member of his government insti-
75gated Wilson's decision.
Another major segment of American society which 
would be represented on the Mission was organized Labor. 
Shortly after the creation of the Provisional Government, 
Francis cabled the state Department to suggest that 
Samuel Gompers and other American labor leaders use their 
influence to encourage Russian labor to support the new
government.7® Similar requests reached the Secretary of
State from other Americans.77 Gompers had in fact already 
telegraphed congratulations and pledges of support to the 
revolutionaries, in a second message he reminded the
74Woodrow Wilson to Joseph Tumulty /no date7, 
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case File 64 B.
75The New York Times, May 30, 1917, 3.
76David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, March 23, 
1917, Frank L. Polk Papers, Drawer 85? also found in Doc. 
No. 861.00/299, St. Dept.
77Henry Morgenthau to Robert Lansing, April 12, 
1917, Robert Lansing Papers, Vol. 25? and Flint, Memories, 
234.
Russians in more conservative tones that "freedom . . .
cannot be established by Revolution only— it is the pro-
78duct of evolution." Subsequently, when the appointments
to the Mission were being made, there was no question that
Gompers would be chosen as the representative of Labor
79if he so desired. A request was made by Joseph H.
Coate that there be two labor representatives, one 
Socialist and one non-Socialist. Wilson and Lansing felt, 
however, that one representative would suffice, and that 
he should be a non-Socialist so as :to more broadly repre­
sent American labor. It was important, however, that the
delegate not be regarded by the Russians as "an active
80opponent of Socialism."
William B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor, approached 
Gompers on the question of his joining the Mission but 
found that the Labor leader felt he could not leave the 
country at that particular time because of America's entry 
into the war. Wilson accepted the decision, and Gompers,
7®Samuel Gompers to N. S. Chekhleiji, March 21, 
1917, and Samuel Gompers to Nscheidge, April 2, 1917, Doc. 
No. 861.00/299, St. Dept.
79Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 11, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/3771, St. Dept.; and Woodrow Wilson to 
Robert Lansing, April 12, 1917, Doc.No. 763.72/4008%, St. 
Dept.
®^Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, April 19,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4029A, St. Dept.; and Woodrow Wilson 
to Robert Lansing, April 24, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4031%, 
St. Dept.
81in turn, offered to recommend a delegate. on May 4, 
he recommended two names to Lansing: James Duncan, First
Vice-President of the American Federation of Labor, and 
James Lord, President of the United Mine Workers, 
described by Gompers "as representing the constructive
Q2radical element in this country." After further dis­
cussion with Gompers, Lansing recommended that Duncan be
selected. The President then extended the invitation,
8 3which Duncan accepted.
The decision to include an American Socialist in
the Mission to Russia was made after the other members
had been chosen. In the early correspondence concerning
the Mission there is no indication that President Wilson
or Secretary Lansing wished such a representative, and,
as late as April 30, Wilson apparently was still unde- 
84cided. The fact that both the English and French 
governments had sent Socialists to confer with leaders 
of the Provisional Government may have encouraged Wilson
8iSamuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor 
An Autobiography (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1925), 398.
82Samuel Gompers to Robert Lansing, May 4, 1917, 
Doc. NO. 763.72/4391%, St. Dept.
88"Lansing Desk Diary," May 5, 1917; and James 
Duncan to Woodrow Wilson, May 7, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/ 
4670%, St. Dept.
84William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, April 30, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4386%, St. Dept.
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to do so. It is also possible that Socialist opposition
to Root encouraged the President to include a Socialist
in order to counteract the conservative image the Mission
had acquired. Regardless of his reasons, Wilson had
decided to include a Socialist in the group by May 3, and
S 5the search began for an acceptable representative.
The first Socialist recommended by Secretary of
Labor Wilson was William English Walling of Greenwich,
Connecticut, who had been criticized by the American
Socialist Party because of his strong support of the
86American war effort. Soon after his recommendation
of walling. Secretary Wilson received from him a lengthy
87letter which he forwarded to the President. ' in his 
letter to the Secretary of Labor, Wailing stated that 
"none of the official leaders of the Majority now in 
control of the American Party can be trusted." It would 
be preferable not to include a Socialist as "the American 
Federation of Labor should represent our working people." 
walling appraised several leaders in the socialist Party 
and indicated those he thought had promoted policies
85Woodrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, May 3, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept.
86William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, April 30, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4386%, St. Dept.
87William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, May 4, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept.
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detrimental to the interests of the united States. He 
also nasntd several, among them Charles Edward Russell,
Opwho opposed the position of the majority in the Party.
After examining Walling's letter, the president
reported to his Secretary of State that it "seems to me
89to show that Mr. Walling is the man we want." Lansing 
was asked by the President to examine Walling's book, The 
Socialist and the war, which was published in 1915.
Lansing informed the President that the work was "a 
compilation of the views of other socialists" but that it 
failed to indicate Walling's own position. After examining 
the opinions of several American Socialists on the war, 
Lansing explained to Wilson that "of these I find that 
the ideas of Charles Edward Russell are more in accord
William English walling to William B. Wilson, May 
2, 1917, Doc. NO. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept. Walling's state­
ment that none of the party leaders could be trusted was a 
reference to the official party attitude toward World war 
I. In March, 1917, the Socialist party called an Emergency 
Convention to decide the party's position if America should 
enter the war. By the time the convention met, war'had 
been declared. The delegates voted on three resolutions 
and overwhelmingly accepted one drafted by Morris Hillquit 
of New York which was known as the St. Louis proclamation. 
It not only condemned the war but also suggested a seven- 
point program of opposition to it. When the Socialist 
party adopted this position, many of its members left the 
party. In addition to Walling, other prominent members 
were Charles Edward Russell, W. J. Ghent, Upton Sinclair,
J. G. Phelps Stokes, A. M. Simons, and John Spargo. David 
Shannon, The Socialist Party of America (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1955), 93-100.
®®W0odrow Wilson to Robert Lansing, May 3, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept.
91
with what I conceive to be the best suited to influence
90Russian Socialists.1
Lansing then discussed the appointment of a 
Socialist with Frank L. Folk, who suggested W. J. Ghent,
91but the secretary of State still favored Russell. Root,
who had made few suggestions about the personnel of the
Mission, then wrote to Lansing suggesting walling. On
the following day, Lansing sent Root's letter to the
President with the comment that "Walling was very
92possibly the man who should be selected." Walling, 
consulted by Folk, informed the undersecretary that 
although he would accept the appointment if it were 
extended, he felt someone else would be more effective 
in view of his split with the majority in the American 
Socialist Party, walling then recommended A. M. Simons, 
John Spargo, and Charles Edward Russell to Polk, who 
relayed the message to Lansing.
Lansing's earlier opinion of Russell was now 
reinforced by Walling's recommendation, and he therefore 
recommended that Russell be the choice, on May 8,
QARobert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, May 3, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4390%, St. Dept.
Q1 "Lansing Desk Diary," May 3, 1917.
92Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, May 3, 1917, Doc. 
No. 763.72/4524%, St. Dept.; and Robert Lansing to Woodrow 
Wilson, May 4, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4524%, St. Dept.
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President Wilson instructed Secretary Wilson to extend
the appointment to Russell, on May 10, Russell accepted
the position and was sent a letter of appointment from 
93the president. As walling had anticipated, the majority
of the Socialist party objected to Russell's appointment
and requested that he refuse with the explanation that
94he did not represent the American Socialist party.
According to Russell, his acceptance of the appointment
95led to his expulsion from the Party.
The selection of a staff for the Mission took con­
siderable time. Colonel William Judson, the Mission's 
Military Attach^, had served as Military Attach^, to 
Russia during the Russo-Japanese war. While in Russia, 
Judson had met Alexander Guchkov, a mild liberal and 
leader of the octobrist party, who, after the March Revo­
lution, was elevated to the position of Minister of War. 
Judson's personal acquaintance with him was now an asset 
and led to his being included in the group. Postmaster 
Albert S. Burleson first suggested Judson for the post.
93William B. Wilson to Woodrow Wilson, May 9,
1917, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, case Pile 64 B; and 
Woodrow Wilson to Charles Edward Russell, May 10, 1917, 
Charles Edward Russell Papers, vol. 6.
94The New York Times. May 16, 1917, 2.
95Charles Edward Russell, Bare Hands and Stone 
Walls: Some Recollections of Side-Line Reformer {New
York: Charles Scribner's, 1933)” 294.
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President Wilson relayed the recommendation and his
96approval of it to his Secretary of War. Colonel R. E.
Ii. Michie was assigned as aide to General Scott and
Lieutenant Alva D. Bernhard as aide to Admiral Glennon.97
Holton C. Curl, a navy doctor, was attached to the group
98as the physician.
Root requested that Lt. Colonel T. Bentley Mott 
be included in the group. Colonel Mott had served Root 
in London in 1903, when the latter was negotiating a 
treaty to determine the boundary between British Columbia 
and Alaska. Shortly after his selection as head of the 
Mission, Root met Mott in Washington and asked him to join 
him on the trip to Russia and Mott agreed." on April 28, 
Root requested Mott's appointment as a military aide and 
the appointment resulted.100
The selection of the clerical staff was assigned
96William V. judson, "Memorandum As To Alexander 
Guchoff Now Minister of war," William V. Judson Papers,
Box 4; and Wbodrow Wilson to Newton D. Baker, May 3,
1917, Woodrow Wilson papers. Box 84, Case Pile 64 B.
97Josephus Daniels to Lt. A. D. Bernhard, May 14,
1917, Woodrow Wilson papers. Box 84, Case Pile 64 B.
"josephus Daniels to Holton C. Curl, May 9, 1917,
Woodrow Wilson Papers, Box 84, Case pile 64 B.
99Mott, Twenty Years, 122, 190-91.
^"Newton D. Baker to Elihu Root, April 30, 1917, 
Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
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to Breckenridge Long, Third Assistant secretary of State.101
This task, wrote Mott, gave "more trouble than all else,"
since "the private secretaries of half the members of the
102House and Senate wanted to go with us." Basil Miles, 
in Petrograd at the time, was finally selected as Secre­
tary to the Mission after Ambassador Francis was consulted
103on his appointment.
Stanley Washburn, who had earlier been named to the
railroad commission which he had interested the government
in sending to Russia, now requested a transfer to the
Root Mission since he felt he would be more useful to that 
104group. Overruling the objections of John F. Stevens,
Chairman of the Railroad Commission, Secretary Lansing
cabled the American consul at Vladivostok to advise Stevens
105that Washburn had been reassigned to the Root Mission.
■L01"Lansing Desk Diary," May 12-14, 1917.
^^Mott, Twenty Years, 193; The papers of the mem­
bers of the Mission as well as the State Department files 
contain hundreds of applications for positions on the 
Mission.
103David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, May 12, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4602, St. Dept.; and Robert Lansing to Basil 
Miles, May 12, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4692A, St. Dept.
104Stanley Washburn to Daniel Willard, May 10, 1917, 
and Stanley Washburn to Newton D. Baker, May 10, 1917, 
Stanley Washburn Papers, Box 1; and Stanley Washburn to 
William Phillips, May 10, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4693^,
St. Dept.
l05John F. Stevens to Robert Lansing /no date/, Doc. 
No. 763.72/5103, St. Dept.; and Robert Lansing to American 
Consul Vladivostok, May 17, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4781B,
St. Dept.
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As civilian aide and interpreter to the Mission,
the State Department selected p. Eugene Prince. Born and
educated in Russia but now a naturalized American citizen,
Prince was employed by Willys-overland, Inc., of Toledo,
Ohio, and was stationed in petrograd. With his employer's
approval, Prince was attached to the Mission for the
106duration of its stay in Russia.
The staff consisted of nine additional persons; 
James P. McKenna, chief clerk and Disbursing officer; 
six clerks, Clyde S. Stilwell, James F. O'Rourke, jay 
Keegan, Duane E. Washburn, Walter W. King, and George D.
Gregory; one messenger, George Long; and one valet, James
_  _ 107Dooley,
10®David r . Francis to Robert Lansing, May 13, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4609, St. Dept.; Robert Lansing to Willys- 
overland, May 14, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4609, St. Dept.; 
and Willys-overland to Robert Lansing, May 15, 1917,
Doc. NO. 763.72/4657, St. Dept.
107The names of the twenty-six men composing the 
Mission and their official titles are found on pages 1-2 
of the "Mission Log" in Box 192 of the Elihu Root Papers.
CHAPTER IV
WASHINGTON, D.C., TO VLADIVOSTOK
The Mission held its first meeting on the morning 
of May 14 at the state Department. All members were 
present except Cyrus McCormick, who would meet the group 
in Seattle, and Charles R. Crane, who would join them in 
Petrograd. A brief session with President Wilson was 
followed by a luncheon given by Lansing.1
The Mission had little time to receive a proper
briefing from the state Department. Root had already
spent several days in Washington in an attempt to gather
2as much information as possible. it is doubtful, how­
ever, that information available in Washington was of 
much help to the group. At that time, the jtate Depart­
ment was understandably preoccupied with problems related 
to America’s entry into World W&r I. There was also much 
confusion about events in Russia, and, more important, 
even as information was received and decisions were made, 
changes in Russia made the policies outdated.
The State Department's major source of information
‘̂"Lansing Desk Diary,” May 14, 1917.
2Ibid., May 9-14, 1917.
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In Russia, Ambassador Francis, proved unreliable and per­
haps prevented the State Department from developing a 
more realistic evaluation of the Russian situation.
Francis' major fault was his overly optimistic evaluation 
of the strength of the Provisional Government. In the 
early days of the Revolution, Francis sent encouraging 
reports, in a dispatch to the State Department dated 
March 24, 1917, Francis reported that the Provisional 
Government was "in absolute contrdl" and that the autho­
rity of the government was "loyally recognized by the army
3and navy and by every municipality and province in Russia."
On the following day he reported that "the situation is
improving daily and I am encouraged to look for a
4favorable outcome." Francis was not alone in his un­
realistic view of the political stability of the Pro­
visional Government. Lansing later recalled that no one
in Washington "appreciated the real menace . . .  to the
5establishment of a Republic" in Russia.
Tttie Secretary of State also sought advice from 
Americans he considered informed on Russian affairs, such 
as Charles Crane, Samuel Harper, and Stanley Washburn.
3David R. Francis to Frank L. Polk, March 24, 1917, 
Frank L. Polk Papers, Drawer 85.
4David R. Francis to Frank L. Polk, March 25, 1917, 
Frank L. Polk Papers, Drawer 85.
^Lansing, War Memoirs, 331.
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Lansing found them "optimistic as to the success of the 
moderate or constitutional Democrats and of their ability 
to control the situation." Crane had returned to Russia 
soon after receiving news of the Revolution. He was in­
tellectually and emotionally attached to the leaders of 
the provisional Government, most of whom he knew person-
7ally. Soon after arriving in petrograd, crane wrote
his son, Lansing’s secretary, that the revolution was
"purely Russian and very characteristic." He also stated
that "practically the whole population took part in it
so there is absolutely no class feeling and no bitterness
8or resentment."
Professor Harper, described by one historian as
Q"an inveterate optimist by temperament," also failed to 
understand clearly the significance of the Russian Revo­
lution. When asked by the State Department to evaluate
6Ibid.
^Lasch, American Liberals, 5-6; and Charles r . 
Crane, "Memoirs, Russia, 1917," p. 174, Charles r . Crane 
Papers.
8Charles R. Crane to Richard Crane, May 4, 1917, 
Hugh Scott Papers, box 1 (Princeton university Library, 
Princeton, N.J.). Copies of this letter were found in 
several sources, and it appears to have been widely cir­
culated at the time. When sent a copy of Crane's letter, 
George Kennan advised his correspondent, "Don't trust 
what Crane says." George Kennan to David Fairchilds, May 
16, 1917, George Kennan papers, Box 8 (Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress).
9Lasch, American Liberals, 6.
the situation, Harper replied that the aim of the revolu­
tion was "to create conditions that would make it possible 
for Russia to bring into force all her strength." This 
would result in "more effective prosecution of war and war 
until victory. "10 Later, in a speech before a group of 
American businessmen, Harper said, "One of the reasons 
for the final success of the political movement /in Russia 
is7  that the businessmen of Russia finally organized to 
support / T t Three weeks later, he remarked that "the
situation in Russia is clearing up" and that he had "not
12been anxious for a single moment." Washburn, the third 
person to whom Lansing turned for advice, was also quite 
sanguine, in fact, he had been warned earlier by his 
editor on The London Times that his reports were too con­
fident.13
Eventually, Lansing received more realistic evalu-
14ations, both from Russia and from sources in the united
•^Robert Lansing to Waodrow Wilson, March 16, 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/297A, St. Dept.
■^"Resum^ of Speech Made at Luncheon of American- 
Russian Chamber of Commerce, March 27, 1917, by Samuel N. 
Harper," Cyrus H. McCormick Papers, Subject File Russia
1917-20, (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 
Wisconsin).
l3Samuel N. Harper to Roger H. Williams, May 17, 
1917, Charles R. Crane Papers.
l3Lord Northcliff to Stanley Washburn, /potetej? 
Stanley Washburn Papers, Box 1.
14Especially the reports of North winship, Ameri­
can Consul in Moscow.
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States. On May 20, Lansing wrote to George Kennan, a man 
he considered "the highest authority in America on 
Russia,"15 and asked his opinion "as to the meaning of
events and their effect upon the conduct of the great
L6war." Kennan sent lengthy letters of advice and copies 
of articles he was preparing for publication in The out­
look. He was concerned about the growing power of the 
Soviets and fearful that the war effort would be damaged
if something were not done to counter the "no annexation,
17no indemnities" policy. As subsequent events would 
demonstrate, Kennan had a clearer understanding of the 
potential power of the Soviets, but even he thought of 
events in Russia only in terms of their relationship to 
the war effort.
The group departed from Washington by train on May 
14, at 6:15 p.m. The four-day trip across the country
15Robert Lansing to George Kennan, May 20, 1917, 
George Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress).
16Robert Lansing to George Kennan, May 28, 1917, 
George Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress).
17Robert Lansing to George Kennan, May 20, 1917, 
May 28, 1917, and June 1, 1917, George Kennan Papers, Box 
4 (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress)* George 
Kennan to Robert Lansing, May 23, 1917, and May 30, 1917, 
George Kennan Papers, Box 4 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress)> George Kennan to Robert Lansing,
May 22, 1917, Robert Lansing Papers, Vol. 27; and George 
Kennan to Robert Lansing, May 30, 1917, Doc. No. 861.00/ 
422̂ 5, St. Dept.
offered an excellent opportunity for the members to ex­
change ideas about the situation they would encounter upon 
reaching Russia. Professor Harper had been advised of the 
Mission's route by Richard Crane who suggested that Harper
accompany the group and give its members the benefit of
L8his knowledge. Harper joined the train on its route to
Chicago and spent one day presenting his "interpretation
of the revolutionary situation" and descriptions of the
19current Russian leaders. He provided a list of news­
papermen living in petrograd and offered comments about 
their recent dispatches. His major criterion in evaluating 
the reporters appeared to have been their willingness to 
transmit news favorable to the Provisional Government, 
in assessing an Associated Press reporter. Harper pointed 
out that he wrote of the sensational aspects of the revo­
lution and neglected to point out "the constructive side 
of the events." Another reporter's dispatches, used by 
The Chicago Tribune and The Hew York Times, were described
by Harper as "excellent because they have emphasized the
20constructive side."
^Richard Crane to Samuel N. Harper, May 15, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4865c, St. Dept.
19Harper, Memoirs, 99.
20"May 14, 1917 Newspapermen working in Petrograd 
Who Have Been Covering the News Services Prom Russia These 
Last Months," Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
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Harper’s influence on the members of the Mission
perhaps created unrealistic reassurance. The professor
felt that his study of Russian newspapers had given him
the "true picture" of the revolutionary situation, and he
was confident that the government would be able to "with-
21stand the friction that developed at petrograd."
The group arrived in Seattle at 2;30 a.m. on May 
20 and was joined by McCormick and captain A. W. Hinds, 
Commanding Officer of the u. £J. £S. Buffalo which had been 
provided for their passage to Vladivostok.
During the first day of their voyage, McCormick 
pointed out to Senator Root the advantage of holding 
conferences during which the members could exchange in­
formation and views pertaining to Russia. At first. Root 
felt that such conferences wauld be of little value, 
since conditions in Russia would dictate the Mission's 
course of action. The following day, after discussing 
the idea with Mott and Bertron, both of whom favored 
his recommendation, McCormick again suggested the idea
to Root. Root agreed and arranged for a session that
22afternoon. During the next twelve days, members of the
2LSamuel N. Harper to Roger H. Williams, May 17, 
1917, Samuel N. Harper Papers, Cabinet I, Drawer I, 
Envelope 9.
22Cyrus H. McCormick, "Diary," May 20-21, 1917, 
Cyrus H. McCormick Papers, Subject Pile "Russia 1917-20". 
Hereinafter referred to as "McCormick Diary."
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Mission found ample time to discuss, and, In general, plan 
their activities In the Russian capital. The practice of 
holding such sessions continued after their arrival In 
petrograd. Root used them to hear the informal reports 
from various members and to discuss and approve official 
dispatches to the State Department.
In the first conference aboard ship. Root began by
summarizing the verbal instructions which President Wilson
23had given them on the day before their departure. Root 
reminded his colleagues of the "three general objectives" 
of the Mission, first and "most important" of which was 
their duty to "express to the Russian people the deep 
sympathy which the American people and their government 
have for the Russian nation and for the new Republic."24 
The second objective was to ascertain the financial needs 
of Russia and to present the American government with 
information to be jed in designating further loans to 
that country, it was Root's understanding that future 
loans to the Allies would depend on the "real needs" of 
each, a matter to be determined by which country was
23There appear to have been no written instructions 
for the Mission. In a speech several months later, how­
ever, Cyrus H. McCormick referred to "sealed orders," 
opened after their departure from the.United States.. 
"McCormick Speech to Chicago Literary Club," cyrus 
McCormick Papers, Subject File "Russia 1917-20".
24"McCormick Diary," May 21, 1917.
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25"doing most to win the war." Hie third objective,
described by Root as "a negative one," was to avoid the
appearance of a strong nation dictating to a weaker one.
He emphatically cautioned his colleagues against insisting
on any particular course of action; in all discussions the
representatives of the Russian government were to initiate
26specific programs.
Most of the discussions on the Buffalo were pro­
voked by questions directed to Senator Root. Usually, 
they were attempts to secure information on current 
conditions in Russia, of what the Mission might expect 
to find upon arrival. The question of American war aims 
was also discussed. The topic had already come up in a 
conversation between Root and Russell while they were 
still in the united States. Walling had suggested to 
Lansing that the President should publicly denounce and 
condemn the "no annexation, no indemnity" concept. After 
Root received this advice, he sought the counsel of 
Russell, who said he not only agreed with walling but had 
already written to Lansing endorsing this position and 
suggested Root do the same. Root disagreed, feeling that 
sufficient information was not available to make such an 




27to express his views to the secretary of State.
In one of the shipboard conferences, James Duncan, 
Labor's representative, stated that the united States 
should "join with Russia on a platform of pursueing /sic7 
the war for the highest principles of humanity, and say 
publicly that there is to be no indemnity and no acquisi­
tion of territory," since this would place the united 
States "in a fine position with the new Russian govern-
2Rment." The information available to Root indicated 
that the term "no annexation and indemnity" was of 
"German origin." Perhaps because of his experience as 
Secretary of State, Root realized that such issues as 
the war aims of the united States, not to mention those 
of the Allies, were far beyond the scope of the Mission 
he headed. Root agreed that president Wilson in his 
speech to Congress on April 2, 1917, had stated that the 
United States sought no compensation and indemnities 
from its entry into the war. This did not, however, 
exclude the possibility of compensation to other nations. 
The united states might join with Russia in denouncing 
any compensation, but "there are quite likely to be some 
occasions arising in the future for demanding from Germany
27Charles Edward Russell, "Diary," May 18, 1917, 
Charles Edward Russell Papers, Box.3. Hereinafter 
referred to as "Russell Diary."
28"McCormick Diary," May 29, 1917.
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29large payments for the damage she has done."
Lest there be any question regarding Wilson’s 
statement. Root read to the members of the Mission that 
portion of the President's Address to Congress. Wilson 
had "weighed very carefully his words," and Root warned 
his colleagues against trying "to improve" upon the 
President's statement. He advised members of the 
Mission to avoid, if possible, any discussion of war aims 
so as not to be misunderstood and reminded them, "This 
jArar aims/ is no part of our errand."
On several occasions, discussion turned to the 
topic of the socialists in Russia and potential problems 
which could arise concerning them. Russell ventured his 
opinion of the socialist role in the revolutionary move­
ment and suggested several factors that would make the 
work of the Mission more difficult. There were, he said, 
several factions or groups of socialists in Russia who
"hate each other more than all of them together hate
31those who are not socialists." He added.
There is no use disguising the fact that the large 
class of socialists in Russia believe that there is no 
essential difference between the political government 
of the United States and the autocratic rule of old 
Russia. They believe that the United States is not 
a democratic republic, but is a Republic in form
29Ibid.
30Ibid.
31,1 McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917.
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only, and in reality the wealthy classes rule every­
thing and make all the laws.32
Russell remarked that socialists who "would probably be
hostile to the United States" would control a majority of
the delegates to the Constituent Assembly, which was to
determine the permanent plan of Russian government.
Therefore, it would be desirable for him to establish
contact with the socialists, and he had brought his "old
33clothes'* for just this purpose. Russell was Incorrect 
in his evaluation of the Russian socialists' view of 
America. At this time, the socialists who held the view 
he described were mainly Bolsheviks and Mensheviks who 
had this opinion of all capitalist countries. They were, 
however, a small minority and not the "large class of 
Socialists" to which Russell referred.
Russell also informed his colleagues that the 
political stability of Russia could be injured greatly 
by the activities of groups he referred to as "radicals" 
or "reds." This element, according to Russell, was similar 
to the "I. W. W . t h e  united States, and consisted of 
“trouble-makers" who could be counted on to oppose the 
Russian government regardless of its form. But, despite 
what Americans in general and the Mission in particular
^"McCormick Diary," May 22, 1917.
33Ibid.
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might think of them# "they are an Influential body of
men in the new Russian Government, and their views and
34their force must be reckoned with."
Russell considered one of the major tasks of the 
Mission to be that of persuading the Russian people that 
the united States was in fact a democratic nation. He 
indicated three major stumbling blocks in the path of 
reaching an understanding with the Russian socialists.
The first was an effort by socialist elements in the 
United states, described by Russell as "strong, resource­
ful, persistent, and ingenious," to do everything possible
to discredit and hinder the work of the Mission. Russell
named Morris Hillquit as the leader of this movement and 
explained that Hillquit had already begun a campaign of
letters to his friends in Russia to undermine the work
35of the Mission. The second obstacle was "pro-German 
socialist propaganda," described by Russell as an 
attempt to gain a separate peace treaty between Germany
and Russia along the lines of "no annexation— no indera-
36nity.” The last barrier was the practice by "Germans 
and misguided men in Russia" of translating for publica­
tion in Russia articles originating in the united States
34,1'McCormick Diary," May 21, 1917.
33»McCormick Diary," May 26, 1917.
^"McCormick Diary," May 28, 1917.
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which, in Russell's opinion, presented a distorted and
inaccurate view of the influence of the capitalist element
37in controlling American politics. Russell was, he indi­
cated, only repeating what was accepted by most Americans. 
Hillquit openly opposed Russell as the representative of 
American Socialists and Russell assumed that he had so 
notified "his friends in Russia." All attempts to dis­
credit the united States in Russia or to end the war with 
a separate peace Russell considered part of a "German 
plot."
Strangely, there is little evidence of lengthy
discussions among the Mission relating to the actual
situation in Russia, ifrus, it is impossible to evaluate
accurately the Mission's views prior to their arrival in
Russia. On the few occasions when Russian political
institutions were mentioned, the comments were usually
vague if not inaccurate. When Admiral Glennon requested
a clarification of the relationship between the Duma and
the zemstvo. Root replied that the Duma and the Cabinet
were "the highest authority in the land," and the zemstvo
38was "as influential . . .  as the duma." Whether through 
ignorance of the current political situation or simply 
omission. Root failed to indicate that the Duma was a
37£McCormick Diary," May 22, 1917.
38"McCormick Diary," May 25, 1917.
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national institution whereas the zemstvo was primarily a
local agency. No one on the Mission mentioned the
Councils of Vforkers' and Soldiers' Deputies, or Soviets,
even though these had received considerable attention in
39the American press,
Another topic which received scant attention in 
the conferences was the importance of organized labor in 
Russia. James Duncan's major task would be to explain the 
American labor movement to Russian workmen. Duncan told 
the Mission that the workmen of Russia were unwilling to 
do anything to aid the German cause and would do every­
thing possible to secure a democratic Russia.^0 He antic­
ipated, however, temporary problems which might result 
from the Russian workers' almost certain insistence upon 
the right to strike. Duncan hurriedly assured his 
colleagues that workmen given this right would not be 
too likely to exercise the power. Senator Foot inter­
jected his understanding that there were two types of 
strikes in use in Russia at the time. There were grievances 
either "real or fancied" in one, but the other was a 
"purely political affair." Duncan agreed and explained 
that the first type resembled strikes common in the United 
States, whereas the latter was associated with the Russian
"McCormick Diary," May 28, 1917.
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Socialist parties, which used the strike as a political
weapon. Duncan proposed to differentiate between the two
types with the aid of Russian workers who had returned
from the United States and were familiar with the system
there. Root gave no indication of his reaction to Duncan's
explanation of the right to strike but pointed out that
"it must be made clear" to the Russian worker "that
industrial development along economic lines is very
different from the political movements which are just
41now in such a very unsettled state."
in addition to discussions of problems which would
confront the Mission while in Russia, questions frequently
arose as to routine procedure. It was agreed that Root
would serve as spokesman for the group In official state-
42ments as well as in interviews with newsmen. Root 
frequently warned his colleagues about their public 
statements and suggested that they be especially cautious 
when talking with reporters. He felt that Russian re­
porters and the foreign correspondents in petrograd would
"require quite different treatment" from that accorded
43American newsmen. Consequently, during his stay in the
41"McCormick Diary," May 28, 1917.
42"Russell Diary," May 17, 1917; and "McCormick
Diary," May 21, 1917.
43"McCormick Diary," June 1, 1917.
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Russian capital, Root held separate press conferences for 
Russian and foreign correspondents.
Another issue which received frequent attention 
was the proposed agenda. Root explained that questions 
as to the schedule of receptions would probably be 
answered by Basil Miles, the Secretary of the Mission, 
who would join them in Vladivostok. McCormick suggested 
limiting the official receptions, and Root agreed that 
they would discreetly inform the appropriate officials
44that the Mission did not expect elaborate entertainment. 
Secretary Lansing had anticipated the burden which would 
be placed on the Russian Government by such a large group 
and had already instructed Ambassador Francis that only 
the members of the Mission and their "immediate personnel" 
were to be considered as "guests of the Russian Govern­
ment." By excluding clerks and interpreters, the "guests 
of the government" were limited to approximately fifteen 
persons.45
The members of the Mission also discussed the 
length of their stay in Russia, since the State Depart­
ment had placed no time limit on their journey. Root 
explained that their departure from Russia would depend
44 "McCormick Diary," May 24, 1917.
45Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, May 31,
1917, Doc. NO. 763.72/5079A, St. Dept.
entirely upon their ability to gather the required infor­
mation but suggested they keep the visit as brief as 
possible, it would be far better to anticipate a tour 
of ten days rather than a month# since they could always 
extend their stay if it became necessary. This would have 
a much better effect than cutting the trip short after 
announcing a lengthy stay# thus giving the impression 
there was not enough business to.keep them occupied. 
"Nothing would be more embarrassing than to have the
Russian people or the government feeling that they had to
46entertain us after we have finished our business."
Colonel Judson later wrote his son that Root felt the
Russians might suspect they intended to "watch them" if
the Mission remained too long. Judson, however# believed
the time proposed was too short to make any adequate
observations# and he hoped to get permission "to stay
47behind long enough to get some real dope."
McCormick mentioned that a Russian commission 
bound for the united States might be in Vladivostok when 
they arrived and suggested a meeting with the group.
Root# however# thought that the Americans should not 
"make any attempt to delay or meet them." In his opinion#
^"McCormick Diary," May 24, 1917.
47William V. Judson to clay Judson, June 2# 1917# 
William V. Judson Papers, Box 4.
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it was unfortunate that the two missions should be working
simultaneously, but it would be up to the State Department
48to "reconcile any matters that arise." McCormick wanted 
to invite officials of the Trans-Siberian Railroad to meet 
with them during their journey from Vladivostok to Petro­
grad and furnish them with information pertaining to local 
conditions. But Root, while conceding that the Mission 
could "receive them politely and hear what they have to 
say," thought it incorrect to "request interviews or
information from anyone until we have presented ourselves
49to the government at petrograd."
Inevitably, the question arose as to their relation­
ship with Ambassador Francis. Root explained that Francis 
had been the first to recognize the Provisional Government 
in "a very dignified and emphatic way" and should be given 
due consideration during their stay in Russia. The Ambas­
sador would probably present the members of the Mission 
to the Russian Ministers on the occasion of their first 
meeting. After that, more informal conferences would be 
conducted "without his presence." warning his colleagues 
that "special missions, as a rule, are not looked on with 
favor by regular ambassadors," Root suggested that "it is 
quite important that we must show that we feel well-satisfied
48 "McCormick Diary," May 22, 1917.
49Ibid.
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50with the good impression he has already made."
Root was accurate in anticipating Francis' atti­
tude. Although the Ambassador cabled Lansing that he 
welcomed the Mission, he expressed misgivings in a 
letter to his daughter. Francis admitted that he was 
“looking forward to its /fission *s7 arrival with some
concern" as it might 'interfere with the pleasant rela-
51tions I have established."
Since little of the time aboard ship was devoted 
to formal conferences, the Mission occupied its waking 
hours in other fashions. Many read material which they 
hoped would prepare them for the task that lay ahead.
Root mentioned reading Russia and Reform by Bernard 
Pares. Mott, oddly, read two volumes of Elihu Root's
c 2published addresses.3 Movies were usually shown during
the evening, and on one occasion the members of the
Mission and the crew of the Buffalo were treated to a
53film on "how to care for and dress a little baby."
Most of the men played deck golf, introduced by John Mott, 
or tossed a sand-filled football, provided by Colonel
50"McCormick Diary," May 23, 1917.
53-David r . Francis to Jane Francis, May 8/21, 1917, 
David R. Francis Papers, Box "May 1917."
52"McCormick Diary,". May 26 and May 30, 1917.
53"McCormlck Diary," June 2, 1917.
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54Mott. McCormick mentioned frequent "dog trots" around 
the deck. Most of the men made the crossing with little 
ill effect. General Scott, however, suffered from sea­
sickness during most of the voyage. After a week at sea
he wrote to his wife that she never need worry that he
55would "turn pirate and take to the sea."
From the first days of their journey, the members 
of the Mission established close personal relationships 
which were not predictable in view of their diverse 
backgrounds. Although selected for various reasons, all 
the members demonstrated strong support for the war 
effort and a feeling that the Mission had an important 
role to play in winning the war. There appears to have 
been a genuine feeling of camaraderie. Years later. 
Colonel Mott noted in his memoirs, "we went out a happy 
family and came back united."
Each man had a rich background in his own chosen 
field which the others respected and found interesting. 
While crossing North Dakota and Montana, General Scott 
told stories of his youth in the Indian country which
54,,The Log," 4-5, Elihu Boot Papers, Box 192. 
Hereinafter cited as "Mission Log."
55Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30, 
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manus­
cripts, Library of Congress).
56Mott, Twenty Years, 195.
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57fascinated the others. Russell, engrossed in the ex­
ploits of the old Indian fighter, filled pages of his 
diary with Scott’s stories. These excerpts indicate a
nostalgia for the frontier completely unexpected in a
53leader of the socialist movement. Due to seasickness,
Scott spent much of the day relaxing in a deck chair, but
he recalled that each morning McCormick brought a blanket
on deck and ninsist/ed7 upon tucking me into my chair and
59wrapping up my feet."
Every man in the group who recorded his reaction
to the Chairman of the Mission expressed respect and
admiration for Senator Root. Colonel Judson found Root
to be "most affable and frank" and possessing "a sense of
60humor I did not suspect." Two weeks later he remarked, 
"Mr. Root grows on me . . . it is a treat to be so clos-3 
to him." Scott described Root as "a very great man" 
and considered himself "roost fortunate to be associated
57"Mission bog," p. 2.
58"Russell Diary," May 15-18, 1917.
59Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30,
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress).
60William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson,
May 17, 1917, William V. Judson papers. Box 4.
®^William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson,
May 31, 1917, William V. Judson papers, Box 4.
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62with him." Later, when writing of the Mission and what 
it had meant to him personally, Scott stated that the 
"greatest advantage" had been the opportunity to know 
Root at "close range" and noted that Root always appeared 
in "good humor" with "something kindly to say to every­
body." Scott believed he "had had the rare privilege of 
close association with the most far-seeing, wisest, and 
sagacious man I had ever seen, and hereby classify him-- 
to my mind— the foremost citizen of the Republic."®2 
Colonel Mott credited Root's "wisdom" and "the charm of 
his nature" with preventing the Mission from breaking up 
into "quarreling groups" and felt that the members 
"truly fed out of his hand."
On one occasion, Mott told Root that he had read 
two volumes of Root's published addresses and compli­
mented him; "in going quite carefully over these 
addresses my conviction has been made stronger than ever 
as to your own absolutely unique and exceptional qualifi­
cations for the presidency of the united States." As 
important as the presidency was, Mott believed there was 
still another position for which Root was "qualified as
®2Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30, 
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manu­
scripts, Library of Congress).
®2Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 30.
®4Mott, Twenty Years, 195.
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no other living man in this or any other country," namely
the "leading part" he could play in the peace negotiations
at the end of the war. McCormick agreed and said that he
had had several conversations along these lines with
65others in the Mission. This great admiration for Hoot
clearly illustrates the political conservatism of most of
the Mission members.
On the last day on board the Buffalo, Hoot again
warned his colleagues to be careful that any statement
was not misunderstood and stressed the "absolute necessity
of discretion." He also repeated President Wilson’s
instructions that the Mission was to "bear a friendly
greeting . . .  to find out Russia’s needs" and to refrain
from giving "any advice or direction as to how to conduct
66Russia's affairs in the present crisis."
On the afternoon of June 2, the coast of Russia
became faintly visible. At 5:30 a.m. on the third of
67June, the U. S. S. Buffalo steamed into Vladivostok.
^5,,McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917. 




Although Captain Hinds had signaled and also used
the ship's wireless to notify the port of his arrival, no
official met the vessel to assign it anchorage. The
Captain of the Buffalo, therefore, selected an anchorage
and waited.1" On their first encounter with Russia, the
Mission had confronted the confusion that prevailed. As
the Army Chief of Staff later recalled, "Here was a ship
of a foreign navy coming into a port in war time and
receiving no notice from anybody. Evidently all officia3~
2had abandoned their duty." perhaps one reason for the 
less than routine port procedure was the fact that the 
Mission arrived on the day of the Russian Feast of
3Trinity or Whitsuntide.
Unwilling to accept the service of the Russian 
navy's small boats which swarmed around the vessel in 
search of passengers, the group remained on board to 
await some Russian official. After an hour, the vessel
■^"Mission Log," 6; and "McCormick Diary," June 3,
1917.
^Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 5.
3"Mission Log," 7.
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was boarded by Lieutenant yestrebev, an aid to the Cora-
4,tnander of the Russian fleet stationed at Vladivostok.
Later, the American Consul in Vladivostok, John K.
Caldwell, came on board along with Major Stanley
Washburn, assistant secretary to the Mission, Lieutenant
E. Francis Riggs, military attach^ to the American Embassy
at Petrograd, Eugene Prince, a Mission interpreter, Hugh
A. Moran, a Y. M. C. A. official, Charles S. Smith,
Associated Press correspondent in Peking, and Lieutenant
5General Krylov, Commander of the Post of Vladivostok.
The American consul explained that he had expected the
Mission to arrive on Monday, June 4, and had received a
telegram informing him of the arrival only after the
6vessel was in port. Nevertheless, the special train
provided for the Mission would be ready to leave at 2:30
7that afternoon.
Lieutenant Riggs had accompanied the Bakhmetev 
Commission bound for Washington, D.C., as far as 
Vladivostok. This group, headed by Boris Bakhmetev, was 
composed of men who would supervise purchases made with 
money already loaned the Provisional Government by the
4Ibid., 6.
5Ibid., 6-7.
6 "McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
7Ibid.
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OUnited States. Eugene Prince had left the Russian capi-
9tal two days after Riggs' departure. Smith joined the 
Root Mission in Vladivostok and obtained permission to 
travel with the party to Petrograd. Lansing let Root 
decide whether Smith could accompany the Mission but 
indicated his own approval in a wire which stated that 
Smith was known to the State Department as a correspond­
ent of "fine character and discretion.
August Held, the general agent for International 
Harvester in Vladivostok, also boarded the Buffalo soon 
after it docked and gave his interpretation of conditions 
in Russia. He was perhaps the first of many persons who 
informed the Mission that discipline in the Army since 
the Revolution had almost disappeared. He attributed 
many of the problems confronting Russia to the radicals 
who were "gradually winning converts to their views."
Many of the "loud talkers" were those who had recently 
returned from the United States. in Vladivostok, this 
element had attempted to discredit the Mission and had 
attacked Root, labeling him a representative of the 
capitalist class. Heid felt, however, that the mass of
« i ■■■» ■  i . i i ■■ —  ■ —  ■ — ■ j
8warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution,
106-07.
8David r . Francis to Robert Lansing, May 18, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4792, St. Dept.
^Robert Lansing to Elihu Root, May 28, 1917, Doc. 
No. 763.72/5121A, St. Dept.
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the Russian people were friendly toward America and that 
the situation could he improved greatly if this element 
could be reached. He suggested that the Mission in some 
way institute a "propaganda of publicity" which through 
"stirring messages" could persuade the people to support 
the war effort. 'The view that adequate "propaganda" 
could persuade the Russians to support the war effort 
was perhaps the most universally held opinion of Mission 
members and persons with whom they consulted during their 
trip. At times it appears that they saw it as a cure-all 
for the problems of Russia, a naive and Unrealistic 
appraisal of the true state of affairs in that country.
At two in the afternoon of June 3, the group
boarded two launches for the pier. 3*hey were met at the
landing by the "local Executive Committee" of Vladivostok,
representatives of the Soldiers* and Workers* Soviets,
Captain V. M. Yakouborsky who represented the city of
Vladivostok, and two young girls who presented a bouquet
of flowers to Root. N. P. Matveov, spokesman for the
group, described by one of the Americans as a "typical
11Russian" with a "full beard and bald head," welcomed 
the Mission to Russia and inquired as to its "aims and 
purposes." "it is our aim," Root replied, "to convey to 
the Russian democracy the good will of America, her sister
H"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
124
democracy? to seek to establish closer cooperation and
friendship between the two nations, and to learn what
the needs of Russia are and to assist her in every way 
12possible." Matveov responded that he hoped the Mission
would meet with success and that "cordial and friendly"
13relations between the two nations would continue.*
Although the Mission learned that there had been
some unfavorable discussion about its composition and 
14objectives, neither the diaries nor the official report 
indicates any significant attempt to prevent their land­
ing or delay their departure for Petrograd. Bertron later
wrote that some "agitators" attempted to stage a protest
15but that it was "ineffective." General Scott recorded
that upon arriving in Vladivostok they were uncertain if 
*they would be allowed to proceed to Petrograd without
l2"Mission Log#" p. 7.
■L3lbid., 7-8; Three days earlier, when the 
Stevenb Commission arrived, one of the members drew 
political implications from a similar reception. The 
reception was headed by a representative of the "Council 
of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies" and "following in 
his wake" were the Military Governor of the Province, 
the Mayor of Vladivostok, and a General "all looking 
cowed and mortified at their part in the performance." 
George Gibbs, "Russian Trip Notes," 8, George Gibbs 
papers (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, 
Wisconsin). Hereinafter referred to as Gibbs, "Russian 
Trip Notes."
14"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
3-5samuel R. Bertron to Edward M. House, June 18, 
1917, Edward M. House Papers, Drawer 3.
125
16some attempt to "blow up the Train." More important is
the fact that on their first encounter with Russia, the
members of Root's Mission failed to recognize the power
of the local Soviet, which prevented any hostile demon- 
17stration.
At any rate, less than an hour after leaving the 
Buffalo, the party was comfortably quartered on a special 
train provided by the Russian government; and under the 
supervision of Vladimir Gorbatenko, an official of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway, they began their trip across 
Russia. The train consisted of seven cars powered by 
two wood-burning locomotives. Root was assigned the 
private car of the railroad's general manager. The 
other members were provided with two bedrooms. Their 
first meal as guests of the Russian Government was in 
keeping with their accommodations. McCormick described 
it as 'fe most delicious affair" which included cavier, 
crab, St. Germain soup, a rice dish with chopped eggs, 
fish, potatoes, and roast lamb as well as other "tid­
bits."18
Notwithstanding their excellent accommodations, 
the Mission observed with unanimous concern the obvious
^Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 5.
■^White, Survival, 142.
^"Mission Log," 8; and "McCormick Diary," June 3,
1917.
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inability of the Russian railway system to relieve the 
port of the tremendous amount of material awaiting ship­
ment inland. Russell described the city of Vladivostok 
as containing between seven and eight hundred tons of 
freight that the Russians were unable to ship inland.
Many of the crates had been broken open, their contents 
exposed to the elements. Russell saw "munitions of war, 
guns, shells, explosives, food, steel, hospital supplies" 
and, in fact, "everything that Russia needs" gradually 
ruining in the streets or in poorly protected warehouses 
in Vladivostok. He felt that this collection of material 
was "a monument to the hapless incapacity of the Russian 
government.II,L
Gibbs, Who was with the Railway Commission, was 
also shocked at the large amount of material stored in 
Vladivostok. He estimated that the stockpile included
150.000 tons of chemicals, 86,000 tons of barbed wire,
100.000 tons of railway material, 160 bales of cotton,
and 50,000 tons of munitions and explosives, unlike
Russell, however, Gibbs thought that "most of these
materials have evidently been systematically cared for,
considering the circumstances, and the result reflects
20credit upon the industry of the port authorities."
^"Russell Diary," June 3, 1917.
20Glbbs, "Russian Trip Notes," 11.
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Gibbs added, however, that the situation illustrated a 
complete lack of "forethought and co-ordination on the 
part of the government." He described as a "crime" a 
situation which allowed material to continue to be brought 
in after there was no possibility of its reaching its 
destination.21
This unfavorable impression of the Russian rail­
way system was later underscored by interviews with 
Russian officials, who constantly mentioned the need for 
locomotives and all types of railway supplies. The 
Mission considered improved transportation so essential 
to the successful prosecution of the war that its final 
report, while acknowledging this to be an area specifi­
cally assigned to the Stevens Commission, placed great
22emphasis on this problem.
The special, train arrived in Harbin about twenty- 
four hours after leaving Vladivostok and was met by 
General Dmitri Horwarth, commander of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway. Horwarth retained his position held 
under the old regime and was described by the socialist 
member of the Mission as a "typical Russian officer," 
very tall and impressive in his elaborate uniform and
21Ibid.
22"Mission Report," Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
i
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23"autocratic to his finger tips." The group was also met 
by a delegation of three Chinese officials headed by wa 
Wang Tingva, a representative of the Foreign office in
Peking, which was to greet the Mission and accompany the
24train through Chinese territory.
Stevens and Charles K. Moser, American Consul in
Harbin, also greeted the Mission. The Stevens Commission
had left Vladivostok at approximately the same time the
25Root Mission arrived. its members had already spent 
several days in Russia and were very aware of the con-
26fusion and poor condition of the Russian railway system.
The two official American groups, appearing in 
Russia at the same time, could have worked at cross­
purposes. The Railway Commission was created before the 
decision to send the Root Mission and sailed from Vancou­
ver for valdivostok the day before Root and his party left 
27Washington. Stevens had asked Lansing to give his group 
diplomatic rank, but Root strongly opposed this, ex­
plaining it would be awkward to have two diplomatic 
missions in the same country at the same time. During
23"Russell Diary," June 4, 1917.
24"Mission Log," 10..
25"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
26Gibbs, "Russian Trip Notes," 9-11.
2^Browder, Provisional Government Documents, II,
702.
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their stay in Petrograd, a certain amount of ill-feeling 
developed between the two groups, due primarily to what 
Stevens considered- interference by members of the Root 
Mission. At least one member of the Railway Commission 
believed that his group received inadequate consideration 
in such matters as hotel accommodations due to the Pro­
visional Government's preoccupation with the Root 
Mission.
Be that as it may, there was some feeling of
rivalry from the two groups' first encounter. Russell
recorded that the departure of the Stevens Commission
from Harbin ahead of the Root Mission "occasioned some
comment." He, however, was impressed with the personnel
of the Stevens Commission and said that he had "never
seen a body of men likely to inspire one with greater
confidence . . . .  _7T7he government has the pick of the
29best railroad ability in America."
During the brief time they were together, Stevens 
briefed Root on the situation. He explained that it was 
neither the congestion in Vladivostok nor the lack of 
terminals that was hindering the movement of freight. 
Although there was a "great lack" of rolling stock, the 
major problem resulted from the "organization of the
28Gibbs, "Russian Trip Notes," passim.
29"Russell Diary," June 4, 1917.
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railway." "A change in the personnel is absolutely nec­
essary if there is to be any success in getting a movement 
30of freight.1 He thought the subordinate workers were
efficient but the "supervising authorities" were "wholly 
31incapable." The same opinion was expressed by another
member of the Railroad Commission who thought that the
major problem was a "complete lack of authority" with
subordinates "moving in circles . . . ignorant of the
32general plans of operation."
The Mission was also met in Harbin by a second 
Chinese delegation, this one representing the Chinese 
Government. It was headed by Wang Lin-goh, a member of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and personal representa­
tive of Wu Ting-fang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
33acting prime Minister of the Peking government. Wang 
presented a letter of introduction from the acting Prime 
Minister which welcomed the group to Chinese Territory 
and also extended them an invitation to visit Peking 
before their return to the United States.3^ Root1s letter
30"McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
3LXbld.
32"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.
33"Mission Log," 10; "Russell Diary," June 5,
1917; and "McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
34Wu Ting Fang to Elihu Root, May 10, 1917, Elihu 
Root Papers, Box 192.
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of reply to Wu, whom he addressed as "my old friend,1
stated that he and the other members would be pleased to
visit Peking, but that the nature of their duties would
not permit it.33 Wang and the other Chinese officials
boarded the train in Harbin and traveled with the Mission
until they reached the limits of Chinese territory the
following day.33
The Mission later considered visiting Peking.
They were strongly advised to do so by Charles S. Smith
37who had just come from that city. Political develop­
ments which occurred in Peking while they were still in
38Petrograd prevented any possibility of a visit.
The Mission was detained briefly in Harbin. The 
party was to board the special train which only a few 
weeks before had been the personal train of Tsar Nicholas. 
In fact, for the next few days the group would be cross­
ing Russia in the very car in which the last Autocrat had 
penned his abdication. The train, nine cars in all, 
included dining cars, a salon, and even a rolling
33Elihu Root to Wu Ting Fang, June 5, 1917, Elihu 
Root papers, Box 192.
36"Mission Log,'1 10.
■^"McCormick Diary," June 6, 1917.
33"Mission Report," 4. in July, Peking was the
scene of an armed clash between the supporters of the
Ch1ing Dynasty and those who favored a Republic thus
making any diplomatic visit impossible.
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slaughterhouse. one member o£ the Mission remarked that 
the train included '’everything that can be thought of for 
the comfort of the traveler." one feature that provoked 
much comment was the amply supplied game area which con­
tained almost every conceivable gambling device. Root sent
his daughter Edith a letter written on a score pad from a
40card table in the Tsar's sitting room. Colonel Mott
"ransacked" the drawers of the card tables and found a
41bridge score card bearing the name "Nicky."
The long trip across Russia was pleasant. After
the first night, McCormick awakened from a "sound sleep"
in "the most comfortable bed I ever had on a sleeping 
42car." Compared to American railroads with their 
"banging and hammering;' Russell considered the trans- 
Siberian like a "sleigh upon ice."43 Colonel ortel, who 
had been in charge of the Tsar's train for fifteen years 
and still remained in that capacity, occasionally told 
the group of his memories of the Tsar and his family.44
39"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917; William V.
Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson, June 5, 1917, William 
V. Judson Papers, Box 4; and "Russell Diary," June 5, 1917.
40jessup, Elihu Root, II, 361.
41Mott, Twenty Years, 196.
4^"McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
43Charles Edward Russell, unchained Russia (New
York and London: D. Appleton and Co., 1918), 181-182.
44"McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
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At almost every stop there were brief speeches. 
Gorbatenko would usually explain briefly to the Russians 
at the station the purpose of the Mission and introduce 
Senator Root. Root would then make a few remarks, 
usually pertaining to the friendship which existed be­
tween the two countries, and would then refer to the
45need for both countries to vigorously pursue the war.
The members of the Mission seldom left the train and then
only for a few minutes in the various stations. Thus,
most of their personal observations were restricted to
the geography of the region through which they passed.
They were impressed by the large number of persons, both
civilian and military, present at all stations. The
apparent lack of disorder and violence re-enforced their
opinion that the great mass of Russians were law- 
46abiding.
The eleven days required to reach the Russian 
capital offered the Mission a second opportunity to con­
sider their situation in Russia and how best to fulfill 
their purpose. The time spent on board the Buffalo had 
been used to exchange views on Russia, but no one on 
board the vessel had been in Russia since the overthrow
^"Mission Log," passim; copies of several similar 
speeches are found in Box 136, Elihu Root Papers.
"McCormick Diary," passim; "Russell Diary," 
passim; and "Mission bog," passim.
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of the Tsar^ and most of the men realized that their 
knowledge of Russia was wholly inadequate. The second 
leg of their lengthy trip, however, was one in which the 
members began to receive impressions and form opinions 
which were to be reflected in the final report which they 
submitted to the Wilson Administration.
One superficial source of information was personal 
observation, if only from the window of the Tsar's train 
and from railway stations. More important were the many 
hours of conversation with Americans who had been in 
Russia during the past few months, other Americans, not
officially attached to the Mission, frequently met the
train and offered the party information and interpreta­
tions. Many Russians who accompanied the group also 
contributed to the opinions formed by the Mission members 
prior to their arrival in Petrograd.
Although the Mission had a keen interest in a 
multitude of topics, their major concern lay* in two areas* 
the events of the past few months which had led to the 
creation of the Provisional Government, and the chances 
of its survival. They were equally interested in the
Russian war effort and the chances of Russia's staying in
the war.
General Scott, later describing the Mission's 
arrival in Vladivostok, made a point of the fact that
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during wartime a vessel of a foreign nation had entered
the port without the knowledge of the commander of the 
47port. For the first few days after the Mission left 
Vladivostok, there was little to change this first im­
pression of Russian negligence and disorganization. The
Mission was constantly confronted with trains loaded with
48soldiers traveling away from the Front. on their first 
full day of travel, McCormick observed that the "predom­
inant feature" of all the railroad stations they passed 
was the large number of soldiers "without any apparent 
reason for their being there." This led him to believe
that the Russian soldiers were apathetic toward "all the
49issues of the war." After almost a week of travel, a 
troop train was finally seen going toward the Front.**0 
One member of the Mission described this event as "the 
first real good sign we have had since reaching Russia."51 
Root remarked that "the saddest thing as I see it is 
the apathy of the Russian soldiers. They seem to have
47Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 5.
43"Russell Diary," passim; "McCormick Diary," 
passim; and Hugh L. Scott, "Diary," passim. Box 71 
(Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress). Herein­
after cited as "Scott Diary."
49"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.
50"Mission Log," 16.
51"scott Diary," June 11, 1917.
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no snap, no objective and to be generally taking things
,.52 easy."
This pessimistic view came not only from the 
Mission1s own observations but also from its discussions 
with persons who had been in Russia during the past few 
months. Heid believed that Russia’s future would be 
determined by the military. He painted a pessimistic 
picture of the Army:
At present they are entirely without disci­
pline. The soldiers come and go as they please 
and take no orders from the officers except as 
such orders may be approved by the soldiers' 
committee. They get up at 9 or 9:30, have no 
drill, walk about the streets, . . .  and, in 
short, seem to be enjoying a complete vacation 
from all military duties, lhis atmosphere 
pervades everything else, and there is no 
discipline anywhere.53
Lieutenant Riggs, who joined the Mission in
Vladivostok, also furnished information about Russia's
military strength. He informed John Mott and McCormick
that Russian troops were "about ready to lay down arms"
prior to the Revolution and would have done so had not
the united States entered the war. The Russian troops
found the war "a very distasteful cause" and America's
entry into the war was the "only influence" capable of
54keeping the Russian soldiers in the war.*' No evidence
52"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
53"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
54"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.
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substantiates this observation, which probably resulted
from America's distorted opinion of the effect of its
entry into the war.
Riggs estimated that “fully 12 or 15 percent" of
the Russian troops along the front had deserted. There
had also been cases of fraternizing between the Russian
and German troops, if the Germans wished to make an
advance, they would be able to “go through the Russian
lines like a circus rider through' a paper hoop. " Riggs
felt, however, that the German armies were waiting quietly
in the hope of winning over the Russian troops by "in-
55action and generosity."
Riggs was quidk to point out that the situation 
in the army resulted primarily from conditions which had 
existed— and which he had personally observed— prior to 
the Revolution. Army discipline and conditions were so 
harsh and inhuman that one could not expect the common 
soldier to react in any other manner. After the Revolu­
tion, soldiers and citizens were intoxicated with their
new-found freedom. "All discipline had stopped" and they
56were "enjoying a grand holiday." Riggs then explained
Ibid. Lieutenant Riggs was wrong in his esti­
mate that American entry into the war had maintained 
military discipline in the Russian Army. He was apparent­
ly unaware of the primary cause of the collapse of army 
discipline; neither he, nor any other observer, mentioned 
"Soviet Order No. 1."
56Ibid.
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to the Mission that if Russia were to leave the war# the
United States would be the "next nation in line” to supply
troops for the Allied cause. He therefore emphasized that
everything possible should be done to keep Russia in the
war even if it was only "an appearance of continuing the 
57war." Reuben H. Smith# an interpreter who had joined
58the Mission of June 8 at Krasnoyarsk# gave essentially
the same evaluation as Riggs.5® At least one observer
believed that the crisis in the Army had passed, it was
Vladimir Gorbatehko's opinion that many soldiers had
returned home expecting an immediate division of the
land. When they found that this was not forthcoming#
60they began the return to their units. Gorbatenko's 
view was completely erroneous.
During their first fdw days in Russia# the mem­
bers of the Mission came to believe that the military 
situation was far from satisfactory. They unanimously 
voiced the urgent need to persuade the Russian people to 
pursue the war vigorously. From both Russians and 
Americans living in Russia, the members heard that oppo­
sition to the war was largely the work of German
57Ibid.
58"Mission bog#" 15.
5®"McCormick Diary#" June 9, 1917.
80"McCormick Diary#" June 10, 1917.
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propagandists and that a propaganda bureau would be the 
most effective for fighting this technique. Members of 
the Root Mission were so ignorant of the deeply rooted 
desire of most Russians to end the war that they assumed 
that anyone who tried to halt the fighting must be a 
German sympathizer or under the influence of German 
propagandists.
In addition to their concern over military prob­
lems, the Mission demonstrated an intense interest in 
the political situation. Not only had the entire Tsarist 
governmental structure been overthrown, but there had 
already been a shift in the membership of the Provisional 
Government. The new government, known as the First 
Coalition, was created at approximately the same time 
the Root Mission left the united States. The change 
resulted from Miliukov's failure to alter Russia's ex­
pansionist war aims. Although non-socialists were still 
in the majority, the new cabinet contained six socialists 
whereas the first had had only one. As events were 
occurring so'rapidly, the Mission engaged in very little 
discussion of current politics prior to their arrival in 
Vladivostok. After their coming, however, they fre­
quently analyzed the shifting political scene.
Basil Miles, the Mission Secretary who along with 
Lieutenant Ramsey of the Russian Foreign office joined the
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group at Ekaterinburg on June 11, attempted to brief the
Mission on current political trends. He requested the
American Consuls in Vladivostok and Harbin to secure
fi 1newspapers for the use of the Mission. After he
joined the group, he frequently read articles from
62Russian newspapers which dealt with politics. But, 
as with military affairs, the Mission's greatest source 
of information seems to have been conversations with 
Americans and Russians who traveled with them across 
Russia.
Without exception, persons who had been in Russia
during the past few months and had expressed an opinion
felt that politics would not become stable for several
63weeks or even months. Heid was one of the first to 
give,, an evaluation of the political situation. He 
pointed out that the Revolution had brought general 
instability and little if any direction. A major cause 
for this, said Heid, were the Russian "anarchists" who 
recently returned from the united States. This element, 
an extremely small minority of the Russian people, 
albeit the most active element, was "gradually winning
Basil Miles to American Consul, Harbin and 
Vladivostok /̂ no date7, Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
62"McCormick Diary," passim.
63-ihis view was expressed by Heid, Eitikoff, 
Katterfield, Smith, and Brittenham. "McCormick Diary," 
passim.
141
converts to their view." Heid believed that the Mission
could render a "great service" if it created an agency
to persuade the "large middle class of quiet thinking
people" to exert an influence on Russian political life.
in Held's opinion, the situation had "improved somewhat
under the coalition government," which he predicted
64"will succeed." Heid's reference to the existence 
of a large middle class and its potential influence on 
politics was obtuse, if not stupid. Advice of this 
caliber prevented the Mission from acquiring a realis­
tic view of the situation in Russia.
Another impression that the Mission received 
from these discussions was that the recent cabinet 
changes strengthened rather than weakened the Provisional 
Government. Lieutenant Riggs, who described former 
Minister of War Guchkov as "a man of autocratic tem­
perament," considered Kerensky an improvement who would 
"be able to do more with the materials at hand."
Tereshchenko would "do just as well" as Miliukov, whom
65Riggs described as a "student and idealist." This 
opinion of Miliukov was also held by Eltikov who told 
Duncan that the Russian leader had "lost his standing 
with the people" as he had been "too opinionated, too
^^"McCorroick Diary," June 3, 1917.
"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.
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66idealistic, too impracticable." Smith was optimistic 
about the recent changes in the cabinet and pointed out 
that Kerensky had made speeches which had "strengthened 
the soldiers very much." He described the new Minister 
of War as "a man of purpose" who would try to "bring
67order out of the chaos that surrounds his department."
In expressing their reactions to the recent cabinet 
changes, the observers made no mention of the party or 
ideological affiliations of Guchkov, Miliukov, or 
Kerenksy, nor did they mention that the changes increased 
the power of the socialists.
Another viewpoint was that the unstable politi­
cal situation would probably change several times 
before a period of stabilization developed. This led
some observers to suggest the possibility of a takeover
68by a dictator, a development which might be desirable.
At least one member of the Mission appears to have
accepted this view. Samuel Bertron wrote Colonel House
that a takeover by a dictator who would remain in power
until a constitutional assembly met "may be a good 
69thing."0
66"McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
^"McCormick Diary," June 9, 1917.
68"McCormick Diary," June 5 and 9, 1917.
®^Samuel K. Bertron to Edward M. House, June 18, 
1917, Edward M. House Papers, Drawer 3.
143
Although there was considerable discussion by
the Mission of "radicals'* and "anarchists," there is no
evidence that the members, any more than others in
Russia at that time, were aware of the Bolshevik threat
to the Provisional Government. Perhaps the only specific
reference to the Bolsheviks came from Gorbatenko, who
informed the Mission that "the only menace to the new
Republic is at Petrograd." The danger came from a small
group of extreme socialists. Led by Lenin, who possessed
"cleverness in planning" and an "unscrupulous character,"
they were able to exert far more influence than their
numbers would indicate, Gorbatenko's solution to the
problem would be to arrest Lenin and "put him where he
70cannot communicate with the outside world." in view 
of later political developments, Gorbatenko*s fears 
were well-founded, in May, 1917, however, few persons, 
and certainly no member of the Mission, recognized that 
threat.
It is apparent, therefore, from conversations 
and interviews with persons who had been in Russia 
during the past few months, that Mission members received 
a fairly hopeful view of the political situation. Air* 
though all observers had agreed that there would be a 
period of considerable political unrest, no one seemed
70"McCormick Diary," June 10, 1917.
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to doubt that the Provisional Government would stay in 
power. Obviously, such advice proved to be incorrect. 
Perhaps the most noticeable error was the inability of 
the observers to discern the division of power between 
the provisional Government and the petrograd Soviet, in 
fact, the petrograd Soviet was not even mentioned.
On June 13, 1917, at five in the afternoon, 
after approximately one month of travel, the Mission 
reached its destination. The train bearing Ambassador 
Root and his colleagues arrived in a "dingy and far from 
imposing" Petrograd station, where they were joined by
71Charles R. Crane, the remaining member of the Mission.
71,1'Russell Diary," June 13, 1917
CHAPTER VI
OFFICIAL RECEPTIONS
The Mission was welcomed at the Petrograd rail­
road station by a Russian delegation headed by Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs M. I. Tereshchenko, American
Ambassador Francis, members of the Embassy staff, mili-
1tary advisors, and members of the consular corps. The 
Mission did not record any displeasure at their recep­
tion. A young Russian naval officer who was present, 
however, recorded in his diary that the whole affair had 
been "sloppily managed." He suggested that the Mission 
failed to notice the Russian Honor Guard because the 
dingy khaki uniforms "blended perfectly with the dirty 
yellow walls of the station." The reception did not
include a military band due, no doubt, to its refusal
2"to be bothered."
Following a few brief remarks and a good deal of 
confusion, the group was assigned to automobiles and 
driven to the winter Palace where quarters had been
L,,Mission Log," 17-18.
2White, Survival, 138.
3"McCormick Diary," June 13, 1917.
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4provided for their stay In petrograd. Ambassador Hoot 
and General Scott were assigned adjoining rooms on the 
second floor overlooking Palace Square. The other members
were assigned rooms on the third floor with a view of the
5Winter Gardens.
Those who recorded reactions to their accommoda­
tions were impressed with the tremendous size of the 
structure. Russell compared the distance from his bed- 
rooto to the dining area to the "distance from 27th to 
32nd Street on Broadway." Anyone unfamiliar with the
"maze of intricate corridors, passages, stairways and
£
twisting and twining" needed a guide. McCormick ob­
served more precisely that the distance from his room to
7the front exit required "440 steps."
Other impressions of the Winter Palace tended to 
reflect the personality and past experience of the in­
dividual. General Scott, who occupied a suite once 
used by Catherine the Great, commented on the "heavy and 
expensive" furniture. He was more impressed with the 
Palace's almost fortress-like structure and described in
4Charles Russell commented that during the trip 
across Petrograd,'"tense crowds filled the near-by streets 
and stared upon us.but without the least ripple of a 
cheer." "Russell Diary," June 13, 1917.
5"Mission Log," 18.
6 "Russell Diary," June 13, 1917.
7"McCormick Diary," June 13, 1917.
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some detail the walls three feet thick and the doors
gcovered with steel plates. McCormick complained of having 
to share a hath. Russell did not know the "imperial para­
site" who had formerly occupied his suite but suspected
"for reasons to be mentioned delicately if at all" that
git had "housed a woman."
On the afternoon of June 14 the Mission was formally
presented to Tereshchenko by Ambassador Francis, who had
been temporarily delayed by a conference with the Stevens
Commission.^ The group walked the short distance to the
Foreign Ministry in "solemn state and long-tailed coats."11
In his introductory remarks, Francis stated that the pur-
12pose of the Mission was to bring "good will and sympathy"
13from the oldest democracy to the youngest. Tereshchenko 
made appropriate remarks of welcome in excellent English 
which impressed the Mission members. He referred to the 
war only once.
8 "Scott Diary," June 13, 1917.
^"McCormick Diary," June 13, 1917; and "Russell 
Diary," June 13, 1917.
^"McCormick Diary," June 14, 1917.
llMRussell Diary," June 14, 1917.
12prancis consistently referred to the group as a 
"Commission" rather than a "mission." White, Survival,
143.
13"McCormick Diary," June 14, 1917. This reference 
to the youngest and oldest democracies was a favorite 
clich£ among the Mission.
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Senator Root then explained to the Foreign Minister 
that the Mission brought friendship and sympathy and was 
prepared to "show our sympathy in stronger ways than words." 
He continued, "We will bring you money, we will help you 
with commodities . . . and we will help you with men."
Plans were made to present the Mission to the remaining 
members of the Provisional Government on the following 
day.14
The Mission gathered at 9:30 p.m. on June 15 in 
the Gold Room of the Winter Palace. Accompanied by aides 
and others who were attached to the Mission, they pro­
ceeded to the palace of the Council of the Empire where
15they were joined by Ambassador Francis and his staff.
Foreign Minister Tereshchenko greeted the men and escorted 
them into the Council chamber. Ambassador Francis intro-
16duced Senator Root, who then read his prepared statement.
Root's address may well be considered the most 
significant message the Mission delivered. He began by 
complimenting the Russian people on their recent revolu­
tion and explained that news of the revolt was greeted
^"McCormick Diary," June 14, 1917.
15"Mission bog," 21-22.
16A copy of Root's speech had been provided Teresh­
chenko in order that he could prepare a reply. The Address 
had been translated into Russian, and members of the Cabi­
net followed Root’s remarks in copies available to each. 
"McCormick Diary," June 15# 1917.
with "universal satisfaction and joy" in America, in an 
obvious attempt to emphasize the reluctance of the Ameri­
can government to interfere with the course of the Revolu­
tion, Root assured his audience that "America knows little 
of the special conditions of Russian life which must give 
form to the government and to the laws which you are 
about to create." Turning to the war, Root expressed a 
view which he and other members of the Mission repeated 
on several occasions; "The triumph of German arms will 
mean the death of liberty in Russia." In order to save 
the Revolution, Germany must be defeated. Root left no 
doubt as to his government's desire for more active 
military participation: "We are going to fight . ... for
your freedom equally with our own, and we ask you to 
fight for our freedom equally with yours." Root con­
cluded by stating that Mission members wanted to discuss
"practical and specific methods" for cooperation between
17the two governments.
The Russian Foreign Minister's reply to Root was 
also couched in generalizations, and reference was again 
made to the "oldest and newest republics in the Vforld." 
Tereshchenko read long passages from the American Declara­
tion of Independence and noted numerous similarities
^"Root's Address to the Council of Ministers,
June 15, 1.1917," Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
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between the two nations. With regard to the war, Teresh­
chenko pointed out that the Russians had "no wish of 
conquest or domination and are opposed to those ideas in 
others." He emphasized that this change "in our inter­
national relations and in our international policy" had
18come as a result of the Revolution.
The Americans were obviously disappointed in
Tereshchenko's reply. McCormick observed that it was
"most general" and made no reference to "the very impor-
19tant points made by senator Root." General Scott com­
mented that the speech "failed to put the emphasis on the 
fighting of Germany" and observed that, if Germany were
not defeated, "all these other airy superstructures of
20the freedom of Russia will go by the board." The members 
of the Mission might have been more sympathetic toward the 
Foreign Minister had they known the degree of anti-war 
sentiment. Even as Tereshchenko made his reply to Root, 
one member of the Provisional Government requested that a 
Russian officer attached to the Mission explain that "we
18"Address of Minister Tereshchenko of Foreign 
Affairs At Reception of Special Diplomatic Mission From 
America, June 2/15, 1917," Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
One million copies of Root's address and Tereshchenko's 
reply were printed and distributed. David R. Francis 
to Robert Lansing, June 7/20, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/
6073, St. Dept.
19»McCormick Diary," June 15,1917.
20»scott Diary," June 15, 1917.
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are tired of this war /7 we are7 weary of the long and
21bloody struggle."
Following the formal addresses, members of the
Mission held short conferences with officials of the 
22Cabinet. During these informal discussions Russell 
thought he detected a reluctance to accept the necessity 
of vigorous prosecution of the war. In conversations with 
the Minister of Food Supplies and the Assistant Minister
i
of Agriculture, both of whom were moderate socialists, 
Russell stated that it was necessary to pursue the war 
"for the sake of democracy." Although they agreed with 
Russell, they "admitted it in a manner perfunctory and 
juiceless."23
McCormick found that "the personality of the 
ministers was most interesting." prince Lvov he charac­
terized as "a quiet looking, rather shabbily dressed, 
silent man, who did not appear to have the knowledge and 
executive ability which his record credits him with." 
McCormick's concern with Lvov was unnecessary, for he 
was merely a figurehead by this time. McCormick described 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs as "easily the leading 
figure among the ministers." He found Minister of War
2lWhite, Survival, 144.
22"Mission Log," 22.
23"Russell Diary," June 15, 1917.
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Kerensky to be "forceful, persuasive and persistent . . .
Were it not for his inexperience and his strong socialis­
tic tendencies, he would be one of the strong leading 
figures in the ministry." McCormick's assessment of 
Kerensky was erroneous. Kerensky was still very much a 
socialist and was perhaps the strongest member of the 
Provisional Government. Minister of Finance Shingarev, 
with whom he would be most directly concerned, impressed 
McCormick as "a man who is trying to do his very best under 
a difficult situation," but he doubted that medical
24training "fitted him for such a position as he now holds."
The group returned to the Winter Palace after 
approximately one hour with the Provisional Cabinet.
Having presented the united States' formal greetings to 
the Government, each member of the Mission began to con­
centrate on his individual area of interest and to hold 
interviews and conferences with appropriate Russian 
officials to gather information for his report.
During the trip across Siberia,. Root had cautioned 
the Mission that Ambassador Francis might resent their 
coming and suggested that the group do nothing which 
might complicate their relationship. Root knew that the 
regular Ambassador might view their presence as an enfringe- 
ment on his authority, and he was correct in that assumption.
24"McCormick Diary," June 15, 1917.
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When Francis first heard of the creation of the special 
mission he entertained serious reservations as to its 
effectiveness. The Ambassador knew most of the members 
of the Mission, and when their names were announced from 
Washington, objected only to the chairman. In Francis'
opinion, Root was a "partisan Republican," and this might
25influence his actions. Following his first meeting with
the Mission, Francis still felt that their coming was a
26mistake which would burden him with additional work.
In fact, throughout their stay in Russia, Ambassador
Francis was occupied with the task of introducing Root
and the others to the members of the provisional Govern- 
27ment. His feeling of suspicion soon disappeared, how­
ever, and Francis established an extremely cordial 
relationship with the group. As early as June 18 he
wrote that he was "getting along very pleasantly" with 
2ftthe Mission. Shortly before the time of the Mission's
25David R. Francis to Edward B. Lilley, May 1/14,
1917; and David R. Francis to Willoughby Smith, May 1/14,
1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box "May 1917."
26David R. Francis to Jane Francis, May 31/june
13, 1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box "June 1917."
27Francis' appointment book indicated that he 
had appointments or lunch with one or more members of the 
Mission almost every day. "1917 Appointment Book," David 
R. Francis papers, b o x  "Miscellaneous 1917."
28David R. Francis to Perry Francis, June 18, 1917, 
David R. Francis Papers, Box "July 1917."
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departure, he reported to the State Department that his
relationship with "Senator Root and every member of the
29Mission" was "exceedingly pleasant." His doubts about 
the Mission's effectiveness, however, remained unchanged.
The presence in Petrograd of the American Rail­
road Commission headed by Stevens was another area of 
potential conflict for the Root Mission. Root wanted 
the railroad group attached to his Mission in some way, 
but Wilson denied this request. Since any request for 
large-scale loans to aid the Russian railroad system had 
to come through Root's Mission, this led to problems.
The two groups met from time to time and, for the most
30part, they attempted to coordinate their efforts.
Shortly before the Mission's departure from Petrograd, 
Stevens developed the feeling that his work was being 
hindered by interference from Root and his colleagues.
This conclusion was also expressed by the diplomatic 
group. This conflict, however, in no way affected the 
Mission's view that assistance to the Russian railroad 
system was perhaps the most vital service that Americans
29David R. Francis to Frank I,. Polk, July 13, 
1917, Frank L. Polk Papers, Drawer 85. This is also 
expressed in personal correspondence. "My relations 
with them were pleasant and there was no friction what­
soever." David R. Francis to Perry Francis, July 3/16, 
1917, David R. Francis Papers, Box "July 1917."
30"McCormick Diary," June 17, 19, and July 3,
1917.
could render.
Members of the Mission hoped that they would be
able to "stir up enthusiasm" for the war effort in Russia.
They thought that this could be accomplished by visiting
31several Russian cities. in a discussion of this topic
on June 18, the Mission mentioned the cities of Msscow,
32Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinostav, and Kharkov. Russian
officials were asked their views of such a tour. The
Minister of Finance told McCormick that it should be
avoided unless the Mission was prepared to explain the
33extent of American financial aid, and Kerensky appeared
"cold but polite" when General Scott described the pro- 
34posed travels. peshchechonov. Minister of Food
Supplies, concurred with his colleagues, explaining that
the proposed tour might be misinterpreted by "a certain
35part of the Socialist circles." in view of these 
reactions, the Mission dropped the idea of an extended 
tour. The only other city it visited was Moscow.
Shortly before midnight on June 21, the Mission 
left Petrograd by special train for the ancient capital.
33-"Scott Diary," June 13, 1917.
32,,McCormick Diary," June 18, 1917.
33,’McCormick Diary,” June 19, 1917.
34”Scott Diary," June 20, 1917.
35"McCormick Diary," June 20, 1917.
Russell and Colonel Judson remained in Petrograd. The
former had “little taste . . . for sight seeing at a
time when hell is popping" and felt that it was more
important to try to make contacts in the Petrograd Soviet.
The latter preferred to remain in Petrograd in order to
gather further information and noted that he had "seen
37the sights" of Moscow before.
The others arrived in Moscow early on the after­
noon of June 22 and were met by the Mayor of the city, 
Nicholas I. Astrov. Root addressed a group of approxi­
mately seventy-five members of various organizations in
3ftMoscow later in the afternoon. At 8:30 that evening
the Mission attended a meeting of the Moscow Duma for
their official welcome. Members of the Mission had been
provided a translation of the Mayor's address but were
unable to follow the addresses given by other members of
the Duma. One member of the Mission observed that "no
adequate preparations" had been made to provide sufficient 
39interpreters. Root's reply* to the welcome was optimis­
tic and emphasized Russia's ability to govern itself at
36"Russell Diary," June 22, 1917.
3^William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson,
June 24, 1917, William V. Judson Papers, Box 4.
38"Mission Log," June 22, 1917.
88"McCormick Diary," June 22, 1917.
15740the local level. As there were no provisions for housing 
the Mission, they returned to their special train for the 
night. They continued to live on board while in Moscow.
On the next day, Root spoke to four groups before
41lunch. For the most part his remarks were general in 
nature, but While addressing the War Industries Committee 
he referred to the willingness of American Labor to sus­
pend the eight-hour day for the duration of the war, a
remark which no doubt was intended to suggest a possible
42course of action for the Russians. Before a meeting 
of the Bourse, Root made the only public speech which 
can be interpreted as a recommendation in the area of 
domestic politics. He described to his audience the 
safeguards to property written into the United States 
Constitution and explained that a person had the 
assurance that his property "cannot be taken away from 
him." "We shall," he said "look with the greatest in­
terest to the work of your Constitutional Convention to 
see how far you find it desirable, or find yourselves 
able to include guarantees and safeguards, against
40America1s Message To The Russian People;
Addresses By The Members Of The Special Diplomatic Mis- 
sion Of~The unltecTstates To Russia in The Year 1917 
(Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1918), 23-28, Here­




43destroying the fundamental basis of enterprise."
Following a luncheon at the National Hotel as
guests of the City of Moscow, Root met with the Procurator
of the Holy Synod of Russia. The conversation almost
immediately shifted from the Russian Church to Russian
politics. Root was pleased to hear the conservative
leader say that the government would be able to pursue
44the war vigorously.
on June 24, their last day in Moscow, the Mission 
occupied itself with seeing the sights of the city, in­
cluding the Kremlin and Sparrow Hills, and attending a
choral concert. They then boarded the train for the
45return to petrograd. An.American newspaper reporter
who accompanied the Mission to Moscow felt that the group
left there with a "distinct sense of encouragement" and
46now viewed the situation with "greater optimism."
The Mission arrived in petrograd in midafternoon 
on June 25, following a twenty-hour train trip. After 
resting a few hours, Ambassador Root, General Scott, and 
the military members of the Mission boarded their special
^America's Message, 40-41.
44"Account of a conversation between Mr. Root and 
Mr. Lvov, Moscow, June 10/23, 1917," Elihu Root Papers,
Box 136.
45"The Mission Log," 28.
4®The New York Times, June 27, 1917, 1.
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train once more, this time bound for the Russian General
Staff Headquarters at Mogilev under the command of General 
47Brusilov. General Scott and the military personnel
planned to continue the journey to include a visit to
48the Russian Front.
Minister Tereshchenko accompanied the Mission, 
thus giving Root an excellent opportunity for uninterrupted 
discussions with him. Thus far, Root's chances for con­
ferences with Tereshchenko had been limited, since the 
Foreign Minister had become ill shortly after the group 
arrived in Petrograd and had been confined to bed for two
A Qweeks. Root remained at Headquarters for less than 
twenty-four hours. During that time Brusilov stressed
the need for immediate aid, especially railway equip-
^ 50 ment.
Root was impressed by the General's plea or per­
haps by the unrecorded conversations he and the Foreign 
Minister had during their two days of travel. Shortly 
after his return to petrograd, Root held a conference 
during which he outlined Brusilov's estimate of his needs
47"Mission Log," 28-29.
48Described in Chapter on Military.
49"Russell Diary," June 25, 1917; and The New York 
Times, June 30, 1917, 1.
50"Address of General Brusiloff at Stafka, June 
14/17, 1917," Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
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and for the first time agreed that the united States should
extend new credit for additional engines and freight cars.
He was also pleased to inform the members of the Mission
that Brusilov planned a military offensive for the near 
51future. it was decided at this conference that they
would leave petrograd for home on July 9. This would
allow General Scott ample time for his tour of the
52Russian Front and his trip to Rumania.
The day following Root's return, reports reached 
members of the Mission that the government anticipated 
problems in connection with demonstrations and parades 
which were planned for Sunday, July 1. Major Washburn 
had been informed by a secretary in the Foreign office 
that the Mission's special train would be made ready 
and that the government desired the group to visit 
Finland on Sunday. Root agreed, but was opposed by 
Russell and Duncan who felt that this channel of infor­
mation was not official. Furthermore, their sources of
information indicated that the planned demonstrations
53would be peaceful.
The Mission decided to inform the government that
51"McCormicX Diary," June 28, 1917.
5 2Ibid.
53"Russell Diary," June 30, 1917; and Russell,
Bare Hands and Stone walls, 360.
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they had already made appointments for the following day
and would prefer to remain in Petrograd. The matter
remained undecided until the evening of June 30, when
Tereshchenko told Root that he would like the members to
remain if they chose, since he anticipated no trouble.
Had he felt otherwise, he would not have planned to be
54absent from the capital. Therefore, only Root accom­
panied the Foreign Secretary. They left Petrograd on
the evening of June 30 and returned the following evening
55after a brief visit to Tereshchenko's dacha in Finland. 
Sunday proved to be quite uneventful. Although the citi­
zens of Petrograd turned out in large numbers to parade
56and demonstrate, there was no violence.
Following his visit to Finland, Root remained in
Petrograd until his departure for the United States on
July 9. During this week he continued his appearances
before various organizations and his daily conferences
with both Russian officials and Allied diplomats. Ready
to end their stay, Root did so as soon as possible after
57Scott's return from the front.
"McCormick Diary," June 30, 1917.
55,'Mission Log," 31-32.
" M c C o r m i c k  Diary," July 1, 1917; and "Russell 
Diary," July 1, 1917.
57"Mission Log," 32-36; and Elihu Root to Michael 




In trying to determine Russia's financial needs, 
the Mission was continuing an established American policy. 
Less than twenty-four hours after President Wilson presented 
his war message to Congress in 1917, Secretary of state 
Robert Lansing cabled the American Ambassador in petrograd 
to "ascertain if financial aid or credit is desirable by 
the Russian Government." Ambassador Francis was instructed 
to determine the amount desired and to what extent such 
credit would be used to purchase goods in the united 
States.1
Following conferences with Russian Minister of 
Finance Shingarev, Francis informed the state Department 
that the loan "would be highly appreciative by Council of 
Ministers and all Russians." He also quoted the Minister 
as saying that all of the money would be used "in the United 
States by direct purchases and not through British inter­
vention as heretofore." The Russian government expressed 
a need for $500 million, "provided tonnage . . . can be 
secured." The Russian Minister understood that both
■^Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, April 3, 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/131, St. Dept.
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England and France were to receive loans of that amount
and that anything less "would be injurious to the new
2government and humiliating to Russia."
Francis strongly supported the loan. He thought
it "advisable from every viewpoint of policy" and "absolute
ly" backed by Russia's "boundless forests, immeasurable
deposits of ores and oils, and immense areas of tillable 
3lands." t w o weeks later the Ambassador again urged his 
government to extend credit and told the Secretary of the 
Treasury that "Russia can undoubtedly meet all obligations.
On April 21, 1917, Lansing advised Francis that 
Congress had provided three billion dollars for loans to 
the Allied governments. He pointed out, however, that 
reports had reached the united States "of the /Russian7 
Government being under the influence of extreme social­
ist parties that aim at a separate peace." Lansing 
emphasized the bad effect of such reports in the United 
States and added that the Ambassador should "widely inform 
the Russian leaders . . . that measures should be taken in 
order to redress the unfortunate bad impression produced 
on the American people." To prevent any possible
2David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, April 6 , 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/133, St. Dept.
3 ib id.
^David R. Francis to William G. McAdoo, April 21, 
1917, Doc. No. 861.00/135, St. Dept.
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misunderstanding of the position of the United States
Government, Lansing concluded his dispatch unequivocally:
"A separate peace would preclude the possibility of any
5kind of assistance on the part of America."
On these orders from the secretary of State, Francis
conferred with Guchkov and Miliukov on the question of the
stability of the Provisional Government. Pointing out to
them that he had done all he could to "assist the Ministry,"
Francis explained that he "felt considerable official and
personal responsibility concerning a stable Government in
Russia." If the Ministry, however, was unable to give more
"satisfactory evidence" of its stability, the Ambassador
would be "compelled to advise /hi.&7 Government not to
extend the aid which /he/ had been continuously recom-
mending." The Russian ministers did not appear to resent
the implication, in fact, "Goutchkoff seemed very much
pleased at the statement" and suggested that Francis make 
7it public.
With this background in mind, it is not surprising 
that one of the Root Mission's most important functions 
was to ascertain the financial needs of the new government.
5Robert Lansing to David R. Francis, April 21, 1917, 
quoted in Browder, Provisional Government Documents, II, 
1053.
£David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, May 8 , 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/4675%, St. Dept.
7Ibid.
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This assistance would presumably help persuade Russia to 
remain in the war as well as enable it to prosecute it 
more effectively. Although Wilson never stated a policy 
of "no war, no dollars," this policy was well-established 
prior to the departure of the Root Mission and was never 
neglected by the President's representatives during their 
sojourn in Russia.
On the day of the Mission's departure, Root, in a 
conference with Lansing and McAdoo, supported a policy of 
immediate aid to Russia. He asserted that "the need for 
rolling stock in Russia is so urgent and so necessary to 
the conduct of the war that it would be unwise for the 
Government of the united states to wait until the Special 
Mission . . .reaches petrograd before giving any aid in
Qthis respect." Lansing and McAdoo agreed and arranged a
loan of $100 million to the Provisional Government on the 
9following day. information concerning the loan was 
released to the press immediately and added to the 
prestige of the Mission in the United States.̂ *0
On the first full day of the Mission's voyage from 
Seattle to Vladivostok, May 21, the topic of loans to
aElihu Root to William G. McAdoo, May 16, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
^William G. McAdoo to Elihu Root, May 16, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
■^The New York Times, May 17, 1917.
Russia dominated the afternoon conference. Root reported 
that the Milner Commission of England had set $175 million 
as the amount that could "properly be utilized, in view of 
the congestion of the means of transportation," by Russia 
in 1917. He explained that the Russian Charg£ d ’Affaires 
in Washington had given him "the distinct impression that 
he was much disappointed that Lord Milner had thus arbi­
trarily limited the amount to be loaned to Russia." Despite 
that complaint, Root warned the members of the Mission: "We
. must be very careful in any recommendation we make which 
would go beyond the $175,000,000 settled upon by Lord 
Milner. "'L1
Both McCormick and Bertron, who would be most 
directly concerned with Russia’s finances, appeared to be 
more generous with their government’s money. Bertron 
questioned Root’s use of the Milner figures as a guideline* 
"Will not the measure of the cordiality with which we are 
received be determined by the amount in excess of 
$175,000,000 which we recommend our government to appro­
priate to Russia?" He answered his own question with 
another; "is it not quite desirable that we should make 
our recommendation cover a substantial sum in excess of 
Lord Milner’s $175,000,000?"12
"McCormick Diary," May 21, 1917.
l2Ibid.
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McCormick next conceded that extension of $100
million in credit would create a favorable impression in
Russia. He then revealed a vague understanding of the
Mission's purpose with his question, "How far does this
commission have anything to say upon the question of
13further loans?" McCormick proposed that the Mission
follow one of two possible procedures. They could wait
until their return to the united States to make any
specific recommendations, or they could "immediately cable
to the President" the financial needs of the Russian
Government. McCormick obviously favored the latter
course, as he remarked that the first procedure "would
delay the application of any further money to Russia for
14a period of say three months." Root accepted the validity
of McCormick's argument but, more aware of the workings of
the Executive branch of the government, .:replied: "I feel
that the line of natural action /for the Mission/ would
15be a medium one between the two you have suggested."
Root's view prevailed and the Mission requested the exten­
sion of limited credit while in Russia. They delayed 
further recommendations until they returned to Washington.





topic of a commercial treaty with Russia. Root briefly 
explained the cancellation of the Russian-American 
Commercial Treaty of 1832, indicating that this action 
had resulted from considerable political pressure applied 
to the Taft Administration by Jewish elements in America. 
Root specifically referred to the action of Representative 
William Sulzer of New York, who "took it upon himself to
frame a /congressional/7 resolution which in Its language
16was roost insulting to Russia." Root squelched any 
desire McCormick and Bertron may have had to arrange a new 
commercial treaty: "I do not think it would be wise for
us to take up now in our interviews and negotiations any 
question of the formation of a new treaty." This in no 
way implied that Root failed to see the potential of such 
an agreement. He felt, however, that any such negotiation 
would "come up in its own way at the proper time. "̂ *7
During a conference a few days later, McCormick 
again introduced the topic of a commercial treaty: "I
have several interesting papers which the state Department 
has sent me relating to the commercial treaty with Russia, 
which expired by notice on January 1, 1913, and I submit 
them to you, Senator, and to any other members who would 




a commercial treaty, Root pointed out, "According to our 
instructions we have nothing to get from Russia. There­
fore, it is best that we say nothing about a commercial 
treaty." Root indicated the pitfalls in any attempt on 
their part to discuss such a treaty and emphasized;
In fact we want to keep as far away as possible 
from any assertion that we have come for any 
commercial advantage whatever to the United states.
The charge has been made and will again be repeated 
by those who are our enemies, or by those who are 
ignorant on the subject, that the United States is 
always after money: that it will do anything for
a pecuniary profit. This sentiment we have to 
counteract.1°
Pour days later, Root told the Mission of a request
from citizens in Nome, Alaska, that the Mission secure a-
"post for trading with Russia." He intended to turn the
request over to Ambassador Francis and warned his
colleagues, "We are not here on a business errand. We
must keep clear of promoting American business or American
interest of any kind . . . .  we must not merely refrain
from suggestions of getting a benefit of any kind for the
United States, but we must avoid even the appearance of 
19such a thing." That seemed to settle the matter of a 
commercial treaty if not of loans.
On May 22, McCormick again -attempted to gain 
information about the precise lending policy of the
^"McCormick Diary," May 26, 1917.
19"McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917.
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American government. He asked the chairman: "is it a
condition precedent to the making of our loans to Russia
that the money provided to them shall all be spent by
them in the united States, or is any portion of the loan
to be available for the Russians for use in Russia?" Root
replied, "I understand that at least three-fourths of the
money provided by the United States is to be spent in the
20United States for supplies to be sent to Russia." It
is apparent from McCormick's questions and comments that
he was not altogether sure of the scope and limitations of
the Mission beyond the fact that he and Bertron were to
ascertain the financial needs of the Russian government
and report these to his own government. Bertron had
conferred with secretary McAdoo prior to departure, yet
he appears to have been equally uncertain as to their 
21position.
In a conference on May 24, Admiral Glennon sug­
gested the possibility of making "some direct contribu­
tion to the zemstvo organizations to strengthen their 
hands." Root replied that he felt the Mission should not 
"distinguish in . . . financial arrangements between two 
different branches of the Russian government's operations,"
20"McCormick Diary," May 22, 1917.
21Samuel r . Bertron to William G. McAdoo, July 2, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
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and that "all financial arrangements should go through one 
22channel."
On May 30, General Scott asked the members if it 
were not possible that they would "be asked pointedly as 
to what kind of co-operation we are proposing? Are we to 
bring to Russia men or money?" Root answered:
It was clearly pointed out to us by the President 
that we have no authority to make any proposition the 
acceptance of which would be a contract on the part 
of the united States . . . .  We are not carrying to 
Russia a bunch of propositions . . . /although/7 if 
they have any definite suggestions or any wishes we 
will hear them. ^
On May 31, Bertron read to other members of the 
Mission "some figures with regard to the finances of 
Russia." The New York banker pointed out that the 
Russian debt, which had stood at nine billion rubles 
before the war, had now reached a figure of twenty-eight 
billion. During the same period the annual budget had 
risen from two and eight-tenths billion to four billion 
rubles, in a somewhat optimistic tone he stated that 
"after the war /financial7  matters will adjust themselves 
to the former normal conditions." Senator Root's reaction 
expressed exactly what he had warned them against voicing 
openly:
^"McCormick Diary," May 24, 1917. Glennon did 
not indicate to which "zemstvo" organization he referred.
23"McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917.
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As I think over the question of Russia's finances, 
with the richness of its mines and the wealth of its 
agriculture, I feel that ample American capital is 
ready to come to Russia to help in its development if 
onely /sic7 one question could he settled, and that 
is the stability of the present government. That is2 * 
the only menace I see to Russia’s future prosperity. 4
Russell, sounding more like a banker than a social­
ist, responded to Bertron1s summation of the Russian 
financial situation with a question: "What are the chances
of Russia's returning the money that we lend? . . .  it 
seems significant that no advance on the eastern front has 
been made— no effort in fighting has been made since the 
revolution." This caused Russell to "wonder how badly 
Russia wants the money from the United States." Duncan, 
pointing out that the United States should not expect the 
Russian Army to make any immediate military advance due to 
problems of establishing a sound government, was confident
that "as soon as the government is in working order . . .
25you will see discipline and action and results.'
Dissatisfied with this explanation, Russell won­
dered why the Russians had "not utilized their forces to 
make any attempt to go forward against the. enemy" if the 
Revolution had not affected the Russian military potential. 
Root concluded the discussion with the statement that the 
Russian military potential was one subject they would
24"McCormick Diary," May 31, 1917.
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attempt to measure, it was quite natural, he said, that
"the united States cannot put in its money unless it is
26for the very best interest of Russia."
The railway trip from Vladivostok to petrograd had 
given all members of the Mission the opportunity to gather 
firsthand information on conditions in Russia. Because 
of their special interest in Russian financial problems, 
McCormick and Bertron were particularly interested in 
the reports of representatives of International Harvester 
Company who joined the train on its journey across Russia.
At the request of McCormick, August Held joined 
the group in Vladivostok on board the Buffalo and accom­
panied them for a brief time. Although Held was primarily 
concerned with the cause and the eventual course of the 
Revolution —  a matter which he thought depended almost 
entirely "upon the question of the military" —  he was 
able to provide illustrations of the effect the Revolu­
tion had had on business. To Held, the major problem 
for Russian business was the uncertainty of a labor force 
even with the inflated wages. He felt that time would 
solve the problem, since "a majority of the business and 
workmen are tired of the present situation and the pre-
27vailing disorder."
2^"McCormick Diary," June 3, 1917.
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When Lieutenant Riggs joined the group in Vladi­
vostok/ his observations and impressions were concerned 
primarily with the war effort, but he also offered 
suggestions with regard to Russian finances and American 
loans. He first noted it would be wise to explain to 
the Russians that the sending of a Mission to ascertain 
need in no way indicated reluctance on the part of the 
United states to extend aid to the Russian government, 
in particular, Riggs advised the group that the United 
States should not "be too particular about the terms" 
for granting aid. "To ask a definite promise from the 
ministry that they would continue the war," he said,- 
"would bring a speedy acquiescence, but what is the 
promise of a ministry worth that is subject to change at 
any moment?" Riggs thought it possible that the loan 
would not be repaid in full, but "the need is so impera­
tive that we must make the advance, even if we charge a
large share of them /loans~7 to profit and loss later 
28on."
Root agreed with Riggs and probably spoke for the 
Mission when he remarked, "If the Russian soldiers will 
not fight, then the united States must quit giving them 
large suras of money; but we can afford to take great 
chances on the question of their fighting —  I should say
28"McCormick Diary," June 4, 1917.
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2Qchances of ten to one would be reasonable." a  few days 
in Russia hardly equipped Root to handicap the Russian 
Revolution.
On June 9, McCormick was met at Novo-Nikolaievsk 
by representatives of International Harvester. Business 
conditions in this area were unstable as a result of the 
Revolution. McCormick learned that although the company 
had granted forty-five per cent wage increases to its 
employees, approximately half of them had quit. The 
company had received a letter from one of its customers 
saying he "supposed all machines belonged to the govern­
ment . . . and that would release him from the necessity 
of paying the note he owed." The Harvester official felt 
that the letter "was not written in a spirit of trying to 
defraud us, but from an ignorance of the conditions, and
from a supposition on the part of the peasants that now
30everyone could do as he liked."
Although officially excluded from consideration, 
the topic of post-war commercial relations inevitably 
crept into discussions of the Russian situation. Smith, 
an interpreter attached to the Mission, had been in Russia 
for seventeen years. Most of this time he had been con­
nected with English mining interests. Smith, pointing out
29"McCormick Diary," June 5, 1917.
30"McCormick Diary," June 9, 1917.
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that Germany "had always been more active than any other 
nation in seeking Russian trade," felt that Russian com­
merce would again be dominated by the Germans once the 
war was over, "unless there is a strong law passed pro­
hibiting German trade."31*
The same position was taken by the international 
Harvester representative at Ekaterinburg. When McCormick 
asked him about the "effect of German trade" after the 
war, he replied, "I believe the Germans will come into 
Russia in strong force . . . trying to capture all the 
trade which they had before." He suggested that "the 
United states will have to join together in concert with
Russia if they intend to prevent Germany from resuming
32the large share of the trade aftorthe war."
On the last day of the trip to petrograd, E. A. 
Brittenham, manager of international Harvester in Russia, 
joined the train and conferred with Root and the other 
members of the Mission. Root found his evaluation of the 
situation "more hopeful" than that of other representa­
tives of the company. Brittenham pointed out, however, 
that industrial production in Russia had fallen off as 
a result of the Revolution. Using the Harvester works at 
Lubertzy as an example, he explained that although wages
31Ibid.
32iiMccormick Diary," June 11, 1917.
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had increased in some cases as much as one hundred per
cent, production had fallen by twenty-five per cent. He
was confident that, given time, the situation would
stabilize. Brittenham said that the American loan of
S100 million had brought "a general feeling of great
relief and satisfaction" not only because the money was
desperately needed but because it allowed the Russians
to "feel a certain independence of England upon whom they
have heretofore been obliged to rely solely for their
33financial support."
Brittenham supported other observers about the 
advisability of a commercial treaty with Russia. Satis­
fied that the Germans would "make a great effort to 
recover the supremacy in trade that they had in Russia 
before the war,"he proposed an immediate effort "to get 
some law which /wbuld7 make a discriminatory tariff in 
favor of the Allies*
The Mission arrived in petrograd on June 13. 
McCormick and Bertron were invited by Ambassador Francis 
to lunch with Shingarev, Minister of Finance, on June 16. 
Their first meeting consisted of a briefing on the general 
nature of Russian finances. To pursue the financial needs
^"McCormick Diary," June 13, 1917.
34Ibid.
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35of Russia in more detail, they met again on June 18 and 
for two hours conferred with Shingarev and his assistant 
Samen, who spoke excellent English. The two Americans 
left the conference with material pertaining to Russia's 
financial situation and examined this the same afternoon. 
They also carried away the impression that Shingarev 
expected that further loans would be arranged while the 
Mission was in Russia. They noted that "he seemed dis­
posed to hasten the procuring of all the information we 
could ask for."3^
That Shingarev expected financial arrangements to 
be made immediately was confirmed in a conference held the 
following day. When asked about the advisability of the 
Mission's visiting various Russian cities, Shingarev 
replied that the reception and usefulness of such a junket 
would depend upon whether the Mission was prepared to 
announce substantial loans to Russia. McCormick replied, 
"We are not a financial body, and we are not empowered to 
make any loans." He explained, however, that the Mission's 
recommendations were to be used by the American government 
in reaching a decision on the subject. Shingarev "showed 
a great deal of concern at this statement" and asked if it
^"Memorandum ©f interviews Etc. by Cyrus H. 
McCormick," Cyrus H. McCormick Papers, Subject Pile 
"Russia 1917-1920." Hereinafter cited as "Interviews 
by Cyrus H. McCormick."
36"McCormick Diary," June 18, 1917.
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would be possible for the Mission to cable their recommen­
dations, thus hastening the process. McCormick said it 
might be, but he must first consult with the other members.
To emphasize his position, Shingarev explained 
that "all the people of Russia are waiting now to know 
what America, which is now our friend, can do for us in 
a financial way." McCormick’s reply, designed to leave 
"the ball in the other camp," was that "all the people of 
America" were also waiting for the answer to a question:
"When will the Russian soldiers be able to make an advance 
against their enemies /~?_7" The Russian, shrugging his
shoulders, replied, "I wish I could answer that question,
37but I am not able to do so." The two Americans left 
the Minister's office after being told that further finan­
cial information which they had requested would be delivered 
within the next two days.
Bertron and McCormick left Petrograd en route to
38Moscow shortly before midnight on June 21. They had 
not yet received the information requested from Shingarev. 
Upon reaching Moscow, they asked Root if they could call 
the Embassy in Petrograd and ask that it secure the promised 
information from the Finance Ministry. Root strongly opposed 
this action, feeling that "any indication of haste on our
37"McCormick Diary," June 19, 1917.
38"Mission Log," 26.
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part would be a sign of weakness." "An inquiry upon 
special.points made in such an unusual manner would almost 
commit us later on toward recommending that our government 
on these points at least should comply with the wishes of 
the Russians."39 This was an indefensible position, since 
one of the very purposes of the Mission was to gather 
pertinent information so as to accurately assess Russia's 
financial needs.
Finally, after a two-week delay, McCormick and 
Bertron received from the Minister of Finance the informa­
tion necessary to complete their evaluation of Russia's
40financial needs^ The delay is difficult to explain. 
Perhaps Bertron's opinion that the Ministry was "busy with 
politics" and had given "little thought to how our services 
can be applied in aiding them" was correct.41.
While in Petrograd Bertron and McCormick had con­
ferences with Peshchechonov, Minister of Food and Supplies,
42and Stephanov, Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry.
The few records of these conferences indicate that the 
Americans held discussions on a rather general plane in 
order to gather information for their recommendations to
39"McCormick Diary," June 22, 1917.
40"McCormick Diary," July 5, 1917.
41*Samuel R. Bertron to Edward M. House, June 18, 
1917, Edward M. House papers, Drawer 3.
42"Interviews by Cyrus H. McCormick.”
181
the united States government. On one occasion, however, 
Stephanov's assistant showed Bertron and McCormick "in­
genious charts" of proposed improvements in transportation. 
Although the men were "favorably impressed" with the plans, 
they "were not surprized /sic7" that they had not been put
43into effect, This was to be done in the "next few weeks."
in addition to the conferences with the Russian 
Ministers of Finance, Food and Supplies, and Commerce and 
Industry, Bertron and McCormick also held interviews with 
other Government officials, Russian bankers and manufac­
turers, and representatives of American business and
44financial interests in Russia. They limited their
inquiries to the more conservative elements of the Russian
financial community and on at least one occasion met with
45a former financial advisor to the deposed Tsar.
All of the bankers whom they interviewed were opti­
mistic, although to varying degrees, over the ultimate 
establishment of a stable and responsible government.
The bankers criticized the Provisional Government for its 
laxness in gaining control over the population, especially 
the soldiers. The president of the Azov-Don Bank, described 
by McCormick as "one of the highest financiers in petrograd,"
43"McCormick Diary," June 28, 1917.
44"Interviews by Cyrus H. McCormick."
45"McCormick Diary," June 17, 1917.
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suggested that Russia needed a dictator who would maintain
control until elections provided for a permanent govern- 
46ment. He also informed Bertron and McCormick that 
there had been a noticeable increase in subscriptions for 
the Russian "Liberty Loan" in the past two weeks and
47repeated this claim to other members of the Mission. of 
the three billion rubles guaranteed by banks, over one- 
half had already been purchased by individuals and, "not­
withstanding this large subscription, the deposits in the
48banks have also increased." Two other bankers inter­
preted the sale of the Liberty Loans as an indication of
a growing confidence in the government, as two-thirds had
49been purchased by early July. These figures failed to 
impress the two Americans, and they later reported that 
the total amount had not been sold and that less than one- 
third of one per cent of the Russian people had purchased 
the bonds.
On vfaether America should attempt to aid in 
stabilizing the ruble, Bertron and McCormick received
46"McCormick Diary," June 19, 1917.
47"McCormick Diary," June 17, 1917.
48"McCormick Diary," June 29, 1917.
4 9 Ibid.
50i'3ertron-McCormick Report," Appendix to "Mission 
Report," Elihu Itoot Papers, Box 192. Hereinafter cited 
as "Bertron-McCormick Report."
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conflicting advice. A representative of the International
Bank wanted the United states to purchase rubles on the
New York market. The president of the Russian Bank of
Foreign Trade opposed this approach. He thought that such
a policy would "attract an indefinite supply of rubles for
sale." in his opinion, the value of the ruble could be
restored only through increased confidence in the Russian
government and increased Russian exports. This led him to
suggest that any American support should "be an economic
51one and not artificial." Bertron and McCormick sup­
ported the latter's arguments. Since the beginning of the 
war the ruble had dropped from a par value of fifty-one 
cents to twenty-two cents in relation to the American 
dollar. This was due in part to the tendency of "local
capitalists" to liquidate their assets and to "remove the
52proceeds to foreign countries."
There is no evidence that Bertron or McCormick 
discussed the question of a new Russo-American commercial 
treaty, although it is quite possible that the topic arose 
in the many unrecorded conversations with various repre­
sentatives of Russian finance and industry. That the 
leaders of Russia's commercial interests were not only 
willing but anxious to discuss the possibility of closer
51,,McCormick Diary," July 4, 1917. 
5^"Bertron-McCormick Report," 4-5.
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commercial ties with the united States is obvious, on 
the afternoon of June 21, Bertron and McCormick, accompa­
nied by Root and other members of the Mission, attended a
special meeting of the Russo-American Committee, an organi-
53zation created to promote trade with the United States.
In a speech before the assemblage, N. N. Pokrovsky,
President of the committee, advocated closer economic
ties with the United States. He felt that the United States
had attained its current level of "economic development and
prosperity" because it had "not crushed personal initiative
and energy" but had "given it full freedom in developing
54the natural resources of the country."
Thirteen short speeches delivered by representatives 
of the various economic interests in Russia followed, with 
few exceptions the speakers followed Pokrovsky’s lead.
They pointed out that Russia's past form of government 
had prevented a close economic relationship with the 
United States. Abdication of the Tsar, however, had re­
moved any obstacle to the creation of closer economic ties.55 
Although he apologized "for mentioning such prosaic
53 "Mission Log," 26.
54"Address Delivered by N. N. Pokrovsky, President 
of the Russo-American Committee," Doc. No . 763.72/7487, St. 
Dept.
55"Speeches Delivered At The Special Meeting Of 
The Russo-American Committee, June 21, 1917," Doc. No. 
763.72/7487, St. Dept.
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business matters at such an exceptional occasion," E. S. 
Karotygin, President of the Chamber of Export, suggested: 
"Simultaneously with . . . the successful conclusion of 
the war preparatory steps /should be made7  for the building 
up of peaceful economic relations and the elucidation of 
the mutual interests of the Allies in different branches 
of trade and commerce." The speaker indicated that the 
United states could easily replace Germany as a source of 
supply for manufactured products and could receive directly 
from Russia "certain raw materials1' which heretofore had 
been 'bbtained from Russia through Germany.”5® The same 
view was expressed by the president of the Association of 
industry and Commerce. Recognizing that currently assis­
tance was limited to "the task at hand,11 namely the 
successful prosecution of the war, the speaker then stated 
that there was "no reason to doubt that this collaboration 
in warfare against the mutual enemy will prepare the road 
for a more complete rapprochment in various economic 
questions, from which both Allies can expect nothing but 
advantage. 1,57
Senator Root, delivering the reply to the various
56"Address Delivered by E. S. Koratysln, President 
of the Chamber of Export," Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
57"Address Delivered by N. N. Cutler, President, 
Association of industry and Commerce," 2 Doc. No. 763.72/ 
7487, St. Dept.
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speeches, explained that '‘the Mission has no function to
discharge in respect to industrial and commercial life."
The topic had, in fact, been "intentionally excluded from
the scope of its duty." He did suggest that after the
war "all those relations of industry and commercial life"
58would no doubt result. Bertron and McCormick supported
59this viewpoint.
Throughout their stay in Russia, McCormick and 
Bertron were anxious to hasten the process of securing 
American loans for Russia. On at least two occasions, 
following interviews with the Russian Minister of Finance, 
they asked Root to cable Washington to request additional 
money. Assuming that the Wilson Administration would extend 
further credit to the provisional Government, they wished 
to capitalize upon the favorable reaction which would 
result. The amount they usually mentioned was an addi­
tional $100 million, though on one occasion Bertron 
suggested a sum of twice that much. This amount was 
along the lines of the "medium" that Root had suggested 
during their journey to Russia, yet Root opposed the idea 
and offered different reasons on each occasion. He first 
objected because he felt that any request for money should 




the Minister of Finance. He later argued that Germany
might overrun Russia and it would be like putting "money
6 0on the sidewalk for Germany to pick up."
The last attempt of McCormick and Bertron to secure
an immediate loan to Russia occurred on July 7, two days
before their departure for the united States. In a morning
conference of the Mission, McCormick proposed that a cable
be sent to Washington seeking an additional fifty or one
hundred million dollars credit to Russia. They were
supported by Russell. The other members supported Root's
view that requests for further credit should be delayed
61until their return to Washington.
In an afternoon session of the Mission on July 8,
the day before their departure from Russia, Root informed
the others that he had received an urgent request from the
Minister of Foreign Affairs for an immediate loan of
seventy-five million dollars. The money was needed to pay
Russian troops in Finland, where the Russian ruble was 
6 2unacceptable. With the approval of the Mission, Root 
and Ambassador Francis sent a telegram to bansing to 
strongly recommend the loan. They emphasized that the
60"McCormick Diary," June 20 and June 28, 1917.
6^"McCormick Diary," July 7, 1917; and "Russell 
Diary," July 7, 1917.
6^"McCormick Diary," July 8, 1917.
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existing government and Russia's military security would
6 3be seriously endangered if the loan were not forthcoming.
Less than twenty-four hours after receiving the 
request, Polk, Acting Secretary of State in Lansing's 
absence, replied favorably. He instructed Francis to 
inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the seventy- 
five million dollar loan would "be made available imme­
diately."64 The Mission had left Russia before the reply 
reached petrograd, and they were not informed of the 
government's action until their arrival in the united 
States. This was the only specific request for immediate 
credit made by the Mission during the trip to Russia, and 
the prompt action of the State Department left the members 
no room for criticism. This loan, like other efforts 
made by the united States during this period, did not 
succeed in keeping Russia in the war or in stabilizing 
the political situation. Russia's problems were such 
that the infusion of American dollars alone could not 
solve them.
63Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, July 8 , 1917, Doc. 
No. 861.00/154, St. Dept.
64Frank L. Polk to David R. Francis, July 9, 1917, 
Doc. No. 861.00/157, St. Dept.
CHAPTER VIII
MILITARY
The Root Mission's roost important function was to 
evaluate Russia's financial needs. Another major chore 
was to determine Russia's ability to remain effectively 
in the war. President Wilson tactfully avoided any 
reference to this latter phase of the Mission's work in 
his message to the provisional Government, but Russian 
officials were well aware that American aid would be 
contingent upon their ability to continue as an effective 
force in the war against Germany. Although each member 
of the Mission would pay close attention to Russia's 
military potential, this part of the Mission's work fell 
primarily to two men, Major General Hugh L. Scott, and 
Rear- Admiral James H. Glennon.
President Wilson's choice of General Scott, chief 
of Staff of the united States Army, as a member of the 
Mission is difficult to explain, perhaps the selection 
of Scott was intended to increase the prestige of the 
Mission and flatter the Russians, but it removed from 
Washington a man who should not have been spared at such a 
critical time. General Scott was unenthusiastic about his
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appointment to the Mission. He later recorded that when
approached by Secretary Baker he had replied that he "did
not wish at all to leave the United States at that time
while we were preparing to go to war with Germany." He
was, however, "completely at the disposal of the President"
1and would "cheerfully" follow his wishes. General Scott
accepted the president's decision gracefully, but Colonel
Judson wrote to his wife that he had the impression that
Scott did so reluctantly and suggested that "his coming
2was doubtless arranged for more reasons than one." The
implication was that the president utilized the Mission
as a means of removing Scott from Washington, D.C.
Apparently, the Chief of Staff viewed the trip with
some trepidation. During the lengthy voyage from Seattle
to Vladivostok, Scott wrote his wife, “I wish I knew . . .
what the war Dept., is doing— No doubt I would be surprised
3if I knew some of the things being done." Almost a month 
later, he wrote her again that he had been "wondering a 
great deal" about his position when he returned. Realizing 
that he might have been replaced as Chief of Staff, Scott
iscott, "The Russian Revolution," 2.
^William v. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson, May 17, 
1917, William V. Judson Papers, Box 4. Judson apparently 
realized that Scott's appointment was being used to get him 
out of Washington. When Scott returned to Washington, he was 
immediately relieved of his position as chief of Staff.
3Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts, Library
of Congress).
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stated that "none of us" is indispensable and that "the
4Secretary may have discovered this for himself."
Although Scott accepted the position with the Root 
Mission unwillingly, he conscientiously fulfilled his duty 
as a member. Russell noted that during a stop at Spokane 
the General was as "nervous as a school boy" for fear 
their drive through the town would delay the Mission.5 
Ibis was due perhaps to his years of military service in 
which strict adherence to a prearranged schedule was essen­
tial. On one occasion, he complained to his wife that the 
Mission’s agenda was too unstable to suit him.6 He later 
commented that the Mission had "wasted enormous amounts of 
the most valuable time waiting around for people to get 
together . . . owing to lack of organization— it makes me 
very cross sometimes but it is no use for me to get angry.
I have to swallow it and wait for the others long after
7the appointed time." His diary and letters reveal that 
he was anxious to proceed with the business at hand during 
his stay in Russia, and an examination of his schedule
^Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 27, 1917, 
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
5"Russell Diary," May 19, 1917.
6Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, May 30, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
7Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 24, 1917,‘ Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
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shows that he utilized his time with a great degree of 
efficiency.
Scott began the journey with an extremely pessimis­
tic attitude and, unlike other members of the Mission who 
might have had reservations about its success, voiced this 
pessimism. On the day of departure from Washington he 
wrote a friend that from the available information, "it 
looks very much as if Russia is breaking up and we will be 
too late." He felt that "only a miracle" could prevent the
QRussian Army from "going to pieces." In a letter to a
fellow officer he stated that in his opinion "Russia's
Army" was "crushed" and he was leaving Washington "with
9very little hope of any successful results."
In his initial encounter with Russian authority,
Scott found nothing to change his opinion. When, upon 
arrival in the port of Vladivostok the Captain of the 
Buffalo found anchorage with no assistance from any official 
of the port, Chief of Staff Scott found this absurd.10 
Scott interpreted the large numbers.of Russian soldiers 
present at each train station as an indication that
8Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. H. L. Schelling, May 15, 1917, 
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 29 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
9Hugh L. Scott to General Elbert Wheeler, May 15,
1917, Hugh L. Scott papers. Box 29 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress).
10Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 5.
discipline in the array had heen destroyed.
The day after they arrived in Petrograd, Scott 
wrote his wife that the Russian situation was extremely 
unstable. "There is" he said, "no real force in the Govt—  
the array is run by town meeting votes of soldiers who do 
not obey their officers." Approximately five million 
Russian soldiers were absent from the Front, and "accord­
ing to all the rules of the game Russia is out of the war." 
For the first time, however, Scott qualified his pessimism: 
The "great recuperative power of the Russian people" might 
possibly enable Russia..to "pull herself together and fight 
but no one has any money to bet on it . " He cited the 
Provisional Government's recent refusal to accept the 
demands of the "dock men" and "socialist and German spies" 
for political control of Kronstadt naval base as one of a 
number of encouraging signs.^
During his first two weeks in petrograd, Scott met
with the leaders of the Provisional Government, obtained
from the appropriate military leaders estimates of Russia's
needs in war material, and conducted a series of military
12inspections in the petrograd area. Scott met Foreign
■^Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 14,
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress).
^Scott, "Report to Secretary of Mission," /no date/,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 1, Folder 1 (Princeton university
Library, Princeton, N. J.).
194
Minister Tereshchenko at a reception in the Foreign Office.
Following the reception, the military and naval members of
13the Mission called on Kerensky, the Minister of War.
14Tereshchenko spoke "excellent English," but Scott spoke 
with Kerensky through an interpreter. The General was most 
favorably impressed with Kerensky, whom he described as a 
"young man of great force and e n e r g y . S c o t t  explained 
to Kerensky that he was primarily interested in determining 
how the United States could best aid Russia's war effort. 
Kerensky acknowledged the offer of aid and pleased Scott 
by suggesting a visit to Army Headquarters in Mogilev to 
be followed by a visit to the Front.^
The next day, Scott was presented to the Council 
of Ministers. Tereshchenko's reply to Root's address was 
a disappointment to Scott, who felt that the Foreign 
Minister had "failed to put the emphasis in the fighting 
of Germany.”'1'̂  During a conversation after the speeches, 
Tereshchenko warned Scott that he would encounter many 
pessimists during his stay in Russia, but the Russian
13"Mission bog," 18-20.
■^Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 14, 1917, 
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
15"Scott Diary," June 14, 1917.
16"Mission Log," 20-21; and "Scott Diary," June 14,
1917.
17"Scott Diary," June 15, 1917.
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asked that the American "not believe them" and assured him 
that Russia would be able to overcome its current diffi­
culties. 18
Two days later Scott had a conference with Kerensky.
Again the Secretary of War impressed Scott as a "forcible
young man" whose words came from his mouth "like shots
19from a gatling gun." in the course of the conversation
Kerensky cited the vote of the Petrograd Council of Workers'
and Soldiers' Deputies in support of the government's
20position in the Grimm case as an example of the stability
of the Provisional Government. Scott told Kerensky of the
success the French and English Missions had enjoyed in
"rousing the people" in various American cities and
suggested that the Root Mission undertake a similar task
in Russia. The Secretary of War, however, "seemed cold 
21but polite." When Scott asked what he should avoid in
22his visit to the Front, Kerensky replied,"PS'litlcs."
Both Tereshchenko and Kerensky impressed Scott as 
men of energy and ability. As was to be expected, both
19"Scott Diary," June 17, 1917.
20The Petrograd Soviet had upheld the action of the 
Provisional Government in expelling Grimm, a Swiss diplomat, 




tried to persuade the General of the stability of the
Provisional Government. Scott later described Kerensky
23as "a bit too radically inclined to suit me," but his 
diary and letters written at the time did not make this 
distinction.
One of Scott’s major tasks during his stay in the
Russian capital was to obtain estimates of materials
sought from the United States by the various departments
of the Russian Army, in order to facilitate the gathering
of this information, Scott arranged a conference for June
18. Accompanied by colonels Michie, Judson, and Mott,
Scott conferred with General Manikovsky, Assistant to the
Minister of war, and the heads of the various military 
24departments.
Scott began the conference by briefly explaining 
the purpose of the Mission. He emphasized the need for 
both America and Russia to continue the war against Germany
23Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 14.
^ I n  addition to General Manikovsky, the conference 
was attended by the following Russian officers: Colonel
jakoubovitch, assistant to the Minister of war, General 
Paltchinsky, Assistant to the President of the Metal 
Conference, General Michelson, Chief of Management of 
supplying troops from foreign countries, General Romanov- 
sky. Chief of the General Staff, General Bozatko, Chief 
of the Commissariat, General Lechovitch, Chief of the 
Artillery Department, Admiral Kavin, Assistant Minister 
of Marine, General Ovchinnikov, Assistant Chief of the 
Military Technical Department, Colonel Yakovlev, Chief of 
the Department of Aviation. "Mission Log," 23-24.
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in order "to make democracy safe." The Mission's, "one
object here" was to offer "cooperation and assistance" and
25to determine how best this aid could be rendered. Mani­
kovsky expressed gratitude and assured Scott that with
American assistance "we are certain that . . .  we will
26be able to crush Germany and the foes of democracy."
Since the Provisional Government had decided that 
"all negotiations of a financial nature" should be con­
ducted by the Minister of Finance, Manikovsky suggested
that they limit their discussions to the specific needs of
27the various departments. As these lists were presented,
General Scott and the other officers frequently asked for
clarification or more detailed information. A tabulation
of the requests was eventually submitted to the state and
War Departments in both the Mccormick-Bertron Report and
28in the report submitted by General Scott.
One point which the Russian officers emphasized 
was that without immediate aid to the Russian railway system
25,transcript of Proceedings of Conference between 
General Manikovsky, Assistant to the Minister of war, and 
Officers, and General Scott, Chief of Staff and officers, 
June 5/18, 1917," 1, Ellhu Root Papers, Box 192. Herein­
after cited as "Conference between General Manikovsky and 
General Scott."
2 6Ibid.
27"Conference between General Manikovsky and General 
Scott," 2.
28"Conference between General Manikovsky and General 
Scott," 4-14.
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all other assistance would be useless. General Michelson
explained that the military had been "keenly disappointed"
to hear that 500 locomotives and 10,000 freight cars
expected in July would not reach Russia until December.
Using the part of Vladivostok as an example, he pointed
out that material was being shipped from the port at a
rate of 150 cars per day. This represented only twenty-
five per cent of the railroad's potential capacity if
sufficient cars were available. He concluded, "We will
hardly be able to avail ourselves of any other assistance
29unless the rolling stock is given."
At the close of the conference Manikovsky again
brought up the question of assistance for the railroads.
He asked that Scott telegraph his government immediately
about the drastic need in that area. Scott agreed to
arrange such a message after conferring with other members
of the Mission. He pointed out, however, that his govern-
30ment would ask if "the Russians intend to advance."
Scott later recalled that this question had the effect of
"exploding a bombshell in their midst" with the Russian^
31"looking first at each other and then at me." * Colonel
29"Conference between General Manikovsky and 
General Scott," 3-4.
30 "Conference between General Manikovsky and 
General Scott," 15.
31Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 16.
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Jakoubovitch then informed the Chief of Staff that the 
Russian Armies intended to advance "in the shortest 
possible time." He emphasized the difficulty of accumu­
lating material for an offensive because of inadequate 
transportation facilities and explained that the advance 
would occur in an area already well supplied where troop 
morale was "improving all the time." The advance was to
be a part of a gradual advance on all Fronts and was to
32occur in no more "than ten days or two weeks." Scott 
found this information "most encouraging," and the con­
ference ended on an optimistic note.
In addition to conducting interviews with offi­
cials of the Provisional Government and conferences to 
determine the needs of the Russian Army, General Scott 
visited various military installations during his first
week. Although he had been told that he would be able to
33visit the Front almost immediately, the days dragged by.
Scott became impatient and frequently wrote to his wife
34complaining about the delay. Later events suggest that 
the Russian officials wished Scott to visit the Front at
32"Conference between general Manikovsky and 
General Scott," 15. The advance occurred on July 1, 1917,
twelve days later.
33»gcott Diary," June 14, 1917.
34Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 14-24,
1917, Hugh L. Scott papers. Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
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the time of the July 1st offensive, if this is indeed 
true, it is not unreasonable to assume that the tours in 
and around Petrograd were designed primarily to keep the 
impatient General occupied.
Upon the invitation of General Polotsav, commander 
of the Petrograd Military District, Scott and his staff 
inspected the Guard Infantry Regiment and the First Regi­
ment of the Don Cossacks.35 Scott was told that this 
"crack Regiment" of the Guard had occupied the same barracks 
for 160 years, ibis led Scott to record in his diary that
"if we had been told the barracks had never been cleaned
36during that time we would have believed it." Nor did
the Cossack Regiment impress the General, who described
37conditions there as "fully as dirty as the infantry."
Scott also noted the absence of such necessities as 
adequate bedding, and that available he described as 
"Rags." He was appalled to find that the commanding 
officer could not recall when the last drill had occurred. 
Scott's impression of the Russian Army was not helped by 
this inspection, which he later described as "a great 
shock. ',38
35Scott, "Report to Secretary of Mission/" 2.
36"Scott Diary," June 15, 1917.
38Ibid.
The following day Scott and Colonel Michie visited
the Pavlovsky infantry School and the Mikhailovsky Artil- 
39lery School. These institutions, which Scott had been
40told were "the two best military schools in Russia,"
were a disappointment to him. He was particularly amazed
at the lack of sanitation. Although the artillery school
was "a great improvement" over the infantry school, he
41found neither to be "at all clean."
In an inspection of a hospital in a portion of the
Winter palace, Scott finally found something which he could
compliment. The large reception rooms of the Palace had
been converted to wards to accommodate 100 men and were
"high and airy." Scott found the men "well taken care of
* «
and cheerful."
On June 19, Scott toured the Putilov Steel Works 
in petrograd. The plant was producing munitions almost
exclusively, and its normal work force of 30,000 made it
one of the largest in Russia. Scott was disappointed to 
find that the plant was producing at only fifty to sixty
2^Scott, "Report to Secretary of Mission," 3.
40"Scott Diary," June 16, 1917.
41Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 16, 1917, 
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress); and "Scott Diary," June 16, 1917.
42,,Soott Diary," June 17, 1917.
per cent capacity. The General attributed this situa­
tion to worker absenteeism and observed that many of those 
present were not working. At one point in their tour, 
described as five miles in length, they came to a room 
where some workmen were holding a meeting. General Scott 
was prompted to suggest that this was "a fair sample of 
what is going on everywhere. 1,44 on the same day Scott
toured an airplane factory where he saw many planes, mostly
45French and German, but observed "none ready for flight."
Scott also accompanied other Mission members on a
brief visit to Moscow. Although the General welcomed the
opportunity to see Moscow, since he felt that one had not
46seen the "real Russia" if this city were omitted, he
47complained of having to wait for the others. He was
obviously becoming increasingly anxious to tour the
Russian Front. He had expected to go much sooner and
wrote that the "many disappointments" and "the exas-
48perating delay would drive me to drink."
4 3Scott, "Report to Secretary of Mission," 4.
44"Scott Diary," June 19, 1917.
45Ibid.
46Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 18,
1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress).
47Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 24,




The Mission left Moscow on the evening of June 24
49and arrived in Petrograd the following afternoon. Upon
arrival, Scott discovered that the long awaited visit to
the Russian Front was to begin. After a ten-hour delay in
petrograd, Scott and Colonels Michie, judson, and Mott and
American officers assigned to the American Embassy boarded
a special train for the Russian General Staff Headquarters
at Mogilev. Root and Tereshchenko were also on board the
train but planned to return to Petrograd after interviews
50with General Brusilov rather than continue to the Front.
The train arrived at Mogilev at 9:00 p.m. on June 27.
Scott, Tereshchenko, and Root called on Brusilov immediately. 
The Americans were invited to lunch with the Russian Com­
mander the next day. Scott was told that arrangements had
51been made for him to leave for the Front after lunch.
Scott's brief visit to Mogilev was his first en­
couraging experience with the Russian military. None of 
the criticism which characterized his earlier tours of
inspection occurs in his description of Brusilov's Head-
52quarters, and his evaluation of the commanding officer.
49"Mission Log," 28.
50Ibid., 29.
51'»scott Diary," June 27, 1917.
52Hugh L. Scott to Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, June 27,1917, Hugh L. Scott papers, Box 5 (Division of Manuscripts,Library of Congress); "Scott Diary," June 27-28, 1917.
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He described Brusilov as a “forceful man" whose command
seemed to have a “more businesslike air . . . than any 
„53so far seen."
For the trip to the Front the Americans were joined
5'by Colonel Navielskoy, assigned to them as a special aide.
The two-day trip was interrupted at one point by a bombing
attack by a German plane. No damage or injury resulted,
although many members had no time to dress in their haste
to leave the train. The group arrived at Tarnopol late in
the evening of June 29 and transferred to automobiles for
55the remaining portion of the journey. After a brief
visit with General Erdley at Eleventh Army Headquarters
in Ezerna, the group proceeded to Budilev where the Sixth
56Corps Headquarters was located.
The Russian Chief of Staff of the Sixth Corps met 
the group. After explaining the next day's battle plans 
he suggested that the party might wish to observe the 
artillery bombardment already in progress. Scott and his 
aides welcomed this opportunity and proceeded on foot to a 
Division Commander's observation post southwest of the
53lbid.
5^Scott,"Report to Secretary of Mission," 6.
55Scott, “The Russian Revolution," 19; and Scott, 
"Report to Secretary of Mission," 6 .
56“Scott Diary,” June 30, 1917? and Scott, "Report 
to Secretary of Mission," 7.
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village. From this vantage point Scott and his aides could 
observe the forty-mile section of the Front where the ad­
vance was to take place. After watching the artillery 
assault for some time, Scott and his group returned to a 
village eight miles to the rear to await the attack.
After a night's sleep on hospital cots reeking with 
formaldehyde, the group returned to their observation post 
shortly before 8:00 a.m. The artillery barrage was lifted 
and the Russian infantry began its assault at precisely 
9:00 a.m. Scott soon observed large numbers of men re­
turning from the Front. He assumed that they were 
retreating Russians but soon discovered that they were
Austrian and German prisoners. Scott and his aides re-
57turned to Corps Headquarters at 4:00 p.m. Thus, after 
traveling thousands of miles and being absent from Washing­
ton for almost three months, the Chief of Staff of the 
United states Army visited the Russian Front for approxi­
mately twenty-four hours and observed a combined artillery 
and infantry assault which lasted three hours.
The visit, however, was far from insignificant. 
Prior to this time Scott had shown nothing but concern for 
the ability of the Russians to continue the war. As a 
result of these observations, however, Scott was impressed
57"Scott Diary," June 30-july 1, 1917; Scott, "The 
Russian Revolution," 19-24; and Scott, "Report to Secretary 
of Mission," 7-8.
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with the potential of the Russian Army and most enthusias­
tic. The American Press quoted the General as saying:
The Russian Army is going to fight, the spirit 
among the troops everywhere is excellent, and the 
/July lst7 advance . . .has every chance for 
successful continuation . . . The precision and 
exquisite working of the Russian machinery was a 
marvel to me . . . there was not the slightest 
sign of insubordination or reluctance among the 
men.58
An American journalist in Russia wrote to his wife
that the Russian advance "was almost as if it had been
staged especially for Gen. Scott and his staff; they could
never have arrived at a better time. Previous to their
59arrival there was nothing doing on the Russian Front."
Whether by accident or design, General Scott had arrived
at a very propitious moment. Years later, when asked if
the offensive had been designed for the effect it would
have in Russia or on the Allies, Kerensky replied,
60"Both.” Kerensky and the Russian General Staff, however, 
did not stage the advance for Scott's benefit although 
Allied pressure, especially French and British, on the 
Provisional Government prompted an offensive at this time.
After the July 1st offensive, Scott and his aides 
began the trip to Jassy, the temporary capital of Rumania.
33 The New York Times, July 10, 1917, 3.
59Donald c. Thompson to Mrs. Donald C. Thompson,
July 8, 1917, quoted in Donald c. Thompson, Donald Thomp­
son In Russia (New York* Century Co., 1918), 258.
60Warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 176.
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The trip was delayed by a brief visit to the Eighth Army 
Headquarters of General Kornilov at Czernowitz. General 
Scott was deeply impressed with Kbrnilov and later recalled
that he had come "to regard him as the hope of Russia."
61After his death there was "no hope for Russia." During 
their brief conference Scott explained the purpose of the 
Mission and told of the preparations for war being made in 
America. Kbrnilov outlined his plan for a proposed attack 
against the Austrians. He invited the American General to 
return in four or five days, in order to observe the 
advance of the Eighth Army, which consisted of about 
200,000 men.62
The trip to Rumania was the result of a request 
made by the Rumanian government through its Minister at 
Petrograd. Although Root was unable to visit Rumania, 
he arranged for General Scott to go there after his in­
spection of the Russian Front. His mission was to assure
61Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 23-24.
62"Memorandum of Conversation Between Gen. Kbrnilov,., 
Commanding the 8th Army, and General Scott at Chernovitch, 
July 2, 1917," Hugh L. Scott papers. Box 71 (Division of 
Manuscripts, Library of Congress). General Korniloff also 
told Scott of his task at the beginning of the Revolution 
of placing the Czarina under arrest. One of General 
Scott's aides would later recall that the General had an 
"insatiable" curiosity about Russia prior to the Revolu­
tion, and "questioned Baron Ramsey for hours on etid as to 
every detail of Russian court-life." Mott, Twenty Years,
198.
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the Rumanian government of the "warm sympathy and friend­
ship” of the United States and of America's intention to
63"help hear the burdens of war.”
General Scott's party arrived at jassy early on
64.the morning of July 3. Although the American legation 
at Jassy had not been informed of the visit until the 
afternoon before Scott's arrival, the Rumanian Government
a Chad prepared a full day's activities for the group.
Scott was met at the station by Vintila Bratianer, Minister
of War, General Prezan, Chief of Staff, and other Rumanian
66 ■ officials. The Minister of War accompanied the group to
the Palace of the Metropolitan of Jassy where accommoda­
tions hcid been provided. The morning was devoted to a 
series of conferences which included both the Rumanian 
Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Russian
a ̂forces in Rumania.
Scott's most important conferences were those with 
the Rumanian Prime Minister, Jean I. C. Bratiano, who
63Elihu Root to King Ferdinand and Queen Marie, of 
Rumania, June 14-27, 1917, Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 5 (Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J.).
^Scott, "Report to Secretary of Mission," 8-9.
65Whiting Andrews to Robert Lansing, July 7, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/6109, St. Dept.
"Scott Diary," July 3, 1917? and Scott, "Report
to Secretary of Mission," 9.
^Scott, "Report to the Secretary of Mission," 9.
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explained that his government wanted to establish military
cooperation as well as an "intimate friendship with the
United States" after the war. The prime Minister explained
that the loss of Rumanian territory had come about "through
the fault of our allies." According to Bratiano, Rumania
had not wished to become a belligerent and had done so
only after the Allies "demanded with the greatest insistence
that we enter the war." They had been told that there would
be a general offensive in which the Rumanian Army would be
opposed by ten or twelve divisions. As no general offensive
developed, the Rumanian Army was opposed by thirty-seven
69divisions and was, therefore, unable to hold the lines.
In his request for military aid the Prime Minister
stressed the strategic position held by the Rumanians.
Rumania had ten divisions already equipped and five more
which could be used on the Front if proper supplies were
made available. The united States would require ten times
the amount requested to supply and transport an equal
70number of men to Europe.
The Prime Minister also pointed out that a great 
demand for non-military goods such as farm machinery would
68"Memorandum of Conversation Between Mr. Bratiano, 
Prime Minister of Roumania, and General Scott," July 3,
1917, 1. Elihu Root papers. Box 71 (Division of Manu­
scripts, Library of Congress).
6 9Ibid., 1-2 .
70Ibid., 3-4.
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develop as Rumanian territory was evacuated by the Germans. 
Bratiano introduced in more than one instance the possi­
bility of trade agreements between the two countries. At 
one point he stated that the United States would "make no 
mistake from any point of view in helping Roumania# not
only during the war# but in the time to come after the 
71war." Scott hesitated to discuss "anything commercial,"
as the Americans wished to "keep our skirts clear of every
ulterior purpose." After the war# however# such "questions"
72would no doubt "be welcomed" by the united States.
In Scott's opinion, transportation presented the
major problem. Bratiano assured Scott that the material
could be handled When it reached the Rumanian border#
though he readily acknowledged that any aid to Rumania
73was tied to the problem of transportation in Russia.
Although Scott was unable to make any specific 
promises# his sympathetic reception to the needs of 
Rumania was encouraging to the Prime Minister. There was 
one problem# however, which might delay or possibly pre­
vent American aid. The failure of the Rumanian government 
to grant full civil rights to Rumanian Jews could lead to 
opposition from Jewish-Americans. The Prime Minister




assured Scott that a decision had already been made to 
"remove all the inequalities of civil rights" between Jews 
and other Rumanians. This was later confirmed in a conver­
sation Scott had with the Rumanian Queen, who said that 
the decision had the "warm approval" of the King.
The prime Minister explained that the decision had 
been made for two reasons: Rumanian Jews had supported 
the war effort, and Jews living in areas of Rumania then 
controlled by Austria had full civil rights. These rights 
could not be taken away when the territory was reacquired 
by Rumania. Scott suggested that it would be well for 
these reforms to take place immediately, but the Prime 
Minister explained that it would be extremely difficult 
to accomplish the required constitutional changes due to 
the occupation of large areas of Rumania by foreign troops. 
He agreed, however, to furnish the American State Depart­
ment with statements from prominent Rumanian jews indi­
cating their acceptance of the necessity of delay, such
letters could then be used by the state Department to
74influence American public opinion.
At 1:00 p.m. General Scott and his aides were pre­
sented to King Ferdinand and Queen Marie, who entertained 
them at a luncheon. If the luncheon had been intended to
74,' "Memorandum on The Jewish Question In Roumania," 
104, Elihu Root papers. Box 71.
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serve any purpose other than a courtesy to the Americans
it was a complete failure.. Scott failed to record any
reference to this meeting with the King except for one
sentence in his diary in which he stated that he was not
impressed with the Monarch. He found the Queen to be "a
beautiful woman" and described her as being "far more
75intelligent than the King."
That afternoon the group was received by the
Rumanian Senate with "a wild ovation."7^ General Scott
77delivered the major address of the day. He restricted
himself to a description of the war mobilization in the
United States, but his audience received the impression
that the General would strongly recommend generous aid
78for their country. Scott's translator had trouble
following the rapid flow of figures and suspected that
if the General had ever given a speech before it had been
79in Indian sign-language.
"Scott Diary," July 3, 1917; Colonel Mott and 
Judson both agreed with Scott's evaluation of the Royal 
Couple. Mott, Twenty Years, 200; and William V. Judson 
to Mrs. William V. Judson, July 9, 1917, William V. Judson 
papers, Box 4.
76Scott, "The Russian Revolution," 24.
77Scott, "Report to Secretary of Mission," 9.
^Translation of an editorial, "American Mission," 
from the independent Roumaine of June 22/july 7, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 71 (Division of Manuscripts, 
Library of Congress).
7^Mott, Twenty Years, 198-199.
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The Prime Minister was favorably impressed and 
remarked that the General's speech had "produced a
tremendous effect" and "was exactly what our people
80 „ needed to hear.” The acting American charge d'affaires
said that Scott's speech made "a most excellent impression"
and his visit aided • '.'enormous/ly/ in raising . . . their
morale.” He added:
It gave the Roumanians the idea that the united 
States would give them everything they asked for.
This last result of General Scott's speech may 
possibly in the near future cause the united States 
some embarrassment. The Roumanians are saying 
that . . .General Scott made them concrete 
promises.3'1.
Later in the afternoon Scott accompanied the 
Rumanian King on an inspection of a contingent of the
82Second Rumanian Division which was stationed in Jassy.
Following dinner with the Prime Minister, Scott and his
aides boarded the train, ending their brief visit to the
83Rumanian capital.
The lengthy trip to petrograd was interrupted by 
brief visits to the Headquarters of General Kornilov at 
czernowitz on July 4 and General Brusilov at Mogilev
80Mott, Twenty Years, 199.
31Whiting Andrews to Robert Lansing, July 7, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/6109, St. Dept.
32"Scott Diary," July 3, 1917; and Scott, "Report 
to Secretary of Mission," 9.
33"Scott Diary," July 3, 1917.
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three days later, in order to "keep faith with Mr. Root,"
Scott reluctantly declined invitations to return to the
Russian Front but was assured by both officers that the
offensive was advancing as planned. By July 8, Scott
and his party were back in petrograd, and the Mission
84departed for the united States on July 9.
The real significance of General Scott's brief 
tour of the Russian Front lies in the fact that it gave 
him a false impression of the military situation in 
Russia. Up to the time of his visit General Scott had 
failed to see anything in Russia which indicated a stable 
military situation. The brief assault that he viewed on 
July 1, he interpreted as an indication of what the
Q CAllies could expect from the Russian Army. Scott
thought he detected an improvement in the morale of the
Russian troops after July 1:
As a result of this offensive it has been gen­
erally noticed that the Russian soldiers are imbued 
with a much better spirit and apparently desire to 
get to the front, on many troop trains passed by 
us on our return from Jassy it was observed that 
the soldiers were singing and apparently enthusiastic
34"Scott Diary," July 4-9, 1917; and Scott, "Report 
to Secretary of Mission," 9-10.
35General Scott was not alone in this impression. 
Colonel judson described the battle of July 1st as "re­
markably successful and spectacular." William V. Judson 
to Mrs. William v. Judson, William V. judson Papers,
Box 4.
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on the prospect of their being taken into action.86
On July 8, Scott recorded in his diary, "We are leaving
the Russians fighting which seemed impossible a great
87part of our stay in petrograd."
The Russian offensive of July 1st on the Galician 
front about which Scott was so optimistic was of short 
duration. The early success of the offensive came be­
cause the attack was against Austrian rather than German 
troops and the Russians had a large numerical superiority. 
The offensive, which at best lasted only two weeks, was 
halted as soon as German troops were brought up. The
ambitious advance was turned into a rout, with the defeated
38Russians burning and pillaging as they retreated. This 
was the Russian Army's last major military offensive, it 
proved that the Russian Army was incapable of any major 
offensive operation and precipitated the political demon­
strations in Petrograd known as the "July Days" which 
caused the reorganization of the Russian cabinet.
General Alfred Knox, the British military attache 
who was also observing the advance, returned to petrograd 
on July 4. Knox cabled his government that the Russian
86Scott, "Report to Secretary of Mission," 10.
87"Scott Diary," July 7, 1917.
88chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 163-64.
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Army was "irretrievably ruined as a fighting organization."8® 
As late as July 9, however, Scott remained extremely opti­
mistic about the advance.
It is impossible to understand how Scott maintained 
his faith in the July offensive, perhaps because it was 
his first opportunity to observe modern warfare, he was too 
impressed by the initial success he witnessed. More im­
portant, however, is the fact that Scott spent only a few 
hours at the Front and was on board the train or in Rumania 
for the next few days. He was, therefore, out of touch with 
the actual situation from July 1 through July 8 . These 
factors alone do not explain the General's failure to 
understand the military crisis in Russia. One can only 
conclude that the "old Indian fighter," unlike General 
Knox, was incapable of grasping the significance of the 
military situation he was sent to observe.
In addition to a report on the Russian Army, Presi­
dent Wilson also sought information about the Russian Navy. 
Naval personnel assigned to the Mission were Rear Admiral 
James H. Glennon, representative of the president with the 
rank of Minister, Captain N. A. Mccully, naval attache,
90and Lieutenant Alva D. Bernhard, aide to Admiral Glennon.
89Warth, The Allies and The Russian Revolution, 112.
90"personnel of Special Diplomatic Mission of the 
United states of America," Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
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Glennon's role was to determine the needs of the Russian 
Navy and to appraise its potential under the new govern­
ment. Glennon learned of the Navy's needs in a series of 
conferences with naval officials in Petrograd and, in
visits to three fleet headquarters, observed conditions
91existing in the navy. Lieutenant D. Fedotov White,
assigned as aide to Admiral Glennon during his stay in
Russia, was among the various officials who greeted the
92Mission upon its arrival in Petrograd.
During his first three days in the capital Admiral
Glennon was presented to the Provisional Government and
conferred with naval authorities there. At the first
major conference, held on June 17, Admiral Glennon and
his aides met with Captain Dudorov, the newly installed
Vice Minister for Marine, and Vice Admiral Kedrov, who
had recently retired from that position. Kedrov stressed
the "urgent necessity of vessels of war" for the protec-
93tion of shipping in "Russian Northern waters." As
German submarines were the major threat to Russian
shipping there, it was suggested that "American destroyers
94would be of the greatest possible assistance to Russia."
^"Mission Report," 7, Elihu Root Papers, Box 192. 
92"Mission Log," 18.
93"Glennon Report," 1, Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
94Ibid., 2; Ehe Russian Naval Attach^ in Washington 
had made similar requests earlier to secretary Daniels. 
Cronon, Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 132, 145-46.
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Glennon learned that there were no destroyers available 
to the White Sea Fleet, that England's promise to provide 
such vessels had not yet been fulfilled, and that the two 
Russian destroyers attached to the Fleet were being re­
paired in England. The presence of American war ships 
would not only minimize the dangers from German submarines,
but would also have a "moral /sic7 effect on the Russian
95people, especially the soldiers and sailors."
Other vessels requested, in addition to the des­
troyers, were nine patrol boats capable of speeds of not
less than ten knots and armed with three-inch guns, and
96seventeen trawlers similarly armed. The Russian Navy 
asked for guns of various sizes, large amounts of ammuni­
tion, and articles needed primarily for repairs. The
total estimate presented by Admiral Kedrov at this first
97meeting came to approximately $50 million. on the 
following day Admiral Glennon again conferred with the
Q QRussian officers, at which time he received more requests.
95"Report of Interview With Naval General Staff In 
Regard To Naval Needs," 3, appendix to "Glennon Report," 
Elihu Root Papers, b o x  192; and "Glennon Report," 2.
98"Report of interview With Naval General staff 
In Regard To Naval Needs," 5, appendix to "Glennon Report," 
Elihu Root Papers, b o x 192.
97"Glennon Report," 2.
98A four-page appendix to Glennon*s Report contains 
a detailed statement of the requests of the Russian Navy, 
"Recommendations of Board of Naval Construction For 
Russian Navy," Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
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Unlike General Scott, who remained in petrograd
for over two weeks before visiting the Russian Army in the
field, Admiral Glennon and his aides began the first of
three trips to inspect the Russian Fleets on June 17, only
three days after their arrival in Petrograd. Before
leaving petrograd, white took Admiral Glennon on a tour
of the Naval Gun Factory at obukov, a few miles from
Petrograd." After a pleasant trip up the Neva, they
arrived at the obukov Gun Works, a large plant which
100employed approximately 12,000 workmen.
Admiral Glennon was favorably impressed and 
described the plant as "most remarkable." He was some­
what surprised to find that the plant was operated com­
pletely by Russians without "a single foreign engineer."*'0'1*
102He found the workers "intelligent and capable." His 
experience was quite unlike that of General Scott, who 
found labor problems in the munitions plant he visited, 
in one of the shops Glennon made a brief speech, after 
which the workers "cheered lustily for America and the 
Americans." This surprised his Russian aide who described
" "Mission Log," 21? and white, Survival, 146.
i°0l,Visit to Obkhoff Gun Factory, petrograd," appen­
dix to "Glennon Report," Elihu Root papers, Box 192.
;L0 :LWhlte, Survival, 147.
102"Visit to obkhoff Gun Factory, Petrograd."
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103the workers' mood as "quite beyond my expectations."
It was White's opinion# quite possibly correct# that
Admiral Glennon received a false impression of Russian
104industry from this one visit.
Glennon's first trip of inspection was to the
Black Sea port of Sevastopol where he was to meet Admiral
105Kolchak, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet. White
secured the use of Kerensky's railway car for the trip
and stocked it with food and liquor obtained from the
106cellars of the Winter Palace. The three-day trip to 
Sevastopol was comparatively uneventful, although the 
group suffered some minor discomfort when they exhausted 
their supply of soda water and had to substitute an in-, 
ferior local product.1*07
Approaching Sevastopol on the morning of June 20, 
the group learned from persons leaving the port city 
that on the preceding day the local Council of Soldiers, 
Sailors, and Workers had, for all practical purposes, 
assumed control of the Black Sea Fleet. Unlike the revolts 
which had occurred in the Baltic Fleet during March, the
1‘0'^White, Survival, 147.
lQ4 Ibid.




seizure of power was not accompanied by the murder or
3.08execution of any of the officers. Admiral Kolchak had 
been relieved of his command and was replaced by Admiral 
Lukine, and all officers had been forced to surrender their 
weapons.
The party decided that, regardless of the events 
of the past two days, it would continue into Sevastopol in 
order to witness conditions firsthand. Shortly after 
breakfast the train pulled into the Sevastopol station, 
where the group was met by a delegation consisting of 
Admiral Lukine, two members of his staff, and two repre­
sentatives of the Executive committee of the local 
109Soviet. White immediately began making preparations 
for attaching their car to the next train for petrograd.
He did not want to prolong their stay any longer than was 
necessary.
Glennon began his tour of the Fleet. He visited 
two battleships and watched as the crews went through 
gunloading drills. The drills were "voluntarily given by 
the men, a fact which they desired to be understood.
in the afternoon Glennon and his aides attended a
108"Giennon Report," 2; and White, survival, 149. 
The Secretary of Navy erred.when he later wrote that a 
hundred officers were murdered. Josephus Daniels, Years 
of War, 60.
109"Glennon Report," 2-3; and White, survival, 149. 
11°"Glennon Report," 3.
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meeting of the Sevastopol Soviet. Following several 
speeches, the visiting admiral was asked to address the 
group. Glennon spoke to the gathering about the American 
navy. He told his listeners that, although its organiza­
tion was baaed on democracy, a certain amount of discipline 
was necessary for its proper functioning. Turning to the 
question at hand, the American admiral asked the sailors 
to fight for their new freedom but stressed the need for 
discipline. Glennon praised Admiral Kolchak and asked the
men to remain loyal to their commander and return the side-
111arms to the officers of the fleet. Glennon's Russian
aide later described the incident as "an instance unique
in all naval history . . .  a foreign officer made a speech
112which helped to quell a mutiny." Although Glennon*s
113accomplishment was exaggerated, it helped to persuade 
the Sevastopol Soviet to rescind by a vote of sixty to
three all of its actions except the removal of Admiral
, ^ n M 4 KOlchak.
The group returned to petrograd on the evening 
train. KOlchak and his Chief of Staff, captain M. X.
"Glennon Report," 6 ; and White, Survival, 153-54. 
■^^White, Survival, 154.
H 3The Hew York Times, June 25, 1917, 1; Russell, 




Smirnov, boarded the same train for the capital. This
gave Glennon the opportunity to discuss the naval situa-
115tion in more detail. Prom their conversation they 
developed the idea of a Russian naval mission to the united 
States. Headed by Admiral Kolchak, this visit took place 
later in the year.
Admiral Glennon and his party arrived in petrograd 
on June 23. After a brief conference with the vice Minis­
ter of Marine to discuss the situation in Sevastopol and
a meeting with Ambassador Francis, Glennon began prepara-
117tions for a tour of the White Sea Fleet. Accompanied
by Crosley, McCully, Bernhard, and White, Admiral Glennon
left Petrograd on the evening of June 24 en route to
Archangel. The party reached its destination on the
]_]_Qevening of June 26. They were met by Captain Petrov,
Chief of the Russian Naval General Staff at Archangel, who
^^White, Survival, 154.
■L3*6warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 109-10; White, Survival, 155-58; ancf Daniels, Years of 
War, 60.
117 "Glennon Report," 6-7. After conferring with 
Admiral Glennon, Ambassador Francis wired the Secretary 
of State in his usual optimistic tone. "Discipline restored 
in Black Sea Fleet Glennon goes Archangle tonight." David 
R. Francis to Robert Lansing, June 24, 1917, Doc. No. 
861.00/414, St. Dept.
HSiij^epQrt from W. S. Crosley office of the Naval 
Attach^, to Francis, subject— Visit to Archangel, Russia—
30 June 1917," William v. Judson Papers, b o x 4; and 
"McCormick Diary," June 30, 1917.
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119represented captain Vilrorsk, the commanding officer.
Since Archangel was a major port of entry, Glennon 
was especially concerned with its facilities and its 
ability to handle cargo. Upon his return to petrograd, 
Glennon reported to Francis that two German submarines 
had been sighted laying mines near Archangel the day 
before their arrival there. Shipping had been halted 
temporarily to enable trawlers to clear the area of mines. 
Glennon believed "this condition clearly shows the . ne­
cessity for destroyers or other suitable fast vessels in
120Russian northern waters." Ambassador Francis cabled
home Glennon1s recommendations that "at least six of our
1.21destroyers be sent /to7 Archangel immediately."
In a conversation with another member of the Mission,
Admiral Glennon described the situation in Archangel as
"fairly satisfactory," as he had "found everything at
122Archangel in ship-shape order." White did not share
the Admiral’s viewpoint. He commented that while the 
officers at Archangel did not live under an "immediate 
apprehension of murder," conditions there were "about as
119ibia.
1,20"Glennon Report," 7.
121David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, July 12, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5854, St. Dept.
I22"McCormick Diary," June 30, 1917.
bad as at other seaports."
On the evening of July 1, Glennon and his aides set
out for Helsingfors, on the third and last of their tours
124of the Russia Fleets. En route to Helsingfors the
group stopped at Revel, a Russian naval base an. the
southern shore of the Gulf of Finland. Glennon spent the
entire day inspecting ships and the shore batteries which
guarded the entrance to the Gulf. Next, they went to
Gausal. There they boarded a Russian destroyer for their
trip to the northern port of the Gulf where the fleet was
125anchored at Roggekuel. Admiral Glennon reported that
"the condition of material and spirit of personnel on
these vessels was the best seen in any Russian Fleet."
126The "ships and men were ready for battle."
That afternoon Glennon inspected a shore battery 
of four twelve-inch guns which commanded the southern 
entrances to the Gulf, captain Knuepfer, commander of the 
installation, guided the group on the inspection tour. 
According to Glennon, there was "no sign of friction or 
disaffection among his men, who . . . seemed to be under 
good discipline." The inspection was interrupted briefly
i23White, Survival, 158.
124"Mission log," July 1, 1317? and "McCormick 
Diary," June 30, 1917.
1,25"Glennon Report," 8 .
126Ibid.
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by a raid by a squadron of German planes. No damage was 
done and one observer felt that Glennon enjoyed the excite­
ment.1,27
On July 4, Glennon's grog? traveled to Helsingfors
for the last important stop of their tour. Conditions
they found to be "very bad." Admiral Glennon had again
managed to arrive at the precise moment of an insurrection
led by local radicals. Admiral Verderevsky, Commander of
the Fleet at Helsingfors, therefore requested that the
American officers make their visit as brief as possible,
128which they did. They left for Petrograd that same day
and arrived there on July 6 . Admiral Glennon utilized 
the time left in conferences with various Russian naval 
officials.
While in Russia, Admiral Glennon saw little to 
give him a favorable impression of the Russian Navy. At 
best, on a few occasions he saw adequate vessels in 
service. Twice, however, he had observed local Soviets 
supersede the authority of commanding officers who had 
the approval of the petrograd government, perhaps more 
so than any other member of the Mission, Glennon had 
seen the power of the Soviets. There is no indication 
that he fully appreciated the significance of this power.
1*27White, Survival, 160.
128"Glennon Report," 9-10; and White, Survival,
162-64.




A third major area of concern for the Mission was 
the growing strength of the socialist parties in Russia. 
Charles Edward Russell, a well-known American socialist, 
was chosen by President Wilson to establish contact with 
these groups. Russell conceived of his task as being 
twofold. He was to serve as a link between the Mission 
and Russian socialists, and he was to explain to them why 
they should support vigorous prosecution of the war.
Russell informed his colleagues that he did not 
know any of the Russian socialists personally but had 
obtained several letters of introduction from American 
socialists in order to offset this liability.  ̂ Russell's 
work with the Russian socialists would be further compli­
cated because he had been dismissed from the Socialist 
party of America when he had accepted an appointment from 
a "capitalist" government. He believed that a conspiracy 
of "pro-German" socialists led by Morris Hillquit had 
caused his dismissal and felt that this group would do
1"McCormick Diary," May 30, 1917. Volume 7 of the 
Russell Papers contains several such letters, including 




everything possible to discredit the Mission. According 
to Russell, Hillquit was "writing letters to his friends 
in Russia warning them that this commission is a capital­
istic propaganda for the commercial exploitation of 
2Russia."
Because of his strong support for the Allied war
effort, Russell had no trouble reconciling his belief in
socialism with the idea of vigorous prosecution of the war
against Germany. His first opportunity to explain his
position to Russian socialists came in the remote Russian
3town of Irkutsk. He was sought out by two socialists who 
explained that they "thoroughly disbelieved in war" yet 
were "urged to go on with this one." Russell replied that 
he, too, hated war but was forced to support this one, 
since it was between the forces of democracy and autoc­
racy. More specifically, he told his visitors that if 
Russia were to withdraw from the war the principles of
4both democracy and socialism would be destroyed. This 
brief statement contained the premise on which Russell 
based his frequent arguments of the next few weeks. He 
supported vigorous pursuit of the war in order to insure 
the democracy that he considered an essential preliminary
^"McCormick Diary," May 26, 1917.
^"Mission Log," 14.
4"Russell Diary," June 7, 1917.
to the establishment of socialism.
Upon his arrival in Petrograd, Russell began work
immediately, on the afternoon of June 14, when the members
5of the Mission briefly called on Tereshchenko, Russell
was disappointed. He believed that the Mission was out of
touch with realities. He contrasted-their "long-tailed
coats" to the Foreign Minister's "sack coat and soft
collar." Russell thought their "regalia" looked "stupid"
and was completely out of place in a nation where "the
red flag floats from one end of the country to the other."
The following day, when the Mission was presented
to the entire membership of the Provisional Government,
Russell talked informally with various members of the
Cabinet. He recognized Kerensky as the unofficial leader
and described him as the "coming man in Russia . . . the
most popular member of the cabinet." Russell felt that
"our plea for immediate action on the front rests first
7of all with' him." He was somewhat disappointed in his
conversation with him, however, and described their talk
8as "little more than the flub-dub of such an occasion."
on June 19, when Russell attended a luncheon given 
by Ambassador Francis, he and Duncan had the opportunity
S"Mission Log," 18-19.
6 "Russell Diary," June 14, 1917.
7l,Russell Diary," June 15, 1917.
8lbid.
to discuss at length the situation in Russia with M. I.
Skobolov, i. G. Tsereteli, and V. M. Chernov, Ministers
of Labor, Posts and Telegraphs, and Agriculture, respec- 
9tively. Again he thought he detected a hesitancy on the 
part of the ministers— "Socialists of the most amiable 
kind"— to accept the necessity of continuing the war. When 
asked whether they agreed that "the safety of democracy in 
the world depended upon the defeat of Germany," they did 
so "without enthusiasm." Russell asked, "What can America 
do that will most effectively help Russia?" Their unanimous 
reply was: "induce the Allies to agree to revise all their
treaties and agreements of alliance and cooperation so as 
to eliminate imperialistic aims." Ambassador Francis 
replied that the united States was not a party to these 
treaties and therefore could "do nothing in this matter." 
Russell thought that this viewpoint had "never occurred 
to any of the three." During the course of the same con­
versation, Duncan explained America's entry into the war 
and its tremendous military potential. Again Russell was 
disappointed in the reaction and "noted that our three 
Ministers showed no enthusiasm about the united states 
whether for its disinterested motives or the extent of its 
resources
^"Mission Log," 25; and "Employment of Charles 
Edward Russell." Skobolov and Tsereteli were Mensheviks 
and Chernov, a Socialist Revolutionary.
10"Russell Diary," June 19, 1917.
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No doubt influenced by the disappointing interview 
with the Socialist members of the Provisional Government, 
Russell recorded in his diary:
. . . the masses of the people are sane and rea­
sonable, and committed to a practicable conception 
of democratic government. But they are sick of the 
war, dead sick and weary. At present, they can see. no 
reason why they should go on with it. What we have 
to do is to reach them with the adequate reason.
Until we do that we are wasting time talking to this 
government, it isn't the power that will decide 
whether the Russian armies continue to fight. The 
masses of the Russian people will determine that.
I am sure we give too much heed to the existing 
government and exaggerate its importance.11
This proved to be a very perceptive observation. Apparently, 
Russell was the only Mission member who correctly inter­
preted popular sentiment toward.the war or the ineffective­
ness of the Provisional Government.
Russell attributed this tendency of the Mission to 
think only in terms of the Provisional Government to the 
fact that Americans were accustomed to dealing with estab­
lished governments which could speak and act decisively.
Such was not the case in Russia, "if anyone thinks this
government is in any such situation . . . how huge is that
12blunder! And what consequences may depend upon it I"
Thus, soon after his arrival in Russia, Russell became 




or "Bureau Chiefs" as he usually referred to them, were 
without sufficient power to determine policy for Russia, 
and he increasingly turned his attention to other areas.
From the first day of his arrival in the Russian 
capital, Russell had been aware of the potential power of 
the masses in Revolutionary Russia, upon returning to 
his quarters in the Winter Palace long after midnight on 
the day of his arrival in Petrograd, he stayed up until 
three o'clock recording his impressions. He had traveled 
around petrograd for several hours and was overwhelmed 
by the "literally hundreds" of public meetings in parks 
or on street corners which were attended by "great crowds 
silently listening." While he thought that this might be 
nothing more than the result of the Russian's
new-found freedom/77 a voice tells me it is some­
thing more . . . Here /jls7  a new and tremendous power 
unleashed and what do we know of it? If the crowds 
were not so silent we could think we understood its 
but vast, inexpressive throngs listening and thinking 
and gathering power, nobody knows what they may 
mean.
This revolutionary fervor of which Russell was so 
aware found its voice in the petrograd Soviet which was 
created immediately before the Abdication. Shortly after 
the Petrograd Soviet was formed, similar groups sprang up 
throughout Russia. With a membership of almost 3,000 dele­
gates, the petrograd Soviet was too unwieldy to function 
)________________________
13"Russell Diary," June 13, 1917.
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effectively. Therefore, most of its power was delegated
to an Executive Committee, in time, this committee became
too large. Finally, most of the decisions were made by a
group of twenty-four men who were members of the various
political parties represented in the Soviet. In June,
delegates of the various Soviets met in petrograd to form
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This meeting was in
session when the Root Mission arrived in petrograd. It
was dominated by the Socialist Revolutionaries and the
Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks controlled less than twenty
per cent of the votes. Thus, the Congress, in which the
petrograd Soviet had a disproportionate influence, main-
14tained a relatively moderate character.
Russell did not understand many of the events
which were taking place in Russia. He did, however, recog-
15nize the necessity of contacting the All-Russian congress.* 
On June 15, he made the first of several attempts to 
communicate with the Congress, on that day and three days 
later he sent a messenger to the presiding officer of the 
Congress to request an interview. Both attempts proved 
unsuccessful. He then requested assistance from members 
of the Provisional Government in order to obtain a pass 
to the meetings. When the pass was not forthcoming, Russell
14Chamberlin, Russian Revolution I, 109-14; and 
Treadgold, Twentieth century Russia, 146.
^Throughout his diary Russell referred to the group 
as the "National Council of Workers*, Soldiers* and peasants' 
Delegates.“
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called to remind the Ministers of their promise. He was 
told that the pass would be brought to him that afternoon 
by members of the Labor Department with whom he had an 
appointment. The officials arrived without the pass but 
promised it would be sent the next morning. Russell felt 
the delay was "merely characteristic of the race, which is 
essentially oriental and cannot see any occasion for haste 
and few for observing a promise"— an excellent example of 
Russell's superficial evaluation of the Russian character 
and his somewhat patronizing attitude. Although he be­
lieved the delay "means nothing else," he was disappointed, 
as he saw "that the National Council is the real power 
here and we have not touched it."3-̂
Disappointed over his interviews with members of 
the provisional Government and unable to establish con­
tact with the All-Russian Congress after a week's efforts, 
Russell became, despondent. He described the morning's 
work of June 21 as "wasted time . . . which is the usual 
thing" and believed that "if this commission is to accom­
plish anything besides looking pleasant and eating copiously
17the fact has not yet been established."
That afternoon Russell attended a reception given 
by the Russian American Committee. He described it as a
16"Russell Diary," June 20, 1917.
n "Russell Diary," June 21, 1917.
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"function calculated to produce weariness and tears" with
a guest list made up of "agents and employees of the inter-
18national Harvester Company." As he was leaving the
reception, Russell was approached by Arno Dosch-Flevrot,
correspondent for The Mew York World. Dosch-Flevrot had
heard Soot's address at the reception and described it as
"so absurd it made me angry." The reporter sought to find
19someone who could understand his sentiment. After a
brief conversation with Dosch-Flevrot, Russell decided
not to accompany the Mission to Moscow but to remain in
20Petrograd in order to "try to break into the Council."
The following day Russell attended his first
session of the All-Russian Congress. He never explained
how he gained admission after such a long delay. Perhaps
it was due to his meeting with Dosch-Flevrot. The reporter
later wrote that in an attempt to show that the Root
Mission "was not altogether 'bourgeois,' the American news-
21paper correspondents in Petrograd took Russell to. it."
While at the meeting Russell was approached by a Russian
18Ibid.
^Arno Dosch-Flevrot, Through war to Revolution; 
Being the Experiences of a Newspaper Correspondent in War 
and Revolution, 1914-1920 (London: John Lane, 1931),
16^-63^
20"Russell Diary," June 21, 1917.
^Dosch-Flevrot, Through war to Revolution, 163.
237
jew named Rabitsch, who stated that he had heard Russell 
speak in New York. Rabitsch offered to assist Russell in 
making arrangements to address the Congress. Russell 
accepted this offer but was not too pleased with the 
situation and recorded that "he would be a simple person 
that would depend much upon this son of Israel, for in
22his face is guile and in his eyes . . .  lurks deception." 
perhaps because there was no one else to rely upon, Russell 
allowed Rabitsch to make the arrangements for his speech. 
For two days Russell returned to the congress
expecting to deliver his address. Each time he was in-
23formed that it had been postponed. When he arrived on 
the morning of the third day Rabitsch told him that the 
Executive Committee had decided it would be better if he 
limited his address to "a few words of greeting and cut 
out all . . . that dealt with the war," since such 
references might cause a riot. Russell agreed to comply 
with these instructions, although his views on the war 
were well known. He was sorry, however, to see that the 
Russian democracy had adopted a policy of censorship. 
Rabitsch left Russell for a few minutes, presumably to con­
fer with the Executive Committee, upon his return he 
explained that it might be best if Russell did not speak
22"Russell Diary," June 22, 1917.
23"Russell Diary," June 23-24, 1917.
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at all as he represented the American government and not 
the American Socialist party. Rabitsch then suggested 
that Russell cable the Socialist Party in the United States 
for credentials. Russell replied, "it would be a cold day 
when I stood hat in hand at the door of any body on earth 
asking permission to speak." if the Congress did not want 
to hear him it could "go to hell."
Dosch-Flevrot and Shepherd, another American news­
paperman, prevented Russell from leaving, and Dosch-Flevrot 
went to confer with the Executive Committee, in a few 
minutes Skobolov and another cabinet member appeared and 
told Russell that the Committee "had never made nor enter­
tained the slightest objections" to his address. Russell 
was "perfectly free" to discuss the war or any other
issue and was extended a formal invitation to speak that
24evenxng.
In Russell's mind there was no doubt that this 
episode represented an attempt by pro-German socialists 
in the United States to prevent him from addressing the 
Congress. He referred to the incident as "a little tribute 
from the East Side of New York and men that used to call 
themselves my friends" and added that Rabitsch had "admitted 
to Shepherd and Dosch-Flevrot that he was a friend of Morris
24"Russell Diary," June 25, 1917.
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25Hillquit." Dosch-Flevrot does not substantiate this 
story. When he wrote of the incident he recalled that 
"the committee of control said it was useless to have him 
/Russel3.7 speak" since "America was so closely associated 
with Russia's other imperialist allies." According to 
Dosch-Flevrot, Russell was allowed to speak because the 
newsmen "put it on a personal basis with some of the
leaders . . . /Whey let him speak then, for no better
26reason than as a personal favor to us."
Regardless of the reasons for delay, Russell finally
spoke on the evening of June 25 before what represented to
him the true voice of the Russian Revolution. In an
obvious and naive attempt to associate with his audience,
Russell wore "the reddest red ribbon in petrograd" and "a
27flaming scarlet tie." Before he began his speech he 
held aloft "the red card of the Socialist party of the
United States" and his membership card in The international
28Typographical union.
In the first portion of his address, Russell
25Ibid.
^Dosch-Flevrotf Through War To Revolution, 162-63.
27Bessie Beatty, The Red Heart of Russia (New York: 
Century Co., 1918), 39-40.
28"Address of Charles Edward Russell of The Ameri­
can Commission Before The Council of Workmen's Soldierte 
and peasants' Delegates, June 12/25, 1917," Charles Edward 
Russell Papers, Vol. 7.
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explained that he came "from the plain people of America, 
the workers, the radicals, the American Socialists, the 
champions of democracy . . .  to greet the freemen and free- 
women of Russia." Russell praised the recent Revolution 
and told his audience that as news of the events reached 
all parts of the world "it was as if in the darkest night 
a new planet had suddenly arisen greater than the sun."
The Revolution was "the grandest event in /the? human 
history" of "the emancipation of man."
Proceeding to his favorite topic, the need for a 
renewed effort in the war, Russell emphasized what the 
United States was doing. The united States had for 
several years "clung to the illusion that . . .  there 
could be some other solution than the use of physical 
force." It was only after-the Americans "perceived that 
autocracy was bent upon the destruction of liberty on 
earth" that we "took up the sword." once the decision 
was reached, however, America "plunged with all its might 
and resources" into the contest and was now in the process 
of raising "an army of millions."
He then turned to the question of American war 
aims and told his audience that the united States "makes 
war that we may have peace." Russell went well beyond 
Wilson's idea of making the world safe for democracy:
Without democracy there can never come socialism, 
never come peace, never come the emancipation of man.
We see that without democracy we can never right the
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ancient wrongs of labor, never gain for the producer 
the just fruits of his toil, never free men's hearts 
and lives from the frightful blight and cold horrors 
of the competitive system.
Only in his closing paragraph did Russell specifi­
cally urge the Russians to continue the war. In words 
better suited to encourage an emotional American rather 
than a war-weary Russian, Russell told his audience that 
"our word to you" is "Lead on. You know the road . . . 
Lead on, and. Russia and America, bound by the same great 
purpose will drive th^ last oppression from its seat and
beat the last shackle that binds the limbs on the minds of
29men into emblems of liberty, progress, and light."
Russell believed his speech had been effective, 
in his diary he wrote that when he spoke of the need to 
continue the war "the right and center roared and cheered 
enthusiastically," although "the extreme left, headed by 
the strange figure Lenine /sic/, sat still and did not 
applaud," He also mentioned that his interpreter de-
30scribed the presiding officer's response as "pleasing."
Russell's impression of his reception was relayed to the
united States. Readers of The New York Times were told
31that Russell's speech "was cheered to the echo" and that
30,1RuBsell Diary," July 25, 1917.
31The New York Times, June 27, 1917, 1.
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"he was received with a warm welcome by the Congress and
32his speech was loudly applauded."
An American newspaperwoman who heard Russell's
speech, however, recalled that "they listened to his
message, but it had no meaning for them. He had come to
Russia to help make Russia fight, and the dream of the
Russian revolutionist was not only to stop Russia from
33fighting, but to put an end to all wars." Another news­
paper correspondent, Robert C. Long, described a speech to 
the Congress made by an unspecified member of the Root 
Mission in which the speaker was unaware of the attitude 
of his audience because of the deliberate deception of 
his translator. When a member of the congress told the 
speaker that "he did not know what he was talking about" 
and that the united States should "mend her own affairs 
before advising Russia," the translator "omitted half of 
this, and toned the other half, down." The result was that 
the American "went away under the impression that he and 
America had been paid pleasant compliments; and that the
32Herbert Bailey, "Russell Foils Trick of Socialist 
Here," The New York Times, June 29, 1917, 2.
33Beatty, The Red Heart of Russia, 40.
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Council was solid with him."34
Russell was correct in his evaluation of the Bol­
sheviks' reaction. A few days after his speech, Pravda 
criticized the speaker for claiming to represent American 
socialism when he had in fact been expelled from the 
party. The Bolshevik organ described Russell as "the 
lackey of America's financial aces . . . _/aZ bourgeois 
renegade and the traitor of the working people." The 
newspaper denied that the American people had "of their
own initiative entered into this cruel war" which had
35instead been forced upon them by "Morgan & Company."
Following his address to the All-Russian Congress,
Russell attended its sessions virtually every day until
, 36it adjourned two days before the Mission left petrograd. 
With the assistance of Alexander Gumberg, an American 
traveling in Russia, he met with members of the
34Robert Crozier Long, Russian Revolution Aspects 
{New Yorks E. P. Dutton, 1919), 286. warth says the 
speaker referred to was Russell. Long, however, only 
says that the speaker was a member of the Root Mission 
and that the speech occurred in June, warth*s assumption 
no doubt resulted from his belief that Russell was the 
only Mission member who spoke before the Council. Warth, 
The Allies And The Russian Revolution, 103.
^"Protest in the Pravda of June 18/July 1, 1917," 
Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Jjept.7 also found in Charles 
Edward Russell papers, Vol. 7.
36"Employment of Charles Edward Russell,and 
"Russell Diary," June-26-July 7, 1917.
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37Congress. on the evening of July 3, Russell met with 
three members of the Congress Committee of Economics. He 
joined "the three for a meal of black bread, sausage, and 
tea in the cellar of the Congress building and began to 
explain the Stevens Plan for improving the Russian rail­
roads. The members of the Committee admitted that they 
had never heard of the plan but agreed that transportation 
was the key to Russia's economic problems. Russell left 
the conference after midnight, returned to the Winter 
palace with a great degree of satisfaction, and recorded 
that the three "with greatest enthusiasm and apparent
sincerity1' had "promised to put the plan before the
38Council at the earliest possible moment." on the 
following day Russell returned to the Congress and "had 
the satisfaction of hearing" one of the three men present 
the Stevens Plan to that body. Russell believed this to
37 "Russell Diary," July 3, 1917. Alexander 
Guniberg, who would later serve as a link between the 
American colony and the Bolsheviks following the October 
Revolution, was of great assistance to Russell, serving 
both as an interpreter and as contact with socialist 
elements. After leaving petrograd, Russell thanked 
Guniberg for his "extreme kindness and invaluable assist­
ance." Charles Edward Russell t o Comrade Alexander 
Guniberg, July 20, 1917, Raymond Robins Papers, Box 12. 
Also, in his letter of introduction to Stevens, he said 
Guniberg was "of the greatest possible assistance."
Charles Edward Russell to John F. Stevens, July 9, 1917, 
Alexander Guniberg papers. Box X (State Historical Society 
of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin).
38"Russell Diary," July 3, 1917.
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39be "the first direct and tangible result of our labors." 
Russell never named his contacts in the congress and he 
made no mention of their party affiliation. It would 
appear, however, that they were insignificant members of 
a rather moderate socialist party, perhaps the Socialist 
Revolutionary.
On another occasion Russell was able to obtain 
financial information from the Treasury Department 
because of his contacts with the Congress. McCormick and 
Bertron had been promised certain reports by the provi­
sional Government on which they would base recommendations 
for a loan to Russia. When two weeks passed without their 
receipt, Russell suggested that he speak with his con­
tacts in the Congress. The following day Russell "told 
the whole story" to his "committee friends in the 
cellarage." The upshot was that the Treasury Department 
was told to turn over the material within "24 hours" or 
"the whole matter would be laid before the Council and 
summary action demanded." Bertron and McCormick received 
the information in the allotted time, and Russell was even 
more convinced that this was "the way to get things done 
in Russia." By now, Russell was totally convinced that 
"all the time spent upon Ministers" was wasted. "If what 
you want is right and good . . .  go to the Council . . .
39"Russell Diary," July 4, 1917.
246
sit down in the cellar . . .--/an<i7 you can get it every 
time.1,40
In addition to holding conferences with the members
of the Provisional Government and working with the All-
Russian Congress, Russell attempted to contact other Russian
socialists, several times he went to Gorky's newspaper
office to see him. Each time he failed, once he visited
the office of Pravda in an attempt to find a printer who
was a member of his union in New York, unable to find him,
he struck up a conversation with a young couple who had
recently returned from America, "to make trouble" in
Russell's opinion. He also met Trotsky and had "a cordial,
rather joshing talk with him." Obviously unimpressed with
the future Bolshevik leader, Russell described him as a
"hot-headed Utopian Jew: bushy haired, sanguine, highly
41strung, excitable, and a gifted talker."
40 "Russell Diary," July 7, 1917.
41,"Russell Diary," June 27, 1917; When Russell met 
Trotsky at the Pravda office on June 27, Trotsky was not a 
member of the Bolshevik Party. At that time he headed a 
"left-wing anti-war Menshevik" faction known as the "inter­
district group." if not a party member, why was he in the 
office of the Bolshevik organ? The explanation is that 
Trotsky, although not an official member of the Bolshevik 
party, had told Lenin that he accepted Lenin's "April 
Thesis." The two men then agreed that Trotsky should avoid 
affiliation with the Bolshevik party until he could bring 
the "Interdistrict group" and certain other left-wing 
Mensheviks into Lenin's party. When Trotsky officially 
joined the Bolshevik Party in August, 1917, this "only 
formalized three months of close collaboration." There­
fore, Russell's assertion that he had met Trotsky under 
the circumstances described in his diary can be accepted. 
Daniels, Red October, 35-36.
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Marie Spiridonova, an old socialist revolutionary,
was another person Russell sought. He later stated that
he wished to see her more than any other person in 
42Russia. After several attempts, he located her in "an 
old schooUiouse" which had been provided for the use of 
returning exiles, it was soon apparent that she had a 
hostile attitude toward Americans and everything American. 
When asked why, she explained that "America was a country 
wholly given over to selfishness, the pursuit of sordid 
wealth and material aims." She had received this impres­
sion during her years in prison when, in an attempt to 
learn to read English in order to study about America, she 
had requested an American magazine or newspaper. The 
Review of Reviews was the only available American publica­
tion, and after eleven years of reading it she had found 
America to be "cold, selfish, materialistic, interested 
in nothing but money." Critics of the contemporary 
American scene, many of whom contributed to The Review, 
would have agreed with'(her. Had Miss Spiridonova spent 
the same eleven years learning English from a different 
American periodical (the Ladies' Home Journal, perhaps?) 
her opinion might have been different.
Russell began "to analyze" for her "the forces and 
elements in America for progress." After a lengthy
42Russell,.Unchained Russia, 211.
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conversation he felt "the ice was broken" and they had "a
grand time predicting the remaking of the world and the
43emancipation of the worker everywhere." Russell may not
have been as effective as he believed, but the experience
confirmed his belief as to the extent of misinformation
which Russians had about America.
Three days before leaving Petrograd Russell made
44a major speech before a convention of Trudoviks. As so
often in the past, Russell argued that democracy was
necessary for socialism. If democracy were to survive the
forces of autocracy, Germany had to be destroyed. In
emphasizing the need for socialism, Russell went much
further than before. He described a world which had
been "blighted, darkened and cursed with the capitalist
system" but commented that all this would change "if only
45the capitalist system were abolished." This statement 
would have been most upsetting to other Mission members 
as well as to the President who had appointed Russell.
43"Russell Diary," July 2, 1917.
44"Employment of Charles Edward Russell."
45"Address Delivered by Charles Edward Russell At 
The Convention Of The Trudoviks, or Moderate. Socialists 
At The Hall Of The Medical Academy, July 6 , 1917," Charles 
Edward Russell papers, Box 3. Duncan, who was present at 
the convention, probably had this speech in mind when he 
told Ambassador Francis that Russell's "Only-object is 
socialistic propaganda." See David R. Francis to Robert 
bansing, July 7, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5798, St. Dept.
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On the same day Russell addressed the members of
"the old British and American colonies" at a meeting held
in the Astoria Hotel. The meeting was organized by the
British suffragette Emiline Pankhurst to promote the
participation of Russian women in politics. Russell
warned "against trying to teach these people anything or
looking down upon them from a height of superiority" and
suggested that they "pay attention to the National
Council as the only power in R u s s i a . A n  American
newspaperwoman who was present recalled that Russell
deviated from the program to uplift the women of Russia
and "spoke at length on the Soviet." She described his
47speech as "socialism, from beginning to end."
In order to gain insights, Russell, who understood 
no Russian, spent a considerable amount of time observing 
parades and listening to street corner orators with the 
aid of interpreters. Mast significant, perhaps, was his 
observation of the reactions of the Russian people to the 
July 1st offensive. Although the newspapers in Petrograd 
issued extra editions, Russell perceived that the popular 
response was "nothing to be exhilarated about," a fact he 
found "ominous." "The Russian advance is a direct result
46"Russell Diary," July 6 , 1917.
47Florence Macleod Harper, Runaway Russia (New 
York, Century Co., 1918), 164-65.
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of our visit, and now that we have it, I don't know, by
48Jinx, whether it is good or bad." Russell was incorrect
in his belief that the Mission's visit was the cause of
the offensive. He accurately interpreted the political
unrest to be a result of dissatisfaction with the military
offensive, an opinion which no other Mission member held.
Two days later Russell wrote:
They are dead sick of the war . . . .  /T7he psycho­
logical effect of the recent Russian advance is some­
thing that ought to give' us a jolt if we are willing
to reflect upon actualities and what they mean. Out­
side of the minority that is bent upon carrying on 
the war anyway, there is no exhilaration.
He described the street demonstrations supporting the advance
as "feeble" in comparison to the one of July 1 which opposed
it. Pravda, as well as Gorky's newspaper, called for a
diplomatic offensive rather than a military one. The most
discouraging sign, however, was the All-Russian Congress's
vote to congratulate the Army. The votes in opposition to
the resolution included all the Bolsheviks, significantly
49joined by more than one hundred non-Bolsheviks.
In the last few days of his visit Russell became
somewhat optimistic, on July 5, he obtained the promise 
of Minister Skobolov to support the Stevens Railroad plan.
On July 7, the Executive committee of the Congress asked
48"Russell Diary," July 2, 1917.
49"Russell Diary," July 4, 1917.
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him to ‘'intervene" in a threatened strike at a factory 
operated by Americans, on his last day in Petrograd he 
was sought out by a "committee of soldiers" from the
National congress, who requested his aid in establishing
50a newspaper to oppose Pravda. Russell believed these 
events indicated that the "bitter prejudice" which had 
existed upon their arrival had finally disappeared. "I 
am,1 he wrote, "overwhelmed with the thought that we are
going away just as the prospect opens before us of oppor-
51tunlty and power to do good."
Russell's personal diary contains many passages 
in which the American Socialist revealed his awareness 
of the power of the Soviets and the weaknesses of the 
Provisional Government. It is difficult, therefore, if 
not impossible to understand why he was heartened by the 
relatively minor events which occurred during his last 
few days in petrograd. Russell repeatedly referred to the 
Soviets as the sole power in Russia. Yet, in his personal 
report to the state Department;, no mention was made of 
these frequent observations. He was, therefore, guilty 
of a very serious omission. Wilson's hand-picked Social­
ist, like the more conservative members of the Mission,
50"Employment of Charles Edward Russell,1'; and 
"Russell Diary," July 5-9, 1917.
5:L"Russell Diary," July 7, 1917,
failed to present to the American Government anything 
approaching a realistic picture of Russia in the summer 
of 1917.
CHAPTER X
LABOR, RELIGION, AND PROPAGANDA
in addition to its major considerations, the Mission
focused on three minor areas: labor, religion, and American
propaganda in Russia. It will be recalled that Samuel
Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor,
suggested James Duncan as the representative of American
Labor on the Root Mission. Duncan was respected by and
popular with his fellow Americans on the Mission. With the
exception of John Mott, Crane considered Duncan to be the
"ablest and wisest man on our commission,"1' and one military
2aide described him as "an absolute joy."
Unfortunately, the Russians did not hold this view.
A Russian naval officer attached to the Mission found all 
of the members somewhat patronizing in their attitude
toward Russia but singled out Duncan as"a stupid and vulgar
3 'person practically devoid of manners." John Reed, American 
radical and famous chronicler of the Bolshevik Revolution,
•••Charles R, crane to J. C. B., July 12, 1917,
Charles r . Crane papers.




contended that Lenin's party viewed Samuel Gompers as
"more reactionary that j. P. Morgan" and "simply ignored"
4James Duncan, as did even the moderate socialists.
Duncan set for himself the difficult task of con­
vincing Russian labor that it must accept a conservative 
view of its political role, in a discussion about the two 
types of strikes in use In Russia, those associated with 
worker grievances and those caused by political reasons, 
Duncan emphasized his task of differentiating between the 
two. He planned to do this with the help of Russian 
workers who had lived in America and, for this purpose, 
had brought a list of people to contact. In words some­
what out of character for a labor leader he stated, "One 
of the most difficult things we have to do with foreign
workingmen is to get them to be tolerant of their
5employers." Duncan believed, however, that the strike as
a political weapon had been borrowed from the socialist
movement in Russia and he thought it would be extremely
difficult "to disentangle the socialist . . .  from the
6trade unions."
Duncan and other Mission members obviously thought
4 John Reed, "Memorandum, Russia, The Soviet Govern­
ment, 1918," Alexander Gumberg Papers, Box I.
5"McCormick Diary," May 28, 1917.
6Ibid.
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that Russian labor could be easily persuaded to accept the 
goals and methods of American labor. This was highly un­
likely as the Russian labor movement differed drastically 
from that in America. Prior to 1905 there were very few 
labor unions in Russia, and from 1905 to 1917 the movement 
was extremely weak, in 1917, however, union membership 
multiplied and by 1918 slightly more than one-half of 
Russia's four million industrial workers belonged to some 
type of trade union. A struggle for the support of labor 
ensued and, as was true of the political struggle, the 
contest was primarily between the Mensheviks-Socialist 
Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviks.7 The result was that 
Russian labor divided itself into two factions after the 
March Revolution: the trade unions, which were usually-
dominated by the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, 
and the factory committees led by the Bolsheviks. The 
Bolsheviks obtained their strongest support from the in­
dustrial workers, and their support enabled the Bolsheviks 
to obtain a majority in the petrograd Soviet in August.
Upon his arrival in Vladivostok, Duncan conducted 
"a somewhat hurried conference" with representatives of 
the local Soviet. After extending greetings and congratu­
lations to the Russian workers, he briefly described the 
accomplishments of American labor and offered to provide
7Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 265-67.
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information pertaining to the movement in the united
States. He also took advantage of the opportunity to
8urge strong support of the war effort.
On several occasions during the journey from Vladi­
vostok to Petrograd, Duncan made brief addresses to groups 
of Russians in the various railroad stations. His speeches
followed a pattern; greetings, congratulations about the
9Revolution, and a plea, for strong backing of the war.
His first lengthy conference occurred on June 12 
at Viatka, a suburb of Petrograd, with Alexander Samrov, 
representative of the railroad and electrical power plant 
workers in that area. Through Samrov, Duncan made arrange­
ments to address the Petrograd union. In the address 
Duncan underlined "the possible necessity" of establishing 
two or three work shifts in the essential industries in 
order to achieve full industrial capacity as well as to. 
obtain the eight-hour workday strongly advocated by 
Russian labor.^ The workers of petrograd had already won 
an eight-hour day immediately after the March Revolution. 
Soon afterward, industries in other Russian cities offered 
this concession.13*
9 "Duncan Report," appendix to "Mission Report," 
Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
9 Ibid., 1-2 .
I0Ibid., 3.
11Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 267-69.
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Duncan's first conference in petrograd was with 
Minister of Labor Skobolov on June 15. Duncan presented 
messages from President Wilson, the American Secretary of 
Labor, and Gompers. The Russian Minister was primarily 
interested in Duncan's description of the way the Depart­
ment of Labor aided in settling labor disputes without 
resorting to "official government interference."
During the next three weeks Duncan met with
Skobolov severa? times. They usually discussed the role
of the American Department of Labor as mediator in labor
disputes, on one occasion Skobolov sent men from his
department to Duncan to obtain government reports on labor
and material on Workmen's Compensation Laws. The eight-
hour workday with three shifts per day was frequently
discussed. Toward the end of his stay in petrograd,
Duncan received Skobolov's assurance that his department
would "use all its influence" to see that this plan was
implemented in Russia. Duncan's last conference with the
Minister of Labor ended "with profuse thanks . . . for
the advice I had given, which had been . . .  to some
12extent put into use and was showing good results."
in addition to conferring with members of the 
Provisional Government, Duncan also spent a considerable 
amount of time with various labor leaders in Petrograd and
12"Duncan Report," 3.
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Moscow, in these meetings Duncan first explained the 
history of the labor movement in the united States. He 
then distributed material which served to explain the 
organization of labor along craft lines and strongly sug­
gested that the Russians follow the same pattern. He 
also stressed the necessity of establishing shifts for 
workers who were engaged in the production of war materials
and# in general# counseled labor leaders to support the
13Provisional Government and the Russian war effort.
On the evening of June 29# Duncan appeared before
the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and delivered his
"principal address" in Russia to approximately 800 dele-
14gates and 4#000 spectators. Russell had assisted in
making the arrangements for the speech and was present.
He recorded that Duncan devoted most of his attention to
15the "problems and demands of labor."
Duncan did discuss such topics as equal pay for 
women, public education# child labor# the right to strike# 
the eight-hour workday# and other issues of interest to all 
workingmen. He explained that American Labor wished to 
furnish "information about our own progress" in order to
I3Ibid.
■^Although Russell's address to the All-Russian 
Congress is frequently referred to by historians, they 
appear to be unaware of the one delivered by Duncan.
Warth, The Allies And The Russian Revolution# 103.
^"Russell Diary#" June 29, 1917.
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assist the Russians and encourage them to follow the 
pattern set by American Labor. A careful examination of 
the speech reveals that his strongest appeal to the 
workers was to encourage them to supply adequate labor 
for war industries and to provide support for the Pro­
visional Government and the Allies. He strongly defended 
the eight-hour day and explained the use of two or three 
eight-hour work shifts to increase production. Duncan 
felt that the production level essential for war could 
be maintained through the use of work shifts, but if a 
"very great emergency" arose the workers should tempo­
rarily suspend hour limitations and follow "the example of 
our workers in America." He discussed the strike as a 
"God-given privilege" which should be used sparingly and 
only "when more friendly methods of adjustment have 
failed.
Duncan believed his speech had been "well received," 
especially by the soldier deputies who were "exceedingly 
pleased" by his appeal for support for the war. He
failed to mention an interruption by one delegate who
17objected to his speech. Like the other members of the 
Mission, Duncan spoke no Russian and was at the mercy of
^"Address Delivered By James Duncan Of The special 
Diplomatic Mission to Russia, Kedetsky corpus, petrograd, 
June 29, 1917," appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root 
Papers, Box 192.
17l'Duncan Report,’*; and "Russell Diary," June 29,
1917.
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his interpreter who probably did not give a literal trans­
lation of the delegate's remarks.
On the following day Duncan delivered a speech to 
approximately 3,500 persons at a mass meeting at Pavlovsk 
in the suburbs of Petrograd. The meeting was held to honor 
a regiment leaving for the Front. The program included
Russian folk music and dancing, which the Americans greatly
18enjoyed. in this speech Duncan devoted little attention
to labor but emphasized the need for stronger backing of
the war. At one point he stated that the united States
"expects that the Russian armies will move forward." Another
time he exceeded the Mission's authority by saying that it
might be possible "to place the Stars and Stripes of the
united States of America alongside of your own revolutionary
19flag on the fighting front."
Shortly before leaving petrograd Duncan made a 
final appeal to Russian Labor. The occasion was a meeting 
of the All-Russian Trade union Convention, which consisted 
of 388 delegates representing twenty-nine labor organiza­
tions. He restricted his remarks almost entirely to labor 
issues and advocated the creation of a labor movement
■^"Duncan Report,"; and "Russell Diary," June 29,
1917.
19"Address Delivered By James Duncan At Pavlovsk, 
Russia, At A Meeting Held There Under The Auspices of The 
Pavlovsk Workmen's and Soldiers' Council, Saturday, June 
30, 1917," appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root 
Papers, Box 192.
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20similar to the one in the united States.
It is evident from his speeches as well as his
official report that Duncan attempted to encourage Russian
labor to give strong aid to the war effort. He hoped to
influence the labor movement to progress along the lines
developed by the American Federation of Labor. This was
an ambitious objective at a time when Russian workers were
being told that they should take over all the means of
production and indeed were doirgso.
Duncan was extremely optimistic as they left
Russia. He described their visit as having had "excellent
general results" and was "sure that the labor and soldier
combination . . .  is in much better condition than when we
21arrived in Russia."
It is impossible to understand this optimism, only 
a few days before the group left Petrograd, large numbers 
of workers and citizens demonstrated to demand that all 
power be placed in the hands of the soviets. Approximately 
one week after their departure, similar demonstrations, the 
July Days, resulted in the overthrow of the First Coalition. 
Why was Duncan so completely ignorant about the true senti­
ments of Russian Labor? The only possible explanation is
20 "Address Delivered By James Duncan To The All 
Russian Trade Union Convention, Petrograd, July 5, 1917," 
appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root papers, b o x 192.
’Duncan Report," 6.
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that he saw only what he wanted to see. During his visit 
to Russia, Duncan spent roost of his time with officials 
of the Provisional Government and union leaders. There is 
no indication that he met with or, in fact, even knew 
about the Bolshevik-dominated factory committees. Thus, 
like others of his group, he was so accustomed to insti­
tutions similar to those in the United States that he 
neglected all others.
Although most members of the Mission were primarily
concerned with eitherppolitical or military developments
in revolutionary Russia, Crane and John Mott devoted their
attention to changes within the Russian Church. Crane was
in Russia when the members of the Root Mission were being
selected and had cabled the State Department to suggest
that, in addition to persons trained in law, politics,
and finance, someone "of the greatest spiritual wisdom and
authority" should also be included. He suggested Mott as
22the logical choice.
Mott was subsequently appointed and Crane tele­
graphed him about the great changes that were being made 
in the Russian Church. Although the Church had "had no 
part in /Ehe7 Revolution," there was a revolution "going on
22Charles R. Crane, "Memoirs, Russia 1917," 185, 
Charles R. Crane Papers.
26323in /the7 church."
Crane remained in Moscow until June 10 and left
24in time to join the Mission in Petrograd on June 13.
Both Crane and Mott were present at the initial meetings
with representatives of the Provisional Government hut
25left Petrograd on the evening of June 16 for Moscow.
They arrived in Moscow on the tenth day of a 
convention being held by the Russian Orthodox Church.
Crane erroneously referred to this meeting as the National 
Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church. Actually, the con­
ferences in Moscow consisted of church leaders from all 
parts of Russia who were making preparations for the 
coming church session, the All-Russian Church Council
(Sobor) which convened in August, 1917, and was the first
26such meeting since 1681. This provided an excellent 
opportunity for the Americans to bring the Mission's
Charles R. Crane to John R. Mott, May 16, 1917, 
Robert Lansing Papers, Vol. 26. The revolution in the 
Church to which Crane referred centered around the meeting 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in June, 1917, in Moscow. 
For Mott's evaluation of the changes occurring in the 
Russian church, see his “Letter . . .Regarding Recent 
Religious Developments in Russia," in John R. Mott,
Recent Experiences and impressions in Russia, Extracts 
from Correspondence and Addresses of John R. Mott, member 
of the Special Diplomatic Mission of the United States to 
Russia (Private Printing, 1918), 15-26.
2^Madding Summers to Robert Lansing, June 7, 1917, 
Doc. NO. 763.72/6099, St. Dept.
25,,Mission Log," 22.
^Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 127.
message to the group of over 1,000 representatives of the 
Russian Church from all parts of the country.
Mott was invited to address the conference, a sin­
gular honor for a Protestant. His speech was read by a 
church official prior to its delivery, and the Americans 
were surprised by a recommendation that they place more 
emphasis on the need for vigorous pursuit of the war. When
Mott and Crane asked the church leader to clarify the
position of the church with regard to the war, he replied,
“The church is for the war and is doing everything possible
27to sustain the army."
Therefore, on June 19, Mott delivered an address
which was interpreted by Father Alexandrov whom he had
28known in San Francisco and which underlined the need for 
the Russians to continue the war. Mott reviewed Russian- 
American relations and stated that there had always been a 
bond of friendship between the two countries. He told his 
audience that the united States “recognize/sT" that . . .
the Russian soldiers and people have been fighting our
battles for us.” The people of the United States “are 
also deeply grateful because of what you are proposing and 
planning to do to continue this struggle to a successful
^Crane, "Memoirs, Russia 1917," 185.
28MDtt, Recent Experiences, 18.
29issue."
Mott then described the preparations for war being
made in the United States and told his audience that "the
United states is with you in this conflict to the very
end.” in conclusion, Mott appealed for support for the
war and asked the representatives of the Russian Church
to "go back to all your parishes . . .  Tell them to stand
firmly behind the Provisional Government . . . Russia and
her allies must continue steadfast to the end.”'*0 Mott
believed that his address was received with "sympathy and
enthusiasm" and recalled that on several occasions the
"entire audience arose," which he interpreted as "a sign
31of most signal approval." The reaction of the churchmen 
revealed their conservative leanings. The more reactionary 
members of the clergy, especially those who had been 
closely associated with Rasputin, had been removed from 
their positions in the Church soon after the March 
Revolution. But the majority of the church leadership was 
Conservative and supported the Provisional Government. 
Later, like most conservative Russians, many of the clergy
29"Address of John R. Mott Member of the Special 
Mission of the united States of America to Russia, at the 
Great Sobor of the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow, June 19, 
1917," appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root papers,
Box 192.
3 0Ibid.
31-Mott. Recent Experiences, 18.
32spoke out in favor of General Kornilov.
Mott and Crane were joined in Moscow by the
33others. They returned to Petrograd with them on June 25.
Two days after their return, Mott and crane were invited
to a session of the Cossack Congress which was in session
in the capital. The 300 delegates who represented the
twelve Cossack Armies in the Russian forces heard Mott
compliment them for their determination to continue the
war against the Central powers, in language even more
direct than in his address before the Conference in
Moscow, Mott strongly urged a vigorous prosecution of the 
34war. He complimented the Congress on its resolution
calling for "an immediate offensive'1 and stated that
their rejection of a separate peace was "precisely what
we had expected from you." Matt pointed out that strong
and loyal support of the Provisional Government was
essential to the military effort. He referred to the
"intrigues of the enemy within your gates" and suggested
that "to wage a triumphant warfare at the front you must
35have no untaken forts in the rear." This remark reflects
-in Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, I, 135-38. 
33,lMission log," 28.
34Samuel R. Harper, who translated the speech for 
Matt, expressed the view that the speech'Was hardly the role 
of the secretary of the Y. M. C. A." Harper, Memoirs, 102.
35"Address of Dr. John R. Mott Before The Cossack 
Congress, Petrograd, June 27, 1917," appendix to "Mission 
Report," Elihu Root papers. Box 192.
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an attitude shared by many of the Allied representatives 
in Russia. It gave voice to a belief that the Provisional 
Government would have to do something to suppress growing 
opposition to the war.
On Sunday, July 1, a special religious service 
was conducted at the Kazan cathedral in petrograd in honor 
of the American Mission. Those present included members 
of the Mission as well as representatives of the Stevens 
Commission and the American Embassy. The service, pre­
sided over by Archbishop Ploton, lasted three hours. Father
Alexandrov delivered the sermon in English, and in it he
36compared the united States to the Good Samaritan.
Mott and crane then returned to Moscow in order to
witness the election of Archbishop Tikhon, who had served
for several years as Bishop of the Russian Church in
America, as the new Metropolitan of Moscow. They had been
invited to attend the service by the unanimous vote of the
delegates to the conference and were presented with sacred
37ikons by the Archbishop of Moscow. '
in addition to conferring with the leadership of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, Mott also met with the leaders 
of other religious groups in Russia. These included the
36Mott, Recent Experiences, 22-24; "McCormick Diary," 
July 1, 1917; and Gibbs, "Russian Trip Notes," July 1,
1917.
37Mott, Recent Experiences, 21.
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Archbishop of the “Old-Believers," a conservative group
within the Russian Orthodox church, Dr. Keen of the
"British and Foreign Bible Society," Dr. Simons of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, a representative of the Roman
38Catholic Church, and Russian and Polish Jews. They
discussed the progress being made toward reform within
the Russian Church, and the leaders were quite hopeful.
Up to the time of Mott's visit, the y. m . C. A.
had been limited to working with prisoners-of-war. Mott
was keenly interested in expanding both its work and its
influence in Russia. As he traveled across Russia en
route to petrograd, Mott discussed the possibility of
expanding Y. M. C. A. work to include the Russian soldiers.
In conferences with both Y. M. C. A. officials and Russian
citizens, Mott gained the impression that facilities were
needed to provide the Russian soldier with constructive
39ways in which to spend his leisure time.
Mott was impressed by the large numbers of soldiers
who were "not occupied at all with activities relating to the
war" or were "devoting themselves to aimless and unprofitable
40political discussion." Like the other Mission members
38Mott, Recent Experiences, 26; and "outline of The 
Activities of John r . Mott," appendix to "Mission Report," 
Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
•3QMott, Recent Experiences, 308; and "McCormick 
Diary," June 7 and 9, 1917.
40Mott, Recent Experiences, 4.
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Mott found the concept of soldiers holding political dis­
cussions completely foreign to his idea of proper military 
discipline. This provides another example of the Mission's 
practice of comparing the situation in Russia to American 
customs. if the practices differed greatly, they were 
assumed to be worthless.
Although he frequently referred to the need of 
spiritual leadership for the Russian soldier, his major 
desire appears to have been to help the soldiers become 
more effective in the war. The solution lay in organized 
activities which would occupy their leisure time.
I do not fear for Soldiers when they are fighting 
or when they are drilling. The time concerning which 
I have anxiety is their leisure hours . . . Shall 
these hours be spent in idleness, in dissipation, 
and in unprobatable agitation; or shall they be 
spent in helpful recreation . . . and in unselfish 
service among one's fellows?41
These were noble, Christian sentiments, indeed!
A number of Y. M. c. A. officials attached to 
prisoner-of-war camps had already begun work with the 
Russian soldiers. Mott supported these activities which
4:should "be reproduced on a large scale" throughout Russia.
"Speech by Dr. John R. Mott Member of the Special 
Mission of the United States of America to Russia at a Dinner 
given by Mr. Emanuel Nobel at his home in Petrograd June 6/21, 
1917," appendix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root Papers, Box 
192.
42,,Outline of Activities of John R. Mott," 3, appen­
dix to "Mission Report," Elihu Root papers, Box 192.
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His suggestion was endorsed by Root and other members of
the Mission, who strongly urged the establishment of Y. M.
43C. A. facilities along the Russian Front. ^
Mott interviewed a number of Russian officials
about expanding Y. M. C. A. activities. Prince Lvov and
Tereshchenko responded favorably, as did other Russians.
Before departing, Mott assigned ten Americans to work with 
44the Army. Both Crane and Mott left Russia secure in 
their belief that changes within the Russian Church would 
have a profound and beneficial effect throughout the 
country.
The third minor area of interest was propaganda. 
Prior to his arrival in petrograd Russell had decided that 
the united States should create an official or unofficial 
press bureau in Russia which could explain the purpose of 
the war to the Russian masses. Russell was obsessed with 
the idea that the Russian people would continue the war if 
thqr could be reached with an appeal. His attitude had 
been formed in conversations with Russian and American 
observers who had accompanied the Mission between Vladi­
vostok and the capital. By the time the Mission reached 
its destination, Russell had assumed the dual responsibility
43Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, June 17, 1917,
Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
44Mott, Recent Experiences, 6.
271
of establishing contact with the Russian socialists and
attempting to establish an adequate press or propaganda 
45bureau. Actually, Russell saw the tasks as one and
the same, on the one hand, he personally would explain
the position of his government to the socialist leaders
in Petrograd. on the other hand, the press bureau would
do the same to the Russian masses.
Upon his arrival in petrograd Russell immediately
took up the task. During his first few days in petrograd
he gathered information and opinions about the proposed 
46press bureau. Aided by Stanley Washburn, he acquired an 
automobile on the day of his arrival and drove "all about 
Petrograd looking up publicity men and conferring with the 
British and other representatives" until well after mid­
night. He called on Ambassador Francis, whom he found to 
be "wholly sympathetic with our idea of a propaganda 
campaign," and he invited local and foreign newspapermen
to a press conference to be held by Root on the morning of 
47June 15.
Russell soon concluded that the Allied approach to
4^"Employment of Charles Edward Russell, of the 
Special Diplomatic Mission of the united States to Russia, 
while in petrograd," 1, Charles Edward Russell papers. Vol. 
7. Hereinafter cited as "Employment of Charles Edward 
Russell."
46Ibid.; and "Russell Diary," June 13-18, 1917.
47"Russell Diary," June 13, 1917.
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propaganda was entirely wrong. The French and British 
tactic was to persuade the Russians to continue the war 
by "appeals to Russians to keep faith and carry out the 
national agreements on treaties." To the American 
socialist, this was "worse than useless," as the Russians 
associated these treaties with the deposed Tsar and there­
fore did not consider them binding. Russell singled out 
for particular criticism the use of war films of "British 
troops being shot to pieces," which he described as "in­
teresting but entirely worthless as propaganda." In his 
opinion, the Russians "knew too much about battle lines"
and needed instead "a living reason why they should offer
48themselves to be shot." The united States would do well
to take an independent course with emphasis on the "peril 
49to Democracy."
Russell had little trouble convincing the Mission
of the need for a press bureau, although at first some
members felt that the united States would be wise to join
50with the Allies in a concerted propaganda campaign. Root 
cabled the State Department recommending the formation of 
a press bureau. The Mission believed that "the people of
48Russell, Bare Hands And stone Walls, 366; and 
"Russell Diary," June 28, 1917.
49“Russell Diary," June 21, 1917.
50"Russell Diary," June 16, 1917.
Russia, particularly the soldiers, are going to decide
whether Russia stays in the war” and it was mandatory to
51"get at them in some way." They, therefore, had "taken 
steps for the immediate distribution of information which 
will cost about $100,000." He stated, "We members of the 
Mission all agree that the business of disseminating
COinformation should be taken up on a much larger scale."-'"
The figure which he suggested was five million dollars.
The money would be well spent if it could keep five million
Russian soldiers in the war. Without going into detail
Root explained that the money would provide "a supply of
newspapers, printing and distribution of posters, leaflets
and pamphlets, employment of numerous lecturers and moving
pictures to go to the front." The work would "be done
with the approval of the Russian Government," and would
53"not be conducted in the name of the united States."
Russell was pleased with Root's dispatch, which 
'Set forth the supreme necessity of propaganda" as well as 
the plans he and Washburn had proposed. He was somewhat 
surprised, however, at Root's opinion that the State 
Department might be reluctant to authorize the full
53*Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, June 17, 1917, Doc. 




appropriation. He recorded in his diary: "I don't see
how /the state/ Department can fail to approve, but Root
, , 54 seems doubtful."
Events were to prove the former Secretary of State 
correct. Almost two weeks later the Mission received 
Lansing's reply, it proved far from satisfactory, only 
at the end of his dispatch did the Secretary of State men­
tion the request for appropriations: "The matter of estab­
lishing an efficient agency for publicity is receiving
55careful consideration." According to Root this could be 
"translated" as meaning "your suggestions about publicity 
are hereby disapproved."
The reply was a disappointment to Russell as well 
as to the other members of the Mission. Anticipation of 
State Department approval had led Root, Bertron, and 
McCormick to sign personal notes for $30,000 to pay for 
the circulation of messages to the Russian people from 
Wilson and Root.57
The Mission again attempted to gain authorization 
for the proposed bureau. in a message to the Secretary
54"Russell Diary," June 17, 1917.
^Robert Lansing to Elihu Root, July 27, 1917, Doc. 
No. 763.72/5782E, St. Dept.
56"Russell Diary," July 2, 1917.
57"McCormick Diary," July 7, 1917.
of the Treasury# Bertron stated that it was "the unanimous 
opinion of the commission that an extensive educational 
publicity campaign be undertaken in Russia." it would "be 
supervised by Ambassador Francis'1 with "the approval of 
/the7 Russian Government." Bertron reminded the Secretary 
of their discussion of the subject before the Mission left 
Washington and urged that they be given a "prompt and 
definite answer."58 on the same day# Root sent Lansing a 
dispatch requesting an answer to their plans. To emphasize 
the urgency he wrote# "I beg you to realize Germany is now 
attacking Russia by propaganda and is spending millions . .
. to capture the minds of the Russian people." A German 
victory "can be prevented only by active and immediate 
counter attacks by the same weapons. The state Depart­
ment replied that President Wilson "approves in principle 
of educational campaign . . . the question of further outlay
and a comprehensive plan is receiving the careful attention
SOof the Department."
Russell had been disappointed about the brief 
period of time the Mission planned to spend in Russia.
58Samuel R. Bertron to William G. McAdoo# July 2# 
1917# Doc. No. 763.72/5693# St. Dept.
59Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, July 2, 1917#
Doc. No. 763.72/5795, St. Dept.
, 80Frank L. Polk to David R. Francis, July 7# 1917# 
Doc. No. 763.72/5693# St. Dept.
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After ten days in Petrograd he was convinced he would have 
to remain in Russia after the Mission's departure if any 
results were to be derived from his efforts, in a wire to 
the state Department he stated that "contingencies may 
arise" which would make necessary for him to remain in
Petrograd longer than the others. He requested permission
6 1_from Lansing and president Wilson to take this action.
Lansing referred the matter to Wilson and recoin-
ft 2mended that permission be granted. He later wired 
Russell that "the President and I heartily approve of your
remaining in Russia as long as you believe you can be of
ft 3s e r v i c e . T h i s  message never reached Russell. Ambassa­
dor Francis withheld the wire and replied to Lansing that 
unless he received "further instructions’1 he would withhold 
the message, since he and Root were of the opinion that "no
party of the Mission should remain retaining diplomatic 
64character." If Russell were allowed to remain, "it should 
be as private citizen or for some specific duty not related 
to diplomatic mission." Francis had found that Russell was
61Charles Edward Russell to Robert Lansing, June 22, 
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5553, St. Dept.
^2Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, June 28, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/5553, St. Dept.
63Robert Lansing to Charles Edward Russell, June 30,
1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5553, St. Dept.
®^A11‘diplomatic notes to the Mission were sent in
care of the American Embassy in Petrograd.
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"in thorough touch with Workmen and Soldiers Deputies 
maintaining that they have the power. He talks of Pro­
visional government disrespectfully and openly, conse­
quently, if he remains in any capacity he might make 
trouble.
Two days later, Francis further informed the state 
Department that Russell had asked the Mission to recommend 
him for the position of director of the proposed publicity 
bureau. Root had already explained to Russell that the 
bureau would be under the direction of the American 
Embassy, and the Mission "would not formally recommend 
anyone to the Embassy." Francis made it clear that he did 
not want Russell to remain. He informed the State Depart­
ment that “six of the members of the mission /5re7 secretly
unfavorable to his employment" and that Duncan believed
66"Russell's only object is socialistic propaganda."
Upon receiving this recommendation, Acting Secretary
6 7of State Polk consulted with the President, and notified 
Francis that the state Department agreed with him.
"Russell should return with /the/ diplomatic mission."88
85David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, July 3, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/5579, St. Dept.
88David R. Francis to Robert Lansing, July 7, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/5789, St. Dept.
®^Frank L. Polk to Woodrow Wilson, July 5, 1917,
Doc. No. 763.72/5680, St. Dept.
68Frank L. Polk to David R. Francis, July 7, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/5680, St. Dept.
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Inhere is no evidence that Russell was ever aware that 
Francis and Root and not the state Department opposed his 
remaining in Russia.
As late as July 6, three days before departure, 
Russell again introduced the topic of a press bureau and 
suggested that he be allowed to remain and “work on propa­
ganda.'1 Root's reply was that the Mission "could not 
entertain any such suggestion." Furthermore, because of 
Lansing's“cryptic remarks" about their publicity proposals,
the Mission "was done with the subject of publicity" which
69"was now up to Francis and the State Department."
Russell asked what the "commission's attitude" would be
if the Ambassador requested that he remain. Root replied
that "such a request would receive no answer." He added
that if any member of the Mission remained in Russia, such
action “must be taken strictly as an individual." The
Mission “could not have anything to do with such a 
70decision."
Russell was keenly disappointed and “strongly moved" 
to remain in Russia., even without official sanction. His 
decision to return with the others was based on his opinion 
that he was "under the State Department's orders" and was, 
therefore, not a "free agent." As he had requested specific
69"Russell Diary," July 6, 1917.
7°Ibid.
permission to remain and thought that the State Department 
had "failed to give that permission,“ he felt that he had
no choice but to return to the united States with the
71Mission. For all practical purposes this ended the 
Mission’s concern with a press bureau, although their 
recommendations were repeated in their official report as 
well as in a supplementary document.
Like Russell, all the other Mission members were 
obsessed with the idea that the Russian people would pursue 
the war if properly informed, thus solving the problem of 
retaining Russia as a belligerent. There is no way, how­
ever, to determine whether the proposed Propaganda Bureau 
would have had any effect. The Bolsheviks had seized 
power before Wilson's representative of the Committee on 
Public information finally arrived, in view of the 
rapidly changing political events in Russia, it is most 






Prom the beginning, Root had been anxious to keep
the length of the Mission trip to a minimum. Following his
visit to Stavka, he grew anxious to return to the united
States. Had it not been for the delay in General Scott's
tour of the Russian Front, the Mission would have left for
the united States earlier than it did. On June 30, Root
informed the state Department of his plans to leave Petro-
Lgrad on July 9. Scott had been instructed to return to
Petrograd by that time so as not to delay the departure
date. When Scott confirmed his return by July 9, Root
notified the Russian Foreign Minister so that arrangements
for the departure could be made. Root explained to his
host that he could "best promote the interest of both
2countries by returning to Washington without delay."
Root was also prompted to leave petrograd by the 
hesitancy of the State Department to respond favorably to 
his request for the creation of a propaganda bureau. Colonel
& ^Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, June 30, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/5771, St. Dept.
2Elihu Root to Michael Tereshchenko, July 3, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.
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Mott Later recalled that Root, anxious to start for home
as soon as Scott returned from the Front, had stated, "We
receive no replies to our telegrams and our staying here
under such conditions is useless, perhaps by going to
3Washington in person we can get some action."
Charles F. Crane remained in Russia to observe the 
changes in the Russian Church and to attend the F.ussian 
Constituent Assembly, due to meet in the fall.^ Colonel 
Judson also remained behind. Disappointed at what he con­
sidered the too brief trip, he had requested permission to 
stay.5 After consulting Root and Ambassador Francis, Scott 
relieved Judson from duty as military attache to the Mission 
and assigned him to the American Embassy in the same capac­
ity.^
On its last day in petrograd the Mission made a 
round of farewells and took photographs. Some of the
3Mott, Twenty Years, 208.
^"McCormick Diary," July 9, 1917.
^William V. Judson to Mrs. William V. Judson, June 2, 
1917, William V. Judson Papers, Box 4.
6Judson was to serve as chief of the American Mili­
tary Mission to Russia as well as the military representative 
in connection with American supplies to Russia. Hugh L.
Scott to Secretary of War, July 9, 1917, William V. Judson 
Papers, Box 4; and Hugh L. Scott to William V. Judson,
July 9, 1917, Hugh L. Scott papers, Box 1 (Princeton, Univer­
sity Library, Princeton, N. J.).
members bought souvenirs and gifts, others enjoyed a visit
to the Alexander H I  Art Gallery, which was opened especially
7for the members of the Mission. Shortly before midnight,
twenty-seven days after their arrival in the Russian capital
the Mission gathered at the terminal where they boarded the
0same train which had brought them to Petrograd. For the
next twelve days the Tsar's special train returned along
the same route it had traveled four weeks earlier.
For the most part, the journey was uneventful and
afforded each member of the Mission time to prepare the
reports requested by their Chairman. The one notable break
in the routine occurred on the second day near thd town of
Viatka. When the group arrived on the morning of July 11,
they learned that there would be a short delay, as a bridge
five miles ahead had been destroyed by fire. The stop,
gfirst estimated at twelve hours, stretched to thirty.
After spending the night on a siding, the group 
witnessed an incident the following morning when a fire 
destroyed a frame ice house near the main line of the 
track. Some members of the group mentioned the possibility 
that both fires were the work of German agents who wished 
to delay their return to the United States,10 but admitted
7"McCormick Diary,” July 9, 1917? and "Russell Diary 
July 9, 1917.
8 "Mission Log," 36.
9Ibid., 37.
10"McCormick Diary," July 12, 1917.
that they had no proof of this.11 At the time of the in­
cident, Russell wrote nothing in his diary to indicate 
that he thought it was part of a conspiracy. Years later, 
however, he attributed the incident to radicals and stated 
that "the Bolsheviks . . . burned a bridge in front of us 
with the pious hope that we should be wrecked, and when we
were blocked at Viatka by this incident, tried to set fire
12to the train." This provides a good example of the way 
in which Russell and other members of the Mission recog­
nized the Bolshevik threat only in retrospect, long after 
the November Revolution. The incident allowed members of 
the Mission to visit Viatka and provided a brief reprieve 
from their travels. McCormick and John Mott hired a 
"droshky" for some sightseeing and entered what they took 
to be a monastery in search of a cup of tea. To their
embarrassment, they found that they had in fact entered 
13a nunnery.
As the imperial Train made its way across Siberia, 
the group utilized the frequent stops to make speeches to 
gatherings and delegations of various officials. The
11Cyrus H. McCormick to Frederick Corse, July 11,
1917, Cyrus H. McCormick Papers, Subject File "Russia 1917- 
1920"; and Elihu Root to Erving Winslow, August 28, 1917, 
Elihu Root Papers, Box 138.
•^Russell, Bare Hands and Stone walls, 370.
■L3,*McCormick Diary," July 11,1917.
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speeches were usually given by Root and followed the same 
pattern he had used earlier: Congratulations on the new
freedom of the Russian people, expressions of friendship 
from the united States, and encouragement to continue the 
war effort, on July 14, Root spoke to a group of soldiers 
in the village of Nazuveskaya. He compared the recent 
revolution in Russia to the fall of the Bastille, perhaps 
because of the remote location of the village or his spon­
taneous enthusiasm, Root's remarks were less conservative
than usual and impressed the socialist member of the
14Mission as "surprisingly radical."
By July 19, the train had reached the Manchurian 
border. Customs officials found that someone had hidden 
20,000 rubles worth of opium aboard the train. There was 
some concern that this would cast a "reflection" on the 
Mission. However, the border officials explained that 
almost all express trains carried such smuggled cargo, and 
the Mission moved on without further delay. Shortly before 
noon on July 21, the trip came to an end at Vladivostok.
Root consulted with the American Consul, sent a parting
message to Tereshchenko, and the group boarded the Buffalo
X6for the return to the United States.-
^"Mission Log," 38; and "Russell Diary," July 14, 1917.
15"McCormick Diary," July 19, 1917.
16"Mission Log," 38-39; "McCormick Diary," July 17,
1917; and Elihu Root to Michael Tereshchenko, July 21,
1917, Elihu Root Papers, Box 192.
285
Before their departure from the united States, Root
had discussed with Secretary Lansing the possibility of
visiting Japah on the return trip. Lansing originally
favored such a trip, and Root left the united States with
17the impression that they were free to go. During the
stay in petrograd, Root cabled the State Department on two
occasions to ask for further instructions on the Japanese
18visit but received no reply. This led some members to 
conclude that the State Department was ignoring their re­
quest in the way it had their recommendations for a propa-
T Qganda bureaa.^ The State Department had in fact decided
that the Mission should return directly to Washington. The
Department indicated that such a trip would delay their
20report and therefore should not be taken. The truth was 
otherwise. Lansing had decided that "the possible diver­
gence of views" between Root and the administration made
21it "unwise for him to represent the Government" in Japan. 
Root did not receive Lansing's instructions
17Robert Lansing to Aimaro Sato, imperial Japanese 
Ambassador, May 15, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/4677%, St. Dept.
18Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, June 17, 1917, and 
July 2, 1917, Elihu Root Papers, Box 136.
19"McCormick Diary," July 16, 1917.
20Elihu Root to Baron Kaneko, July 21, 1917, Doc.
No. 763.72/7487, St. Dept.; and The New York Times, July 12, 
1917, 6 .
21Robert Lansing to Woodrow Wilson, July 5, 1917, 
Doc. No. 763.72/5737%, St. Dept.
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pertaining to the Japanese visit until July 19, only two 
days before their arrival in Vladivostok. The message, 
forwarded to the Mission by the American Consul at Vladi­
vostok, informed Root that the state Department considered
a trip to China or Japan "inadvisable" and instructed them
22to return home directly. The Mission also learned from
the consul that an American Red cross Commission headed by
Dr. Frank Billings was due to arrive the following day.
Root decided to meet with the group and offer information
23which might be helpful in their work. When Root learned
that the Commission would arrive later than expected, he
decided to delay their return no longer and left a letter
24for the chairman of the Commission.
The two weeks required to make the voyage from 
Vladivostok to Seattle offered the Mission an opportunity 
to complete their notes and to prepare the final draft of 
their reports. The trip was without incident. The only 
delay occurred on July 23 when heavy fog required the vessel 
to drop anchor for approximately eight hours until the fog
22"McCormick Diary," July 19, 1917; and Robert 
Lansing to Elihu Root, July 7, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5425, 
St. Dept.
23"McCormick Diary," July 18, 1917.
2^"McCormick Diary," July 21, 1917; and Elihu Root 
to Dr. Frank Billings, July 21, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/
7487, St. Dept.
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25lifted. on Sunday, July 29, the Buffalo crossed the
26180th meridian. After two weeks at sea, the lights of
Seattle were spotted at 9:00 p.m. on August 3. An hour
later the vessel was at anchor in the port. '
The following morning the members of the Mission
were given a tour of the city followed by a luncheon with
27the Seattle Chamber of Commerce. When asked if the 
Mission--would be permitted to accept such an invitation, 
the State Department had left the decision to Root.28
The Mission boarded a special train on the after­
noon of August 4 for the last leg of their trip and arrived
in Washington on the morning of August 8 . They were met at
the station by Polk of the state Department and retired to 
hotels where they rested briefly before presenting their
OQreports that afternoon.  ̂ Secretary Lansing had a "long 
conference" with Root and another with the entire Mission 
that afternoon. Later in the same day, the group met
25"Mission Log," 39-40; and "Russell Diary," July 
23, 1917.
28|,McCormick Diary," July 29, 1917.
27"Mission Log," 41-42.
28Prank L‘. Polk to Senator Miles Poindexter, July
26, 1917, Doc. No. 763.72/5966, St. Dept.
29,,Mission Log," 42; and "McCormick Diary,"
August 8, 1917.
30"Lansing Diary," August 9, 1917.
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with President Wilson for approximately two hours and
31presented their evaluations to him.
The written report of the Root Mission, signed by 
all members except Crane who had remained in Russia, was 
submitted to Secretary Lansing shortly after their arrival 
in Washington. Although the document was twenty-nine pages 
long, a large portion was devoted to their journey and, to 
a certain extent, duplicated the "Mission Log." One 
impressive feature of the report —  and one thing that 
impressed Secretary of State Lansing - was its extremely 
optimistic tone. Root felt that the Mission had been suc­
cessful. He believed that the group had "contributed 
materially to strengthening the provisional government,"
and he concluded that "the situation is certainly much
„ 32more stable and hopeful than it was when we arrived."
Root and his colleagues directed their.attention 
to four basic areas: the problem of transportation, the
ability of the Russians to continue their military effort, 
the political stability of the Provisional Government, and 
the recommendations of the Mission. The report recognized
3*"Hugh L. Scott to William V. Judson, August 14, 
1917, William V. Judson Papers, Box 4; and Samuel R.
Bertron to Edward M. House, August 13, 1917, Edward M.
House papers, Drawer 3.
32Elihu Root to Robert Lansing, July 10, 1917,
Hugh L. Scott Papers, Box 1 {Princeton University Library, 
Princeton, N.J.).
the necessity of improved transportation as "the fundamen­
tal material need of Russia for the prosecution of the War. 
Root realized that there were not enough vessels to carry 
the necessary war material from the united States to Russia 
"The supplies to be actually furnished by the United States 
to Russia cannot possibly be more than a small part of the 
total amount called for." The report directed Secretary 
Lansing's attention to the problem of rail transportation 
within Russia, an area to be investigated in more detail 
by the Stevens Commission. The report explained, howevey, 
that without exception, all requests from Russian civilian
and military leaders were prefaced with the plea that some-
*thing be done to secure equipment for the Russian rail
system. Basing their opinion on their own observations
and on conversations with members of the Stevens Commission
members of the Root Mission agreed that assistance to the
33Russian railway system should be given first priority.
As to whether or not the Russian government would 
continue the war, the report contained no doubts whatso­
ever: "We are satisfied' that the provisional Government
of Russia intends to continue the war and has no intention
34of making a separate peace." Mission members recognized, 




and it was their conclusion in this area which proved to 
be totally inaccurate. The report briefly described the 
political events of the past two months but concluded that 
the Provisional Government had been able to stabilize its 
power. in summarizing their view of the political ques­
tion, the Report stated:
It is the unanimous opinion of the Mission that 
the Russian people have the qualities of character 
which will make it possible to restore discipline, 
and coherent and intelligently directed action, 
both in military and civil life . . . _/w/e have 
little doubt that they will be able to establish 
and maintain successfully free self-government on 
a great scale. Such a development, however, cannot 
be accomplished in a day; time is essential; but 
they are moving now with a rapidity which is quiteextraordinary.35
The report did not make specific recommendations 
for financial assistance to Russia. It did, however, 
strongly advise "giving substantial aid to Russia in a 
large way." It gave as justification the following ob­
servation:
With such aid /there/ is a strong probability of 
keeping Russia in _the war and the Russian Army in 
the field . . . /r/here is little prospect that 
Russia can be kept in the war and the Russian Army 
in the field without such aid . . . .  The benefit 
of keeping Russia in the war and its army in the 
field will be so enormous that the risk involved 
in rendering the aid required should not be 
seriously considered.36




by the entire committee, three additional reports which 
dealt with the Army, the Navy, and financial conditions 
were presented. General Scott prepared a report on the 
military situation in Russia and submitted it to the secre­
tary of war. Scott began with the observation that the 
most serious problem which the Russian Army faced was that 
of railway transportation. He explained that all Russian 
military leaders with whom he talked began their discussion 
with a plea for the immediate shipment of locomotives and 
railway cars. Scott agreed with the urgency of the request 
and stated, "Unless the railroads be soon rendered more
efficient, Russia's military strength will no longer be
37of much avail in this war."
General Scott explained that upon their arrival in 
Russia the Mission members were shocked at the military 
situation. They were amazed by the large crowds of sol­
diers standing, with no apparent purpose, around train 
stations. Scott felt that this was a result of the sol­
diers' desire to test their new-found freedom. He described
the situation as "individual liberty run mad, an orgy of
* 38do-as-you-please." He also reported his observation that
upon his arrival in Russia, more troop trains were traveling 
away from the Front than toward it. Along the same route 
six weeks later, however, he witnessed a "considerable
37"Scott Report," 2.
3QIbid., 9.
change." He observed "fewer men in uniforms crowding the
stations and the trains going toward the front were fre-
39quent and filled with men returning to their duty."
This change he attributed to "orders and appeals from the
government." Recognizing that the situation was not yet
ideal the General believed it "important to note that
40these orders are being increasingly obeyed." included 
in his report was his observation that the nearer one came 
to the military Front, the greater the degree of military 
discipline one observed, and "the further one went from 
the workmen and their committees the better conditions 
became."
The question of desertion from the ranks he recog­
nized as a serious one. Scott placed the estimate at 
one and one-half million desertees. Nevertheless, he 
was optimistic and stated that they were "slowly filtering 
back. 1,41 in his opinion, the answer to the desertion 
problem rested with the government's ability to enforce 
its authority, and Scott thought that "the tide /Had7 now 
set in that direction and if not checked by some new in­
fluence /would7 slowly grow stronger."42 To Scott, the
39Ibid., 1 0.
4 0 Ibid.
4 1Ibid., 1 1 .
42Ibid.
most significant indication of the political and military 
stability was the Russian advance of July 1st. He saw 
the advance as a test to determine whether the Russian 
troops would obey their commanders or retreat. He ex­
plained that "the most they expected was /to7 prove to 
Russia and to America that the army would and could fight. 
If this were indeed true, the July advance served its 
purpose. Scott returned from the Front confident that 
the Russian Army was capable of maintaining its position 
along the Eastern Front.
In concluding >:his report, Scott emphasized the 
need to retain Russia as a belligerent:
If she remains in, the war will be all of a year 
shorter and our victory assured. If she goes out, no 
one can predict how long it will take to conquer 
Germany, and there arises a clear possibility that 
it cannot be done at all . . .  I therefore believe 
it is worth to us a great sum of money to keep 
Russia even passively in the war . . . for the 
dangers attending her withdrawal are too great for 
any haggling to be admitted.44
Admiral Glennon also submitted a report of his ob­
servations. Unlike General Scott, Glennon found little 
that encouraged him. He described the conditions in 
Sevastopol as "far from satisfactory." Glennon reported 
that each ship was controlled by committees which included 




outnumbered their officers by a ratio of approximately 
five to one. in theory, these committees dealt with the 
"internal life of the ship" and had "no control over 
military matters." Glennon found, however, that "officers 
dare not give orders to their men" and that "all drills 
and preparations for battle have ceased except to the 
degree desired by the men." The result was that "a con­
dition of profound distrust exists between officers and
men," with many of the "ablest officers" refusing to accept
45the responsibility of their positions.
It was Glennon's opinion that conditions in other 
Russian ports were not as bad as in Sevastopol. Though he 
refrained from making judgment on what he had observed, 
nothing in his report indicated that he had been encouraged 
by anything he had seen. Even when listing the requests 
made by the Russian Navy, Glennon made no personal recom­
mendations,46 but his omission of any encouraging remark 
made his report unique.
Bertron and McCormick reported on the financial 
situation, which they described as "undoubtedly serious."
The total indebtedness of Russia stood at twenty-nine billion 
rubles, and government expenses for 1917 were estimated at 




and a Liberty Loan of three billion, the resulting deficit
47would run to over twenty billion. They also stated that 
the value of the ruble had declined to such extent that 
it was worth less than one half its par value. They men­
tioned the fact that England was attempting to raise the 
value of the ruble by purchases in the international money 
markets. They felt that this was of no lasting consequence 
and advised the United. States government against a similar 
action.48
The most important part of their report consisted 
of a list prepared by the Minister of Finance of seventy- 
eight items requested by the Russians. The items would 
cost an estimated $1,276,000,000 and would require approxi­
mately three and one-half tons of cargo space, in view of 
the shortage of available cargo vessels, the Minister of 
Finance had listed the items according to preference. 
Bertron and McCormick recommended that their government 
carefully review and grant these requests if it expected 
Russia "to maintain an effective fighting force. . . .
7r7he action our Government takes in this question will be
an important factor in maintaining the present Provisional 
49Government."




The report of the Root Mission was one of extreme 
optimism. A careful reading of the document leaves the 
impression that the Provisional Government would maintain 
a position of control in Russia. Secretary Lansing was 
amazed at the report and the day after receiving it re­
corded a lengthy evaluation in his diary:
The Root Mission, excepting Charles R. crane, have 
arrived and I had a long interview with them yesterday 
preceded by one in the morning with Mr. Root alone.
I am astounded at their optimism. I cannot see upon 
what it is founded. When I expressed doubts as to 
Kerensky's personal force and ability to carry through 
his plans in view of the strong opposition developing 
against him, they assured me that everything would 
come out all right and that Russia would continue the 
war against the central Powers with even greater 
vigor than under the czar.
X hope they are right and I presume they know more 
about it than I do, and yet in spite of What they say 
I am very skeptical about Kerensky. He compromises 
too much with the radical element of the Revolution.
From the first X have felt that the attempt being 
made to harmonize the radicals and moderates in Russia 
would be a failure, but X confess that the confident 
tone of Mr. Root and colleagues has shaken, thought 
it has not removed, my doubts . . .  in my judgment 
the demoralized state of affairs will grow worse and 
worse until some dominant personality arises to end 
it all.
I may be all wrong about this. I hope I am. Mr. 
Root and his colleagues may be entirely right. I 
hope they are. The present Government may develop 
into a constitutional democratic government; it may 
become stronger, suppress radicalism, and make society 
safe from lawlessness. Yet the logic of events in my 
opinion does not warrant such hopes.
I naturally hesitate to set up my judgment against 
so experienced and wise a statesman as Elihu Root, 
especially after he has been on the ground floor and 
in contact with the forces at work in Russia, but even 
taking his statements as accurate I cannot agree in the 
conclusions which he reached.5
50"Lansing Diary," August 9, 1917.
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Root did not include in his report the recommen­
dation for a comprehensive propaganda bureau, although 
the creation Of such a bureau was the one thing for which 
there was unanimous support from the Mission. Without 
exception# they felt that this was the most constructive 
thing which could be done to assist Russia and the war 
effort. When Root submitted the report, h'e explained 
that he would not repeat recommendations already made.
He later told his biographer: "I was in doubt as to whether
to put in my report what was in the dispatches, but I felt
that I shouldn't make a record against the president who 
51appointed me." Root was probably reluctant to suggest 
the bureau again, since repeated dispatches to the State 
Department had brought no authorization to begin work in 
that area.
Finally, and at the request of President Wilson,
Russell and John R. Mott prepared a supplementary report
52describing such a bureau. Their report included the
major points that had already been suggested and proposed
S3an annual budget of five and one-half million dollars. J 
The President turned the report over to George Creel,
51-jessup, Ellhu Root, II, 367.
52Baker, Wilson Letters, VII, 208; and "Russell 
Diary," August 13, 1917.
53"Russell Diary," August 13, 1917.
Chairman of the Committee on Public Information. Creel 
drastically reduced the project in size and suggested a 
budget of $810,000. He eliminated many of the Mission's 
recommendations with such remarks as "this is a half-baked 
suggestion" and "this suggestion is interesting in theory 
but mighty dangerous in practice." in concluding his 
evaluation, Creel stated that the project "lies entirely 
within the province of the Committee on Public informa­
tion . . . .  I do not think the State Department should 
have anything to do with it at all."^5 The President
agreed with Creel, and the task of establishing a propa-
56ganda bureau was delegated to his agency. There was
considerable delay in sending a representative of the
Creel Committee to Russia. Edgar c .  Sisson was finally
sent, but he arrived after the Bolsheviks had seized 
57power.
Wilson's decision to place the proposed Russian
54"Russell Diary," August 17, 1917? and George 
Creel to Woodrow Wilson, /August 267, 1917, George Creel 
Papers, Box 3. (Division of Manuscripts, Library of 
Congress).
^George Creel to Wbodrow Wilson /^ugust 207,
1917, George Creel Papers, Box 3.
56Edgar Sisson, one Hundred Red Days; A personal 
Chronicle of the Bolshevik Revolution (Hew Haven, Conn.: 
Yale university Press, 1931), 4.
57George creel, Rebel at Large; Recollections 
of Fifty Crowded Years (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1947),
176.
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propaganda agency in the hands of Creel removed it from 
the jurisdiction of the State Department. The members of 
the Root Mission had assumed that any such project would 
be handled by the State Department and were disappointed 
by Wilson's decision. Apparently, there existed a degree 
of distrust between the Chairman of the Committee on 
Public Information and the head of the State Department 
which made it difficult for the two men to work together 
harmoniously, in a note dated June 29, George Creel 
indicated the degree of hostility that existed between the 
two men:
Mr. Lansing, a dull, small man, bitterly resented 
my chairmanship of the committee, and made himself so 
unpleasant at the first meeting that I never called 
another. As a consequence, he refused to work with 
the Committee, and did everything that he could, in 
his mean, cheap way, to hinder and embarrass.53
Following the presentation of their reports and
the assignment of their propaganda recommendations to
George Creel, the work of the Mission finally ended.
Secretary Lansing continued to confer with various members
59of the Mission, but as the days passed most of the mem­
bers began to feel that their services were no longer 
desired and, in fact, were resented. Years later, Elihu 
Root wrote: "Wilson didn't want to accomplish any thing.
53George creel papers. Box 1.
"Lansing Desk Diary," August 9-30, 1917.
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It was a grand-stand play. He wanted to show his sympathy 
for the Russian Revolution. When we delivered his message
and made our speeches, he was satisfied; that's all he
^  „60 wanted."
Before examining the failures of the Mission, it 
is well to note the extent to which the group accomplished 
what it was sent to do. A major purpose of the Mission 
was to extend to the Russian people congratulations upon 
their recent revolution and to assure the Russian govern­
ment of American goodwill as well as material support. 
Ambassador Root and other members of the Mission took 
every conceivable opportunity, whether before a small 
group of soldiers gathered at some remote Siberian siding 
or before a gathering of the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets, to speak to the Russian people and deliver their 
President’s message. Today, one can easily see that a 
war-weary Russia would not be receptive to such speeches, 
which had as their major theme a plea for the continua­
tion of the war. There is no evidence, however, that 
President Wilson or the State Department found any fault 
in what the men said, and the speeches of Root and his 
group sound much like the speeches of President Wilson 
and other, government officials of that period.
60Elihu Root to Philip C. Jessup, September 16, 
1930, quoted in Jessup, Ellhu Root, II, 356.
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There is little to criticize with respect to the 
Mission's attempt to determine and report the material 
needs of the Russian Government. Members of the Mission 
held long and frequent conferences with Russian civilian 
and military leaders to determine these needs anddily 
presented the Russian requests to the American govern­
ment. Nor can Root or any other member be censured for 
a lack of enthusiasm or for any reluctance to perform 
his task to the best of his ability. Rather, the evidence 
reveals that every member of the Mission appreciated the 
seriousness of the task.
These minor successes are overwhelmed by the 
Mission's shortcomings. The most serious failure of the 
Mission was its evaluation of the stability of the pro­
visional Government and the ability of that government to 
keep Russia in the war. It would be unrealistic to expect 
that Root and his colleagues could have altered in any way 
the course of the political movements in Russia. It is 
not unreasonable, however, to have expected a more accurate 
evaluation of events in Russia. That these men were unable 
to provide such information was primarily the result of 
President Wilson's method of handling foreign affairs and 
his personal choice of Mission members.
The Root Mission provides an excellent example of 
Wilsonian Diplomacy in action. Many of the weaknesses
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attributed to Wilson, the diplomat, are revealed in this 
study. Two problems confronted the Root Mission, and both 
were beyond their control. The first difficulty was the 
official policy of the United States toward the Russian 
Provisional Government. It was an unrealistic policy
with little hope of success. The second factor was Wilson*s
61attitude toward revolutions in general.
Historians who have studied President Wilson in 
his role as diplomat have found several serious flaws in 
his technique of conducting foreign affairs, one such 
deficiency was his tendency to rely almost exclusively 
upon special commissions, thereby bypassing the State 
Department and revealing distrust of the diplomatic corps.
In dealing with the Provisional Government, Wilson utilized 
three such groups, in addition to the Root Mission, he 
sent the Stevens Commission to determine the railroad 
needs of Russia, and a Red Cross Commission. These over­
lapping commissions taxed a government already faced with 
the very difficult and time-consuming task of consolidating 
its control. It also led to misunderstandingsbetween the 
Root Mission and the Stevens Commission.
Apparently, Wilson relied upon missions to indulge 
his penchant for the dramatic. Although he ostensibly 
sent out missions to obtain vital information, he conveniently
S^-See chapter I above.
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ignored and usually failed to act upon their reports and
/
recommendations. This was especially true with respect 
to. the Hoot Mission's advocacy of a large-scale propaganda 
bureau, in addition, the President also tended to ignore 
Mission members after receiving their initial reports.
Possibly his greatest failing was his apparent 
inability to explain in a satisfactory manner the purpose 
of the Mission. Root conferred privately with Wilson 
prior to his departure for Russia, but it is perfectly 
obvious from the conversations between Root and his colleagues 
that there was never a thorough explanation of what the group 
was expected to accomplish.
To these defects in Wilson's conduct of foreign 
affairs must be added the selection of the members of the 
Root Mission. Historians have deemed the choice of con­
servative Republican Elihu Root as chairman of such a 
group as a most unwise decision which is difficult to 
explain.62 Both the French and British governments had 
selected socialists, who were also cabinet members, to greet 
the new Russian government. While it is irrational to expect 
Wilson to have selected a socialist, it is perplexing that 
he ultimately chose a man whose political views were
62Warth, Allies And The Russian Revolution, 98;
Kennan, Soviet American Relations',' I, £l; and William 
Appleman Williams, American Russian Relations, 1781-1947 
(New York: Rinehart and Company, 1952),87.
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considerably more conservative than were his own. That 
Root's ideas differed greatly from those of the Adminis­
tration is revealed in a letter to President Wilson from 
Secretary Lansing. Lansing strongly suggested that Root 
be denied the opportunity of consulting with the Chinese 
government on the return trip., since his views were not 
representative of the Administration. Thus arises the 
question of whether Root should have been chosen to sym­
bolize the Wilson Administration in any capacity.
Probably, Root was selected in order to give a 
bipartisan character to the Mission. Wilson was not 
unaware of the frequent suggestion that he create a 
coalition cabinet for the duration of the war, as the 
British and French had done. The selection of such a 
prominent Republican to head the Mission was perhaps a 
gesture in this direction. Few Americans questioned 
Root's ability. Many Russians, however, looked upon 
Wilson's selection of Root as an affront which, inciden­
tally, was pointed out by one American socialist even 
before the Mission left America. Root's political con­
servatism no doubt rendered him incapable of comprehending 
the significance of the Russian Revolution.
The other Mission members were also inappropriate. 
General Scott was probably chosen in order to vacate the 
position of Chief of Staff and provide Wilson the oppor­
tunity to fill it with a more competent man. In doing
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this, however, the President sent to Russia a raconteur 
who entertained his colleagues with anecdotes about the 
American West but who was totally incapable of under­
standing the Russian military situation. Admiral Glennon 
was the other representative of the military. Unfortunate­
ly, his major qualification seems to have been that he was 
inferior to Scott in rank. He was, however, equal in his 
inability to perceive the crisis confronting the Russian 
military.
Cyrus McCormick was no doubt selected because of 
his many contacts throughout Russia, the result of exten­
sive investments during recent years by International 
Harvester Company. His personal friendship with the 
President also played a part. McCormick's business con­
nections in Russia afforded him the seemingly distinct 
advantage of calling upon international Harvester personnel 
for advice. With regard to the worth of their opinions, 
however, the Mission would have been better served had 
this source of information not been available, in view 
of McCormick's quite sizable financial investment in 
Russia, the possibility of a conflict of interests presents 
itself. An example is provided in the list of items re­
quested by the Russians in the report prepared jointly by 
McCormick and Bertron. Agricultural equipment, including 
harvesters, was near the top of the list of seventy-eight
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items arranged in order of their priority, enumerated 
even before weapons and ammunition.
Charles Crane's reputation, apparently undeserved, 
of being well-informed about Russian institutions and 
therefore capable of understanding the Russian situation, 
led to his appointment. Crane, however, was so emotionally 
committed to the leadership of the First Provisional Govern­
ment, especially Miliukov, that he was blind to the possi­
bility of Russia's being effectively governed by any other 
group, and could foresee nothing but chaos if Miliukov's 
group lost control.
Duncan, the representative of American Labor, was 
also an unfortunate choice. The aging labor leader spent 
all of his time trying to persuade his Russian counterparts 
to withhold or delay labor demands, a singularly absurd 
approach. Although well in touch with the sentiments of 
American labor, he failed to recognize the growing 
radicalism of Russian labor, and, consequently, made no 
effective attempt to deal with it.
Charles Russell, emissary of American socialism, 
was also a poor choice. Not only was he out of step with 
the group he was chosen to represent, but had been ousted 
from the party by the time the Mission arrived in Russia. 
There is no evidence to indicate that banker Samuel Bertron 
or Y. M. C. A. President John Mott were any more or less
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capable than were their colleagues. Thus did President 
Wilson round out a roost distinguished though incompetent 
delegation.
It is woefully apparent that President Wilson and 
Secretary of State Lansing selected men who were unprepared 
and consequently unqualified for the task which lay ahead 
of them. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Mission 
presented a report Which recognized some degree of political 
instability but concluded that the Provisional Government 
would be able to maintain political power and continue as 
an effective belligerent. Yet, three months later, the 
Bolsheviks seized control in petrograd and drove from the 
capital that government in which Hoot and his colleagues 
had expressed almost complete confidence.
Years later, Robert Lansing insisted that the Bol­
shevik Revolution "did not take the Department of State by 
63surprise." He explained, however:
In view of the favorable report of the Root Mission 
and the convictions expressed by the American Com­
missioners that the Kerensky Government was sufficient­
ly stable to deal successfully with the situation . . . 
there was no practical course for this government to 
take other than with loans, experts, and publicity to 
assist Premier Kerensky in his endeavors to keep con­
trol and bring order out of disorder.®4
Thus, the optimistic report of the Root Mission failed to
indicate to the state Department the true conditions in
Russia and gave no warning of the Bolshevik takeover. Yet,
6 3Lansing, War Memoirs, 338.
64Ibid., 338-339.
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even after the Mission's report proved invalid, Lansing
continued to defend its members as "very able men" who
were "as capable of judging the situation and giving
65advice as any thxs government could have sent out."
This leads to only one conclusion. If the members of the 
Mission were incapable of making a valid judgment, and 
they obviously were, the responsibility for their selection, 
and the method by which they were selected, belong to 
President Wilson and secretary of State Lansing. The 
failure of the Root Mission was also the failure of the 
Wilson Administration.
One serious problem which the Mission faced while 
in Russia was the lack of a sufficient number of inter­
preters. Although the Mission staff included a large 
number of clerks, none spoke Russian. This was the 
fault of the state Department and did not result from a 
shortage of suitable applicants for the positions. State 
Department files as well as the private papers of Mission 
members contain hundreds of letters of application from 
apparently qualified persons. Breckenridge Long of the 
State Department was in charge of arrangements for the 
group and handled appointments as well. Unfortunately, 
the staff was chosen because of political connections, not 
facility in Russian. It is impossible to state accurately
65"Lansing Diary," December 7, 1917.
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how this lack of sufficient translators hampered the work 
of the Mission although several of its members complained 
bitterly about this' problem, on some occasions, they 
felt that their speeches had been altered deliberately.
More than once, Russell felt that an interpreter whom he 
had hired in petrograd had, for political reasons, de­
liberately misquoted him. Another possible motive might 
have been that the Russians were reluctant to repeat un­
pleasant remarks to their American guests upon whom so 
much depended. That the interpreters were remiss in their 
duties can be seen in numerous reports from American 
journalists living in Petrograd.
perhaps the most serious error made by the Mission 
was its tendency to limit conferences to representatives 
of the Provisional Government and to the conservative 
supporters of that government. During their first few 
days in Russia, the Mission came in contact with Russian 
and American army officers and businessmen, all of con­
servative hue. When they arrived in petrograd, most of 
their contacts were still with the conservative elements. 
Because of his official position and his attitude as to what 
constituted correct procedure, Root restricted his dis­
cussions almost exclusively to officials of the Provisional 
Government and personnel of the American and Allied embas­
sies. In addition to government officials, McCormick and
Bertron met with a large number of conservative bankers 
and businessmen who gave strong support tc the Provisional 
Government. For the most part, Mott and Crane met with 
conservative church leaders, whereas Glennon and Scott con­
ferred with military officers of the same political per­
suasion. Even Duncan, the representative of American 
Labor, had no contact with the radical factory committees. 
Charles Russell was the only Mission member who deliberate­
ly sought out and tried to understand the petrograd Soviet. 
It is significant that Russell alone detected the very real 
power which was possessed by that revolutionary body. It 
is also evident that he comprehended the provisional Govern­
ment's weakness, one searches in vain, however, for any 
evidence that he came close to a true understanding of the 
"dual power" shared by the Provisional Government and the 
Soviet. Russell was clearly the only member of the Mission 
who made any attempt to understand the revolutionary bodies 
in Russia and came far closer than did any of his colleagues 
to an understanding of the situation. Unfortunately and 
inexcusably,Russell failed to emphasize any of this in his 
written report, and there is no evidence that his observa­
tions were reported to the State Department in any way.
It is difficult to understand how the group could 
have remained in the Russian capital for almost one month 
and yet have received such a distorted view of the realities
of the situation. Several factors, however, partially 
explain the situation. The Provisional Government obvious­
ly tried to shelter the group from actuality. The lengthy 
and useless official receptions, which led more than one 
member to conclude that they were wasting their time, were 
designed to give the illusion of stability and occupy the 
members’ time. It is significant that American journalists 
who were living in Petrograd in the summer of 1917 wrote 
of the difficulty of obtaining enough food and emphasized 
that the food shortages could present serious problems 
for the Provisional Government. But the Mission, well- 
provisioned with food and drink, was evidently unaware 
that there was a shortage of bread in the Russian capital.
The group should have obtained some insight about the 
situation from Ambassador Francis, unfortunately, Francis 
was as unaware of what was going on as was the Root 
Mission. Their mutual ignorance tended to reenforce the 
misconceptions which all held, only after the Bolshevik 
Revolution did Francis fully comprehend the situation.
Another error committed by all members of the Mission 
was their tendency to compare Russia with the United States. 
Duncan, when speaking before the All-Russian Congress of 
Soviets, attempted to explain how the American labor move­
ment functioned. For example, he suggested that labor 
could obtain its ends by placing "union" labels in consumer
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products, as American labor did. Thus, the vice-president 
of the American Federation of Labor was trying to intro­
duce selective buying as a means of strengthening labor at 
the same time the Bolshevik party was working through the 
factory committees to seize control of the manufacturing 
plants.
Probably the greatest error the Mission made in 
comparing Russia with the United States was their belief 
that the Russians would be as enthusiastic as the Ameri­
cans were in pursuing the war. For example, the suggestion 
to tour several Russian cities was prompted by a recent and 
successful tour of American cities by representatives of 
the French and British governments. Having just entered 
the war, Americans responded enthusiastically to the 
Allied representatives. Members of the Root Mission 
expected the same response from the Russians. Apparently, 
Russell was once more the only one who realized that the
i
Russian people were sick of the war. He was also alone 
in his realization that the public demonstrations on July 
1 supported the Soviets far more enthusiastically than 
they did the provisional Government, one can only surmise 
that Russell's failure to include such pertinent observa­
tions in his individual report resulted from a reluctance 
to contradict the Mission report.
Another factor which perhaps helps explain why the
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Mission had such a distorted view of the Russian condition 
was the very timing of their visit. When the decision to 
send the Root Mission to Russia was made, the original 
members of the Provisional Government were in power, on 
the day the group left the United States, a new cabinet, 
the First Coalition, was formed. This government remained 
in power throughout their stay in Petrograd, a period of 
relative calm, and was replaced by the Second Coalition 
several days after the Mission left Petrograd. Strangely, 
this shift in power in no way led the group to question 
the stability of the Provisional Government but, on the 
contrary, had the opposite effect, perhaps it was because 
they had been told by virtually every observer upon their 
arrival in Russia that the Cabinet changes, especially the 
elevation of Kerensky to Minister of War, would enhance 
the war effort. During the course of their visit, vir­
tually every Mission member was impressed by Kerensky 
who, they felt, could save Russia. Consequently, as they 
traveled across Siberia en route to Vladivostok and learned 
of the creation of a new cabinet following the July Days —  
a cabinet, incidentally, in which Kerensky was the Prime 
Minister —  they thought this a good sign. The members of 
the Root Mission interpreted Kerensky's subsequent action 
against the Bolshevik Party,»as evidence of his willingness 
to suppress the radical anti-war forces and felt that this
would bring about a politically stable situation.
Perhaps most difficult to understand is the 
Mission's optimistic report on the military situation. 
General Scott based his report almost entirely upon the 
July 1st offensive. Up to that time, his diary and letters 
make it obvious that Scott was extremely disappointed in 
what he had seen of the Russian military. After his brief 
visit to the Russian Front on the first day of the offen­
sive, however, he altered his viewpoint drastically. After 
July 1, Scott's diary and letters reflect his optimism. 
Since this was the first time Scott had witnessed modern 
warfare, he can perhaps be pardoned for not realizing 
that he had seen a limited success which would be reversed 
in a few days. It is impossible, however,.to even specu­
late as to why he insisted six weeks later in his report 
to the Secretary of War that the Russian army was in good 
condition. By then, it was apparent to all that the July 
offensive had been broken after only a few days and that 
the German armies had regained all the territory tempo­
rarily lost.
From the beginning, Mission members labored under 
the misconception that all that was necessary to strengthen 
the Provisional Government, and through it the Russian war 
effort, was an explanation to the Russian people of the 
necessity of pursuing the war. T̂ his solution was always
stressed in the dispatches from petrograd and in the final 
report as well as in the diaries and letters of the members. 
Charles Russell perhaps placed more faith in this technique 
than did anyone else. Hi is idea eventually evolved into a 
recommendation that the united States government finance 
an agency in Russia to publicize and promote a vigorous 
prosecution of the war. Without exception, all the members 
felt that if the Russian people were told why they should 
continue the war, all agitation for an early or separate 
peace, which they considered to be German inspired, would 
cease. The establishment of a "propaganda bureau" became 
an obsession with some of the Mission members. They were 
so sure that this must be done that they could not under­
stand how anyone could even question it. Consequently, 
when Lansing responded to their first request for such a 
bureau with the vague reply that it was being carefully 
considered, the members were sorely disappointed. When 
the President turned the suggestion over to George Creel, 
it seemed to the disappointed members of the Mission that 
their most constructive, suggestion had been cast aside.
one would think that in the many pages of the 
lengthy reports, in the hundreds of letters, and in the de­
tailed diaries that somewhere, even if by accident, some 
member would have recorded a prediction that would prove 
to be true. Such is not the case. Of what value, then.
was the Mission? Very little, if any. The lengthy reports 
were outdated when they were finally presented and were 
immediately questioned hy the Secretary of State, with the 
exception of obtaining limited credit for Russia, which the 
United States would have extended anyway as long as the 
Russian army was in the field, the Mission achieved nothing. 
There is no evidence that the Mission influenced American 
foreign policy in any way. The report of the Root Mission 
succeeded only in creating a false impression of the stability 
of the Provisional Government. Thus, when the Bolshevik 
Revolution overthrew the government, the state Department 
was in an even poorer position to deal with the realities 
of Russian politics. Because of the way the State Depart-: 
ment was misguided in its attempt to establish an effective 
policy toward Russia, it would have been preferable had the 
Root Mission never made the journey.
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